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OPSOMMING
Die studie het sy oorsprong in die groeiende behoefte aan inligtingstelsels wat as 'veilig'
beskou kan word. Met die toenemende gebruik van rekenaargesteunde sagteware
ingenieurswese hulpmiddels ('CASE-tools') in die ontwerp van toepassingstelsels vir
kornmersiele gebruik, het die risiko's wat daar bestaan in terme van inligtingsekuriteit, al hoe
meer prominent geword.
Dit word al hoe belangriker om sekuriteit in ag te neem tydens die analise en ontwerp van 'n
stelsel, m.a.w. op 'n logiese vlak, in plaas van om dit op 'n ad hoc basis by bestaande
toepassingstelsels te probeer voeg. Sekuriteitsontwerp-aktiwiteite behoort op so 'n logiese vlak
deel te word van stelselanalise en -ontwerpsaktiwiteite dat daar volkome integrasie tussen die
twee vakgebiede sekuriteit en rekenaargesteunde sagteware-ontwerp bereik word.
Die doelwit van die verhandeling is om die teorie te bestudeer vir bestaande benaderings tot die
integrasie, en dan aile relevante sterkpunte daaruit te haal en dit uit te brei indien nodig, ten
einde 'n benadering daar te stel wat ten volle implementeerbaar is in die vonn van 'n prototipe
datavloei-ontwerp hulpmiddel ('DFD CASE-tool'). Die voorgestelde benadering tot die sekure
analise en ontwerp van 'n toepassingstelsel of 'n logiese vlak, wat in Hoofstuk 4 aangebied
word, is ontwerp in samewerking met H.A.S. Booysen en J.H.P. Eloff [Booysen, Kasselman,
Eloff - 1994].
Bestaande rekenaargesteunde sagteware-ontwerp hulpmiddels is deur die outeur bestudeer om
te bepaal wat hul huidige vermoens is in terme van veral die definiering van sekuritcit, maar
ook in terme van steun aan die stelselanalis tydens die analise en ontwerps-fases van die
projeklewensiklus wanneer 'n toepassingstelsel ontwikkel word.
Sekuriteitsbeginsels word ook daargestel wat nodig sou wees vir die sekure en effektiewe
ontwerp van 'n toepassingstelsel. Hierdie beginsels word gebruik in die ontwerp van die
prototipe en geillustreer met voorbeelde. Daar word gepoog am met hierdie studie aan te toon
dat dit prakties moontlik is om sekuriteitsaktiwiteite te integreer met 'n bestaande metodologie
vir die analise en antwerp van inligtingstelsels.
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SUMMARY
This study has its origin in the growing need for information systems to be classified as
'secure'. With the increasing use of Computer Aided Software Engineering (CASE) tools in
the design of application systems for commercial use, the risks that exist in terms of
information security have become more prominent.
The importance of considering security during the analysis and design of an information
system, in other words, on a logical level, is increasing daily. Usually security features are
added to existing application systems on an ad hoc basis. Security design activities should
become such an integrated part of systems analysis and design activities on a logical level, that
a complete integration of the two fields, security and computer aided software engineering,
can be achieved.
The aim of this dissertation is to study the literature to discover existing approaches to this
integration, and to extract the strengths from them and expand on those strengths in order to
compile an approach that is completely implementable in the form of a prototype data flow
design tool (DFD tool). The proposed approach to the secure analysis and design of an
application system of a logical level, which is presented in Chapter 4, is designed in
conjunction with H.A.S. Booysen [Booysen, Kasselman, Eloff - 1994].
Existing CASE-tools have also been studied by the author to determine their current
capabilities, especially in terms of security definition activities, but also in terms of their
support to the systems analyst during the analysis and design phases of the project life c: ~k
when developing a target application system.
Security principles that would be necessary for the secure and effective design of ';'I1
application system are determined. These principles are used in the design of the prototvoc
and illustrated with examples The aim of this study is to prove that it is possible to inregr.: t'
security activities with existing methodologies for analysis and design of information sysie:n-
in a practical way.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1 Introduction to this study
Security· is one of the fields in computer science that is being researched with increased
intensity. This is due to the fact that systems need to be more secure against unauthorised
access, since the level ofuse ofcomputers is increasing in the business world.
Imagine the following scenario: An idea or need for an application is conceived, the user
requirements are assimilated, the system is analysed, designed, implemented and tested. It is
set up in the production environment of the business, and used by people. Months after being
put into the production environment, some vital, secure data is discovered by the wrong
people (disclosed), because of one or more loopholes in the logic of the application which was
overlooked by the systems analysts, designers and programmers. The reason for this is that
security features were added to the application as a separate activity from the programming
and testing activities. Although the security features have been tested extensively as well,
those tests were still not rigorous enough to pick up ALL the security loopholes in the system.
This situation, which is not very uncommon, could have been avoided had security features
been an .integral part of the systems analysis and design. If this was the case, security
mechanisms would have been a much more integral part of the normal program logic
mechanisms, and the resulting security features and strengths in the application could have
been sufficient to prevent breaches such as the one described in the scenario above.
Parallel with the growth in business computing, there has been an increase in the number of
programs created with CASE-tools. CASE (Computer Aided Software Engineering) is also a
field in computer science which is expanding daily, so that currently almost all new business
software is created by system analysts using CASE-tools. This situation has led to a need for
some sort of integration between computer security and computer aided software engineering.
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1.1 State ofthe art situation
After a literature overview, the author has found that there is a general absence of security
enforcement facilities in mainstream CASE-tools used in business environments. The main
reasons for this, according to Baskerville, are the following:
(i) Loss of performance of the final application with the addition of security features;
(ii) Loss of flexibility because of restrictions and confinements on the target system's
behaviour;
(iii) Higher costs in system creation to account for:
- analysis of the security requirements;
- design and implementation of the security specifications;
- maintenance ofsecurity properties in the system [Baskerville - 1988].
Charles Cresson Wood [Wood - 1990], states that computer systems designers and analysts
are usually very aware of and concerned about information systems security, but that they still
don't incorporate control measures into the systems they create and maintain. This is because
they don't. have a set ofprinciples ofsecure information systems design that they can adhere to
when selecting or creating control measures. This view supports the finding that security
design is not part of the process ofdesigning information systems.
Most of the mainstream CASE-tools in use in the commercial world today don't have any
facilities.for ensuring information flow security in the models and systems created. However,
the author has tested one CASE-tool that comes close to facilitating a secure information
system, but only in the area ofaccess control. Chapter 3 investigates this CASE-tool in detail.
1.2 Definitions
Some definitions are presented now which will be useful when reading this dissertation. They
represent important concepts in the study of CASE-tools and information systems security
a. Software Engineering
The disciplined application of engineering, scientific, and mathematical principles and
methods in the economical production of quality software [Sodhi - 1991].
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b. Computer Aided Software Engineering (CASE)
The application of tools in the whole of the software development process [Vliet - 1993].
(i) Upper-CAS~
Tool support during the analysis/design phases ofCASE [Vliet - 1993].
(ii) Lower-CASE
Tool support during the implementation/test phasesof CASE [Vliet - 1993].
c. Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs)
Data flow diagrams are used to illustrate data flow between data entities in a data flow
design. In its simplest form it is a functional decomposition with respect to the flow of data.
This design technique originated with Yourdon and Constantine [Yourdon - 1975] and is
also known as composite design or structured design. In a DFD, four types of data entities
are distinguished [Vliet - 1993]:
• External entities are the source or destination of a transaction. These entities are
located outside the domain considered in the DFD.
• Processes transforms the data in some way.
• Data flows occurs between processes, external entities and data stores. A data flow is
indicated by an arrow. Data flows are paths along which data structures travel.
• Data stores are where data structures are stored until needed. They should be placed
between processes [Gane - 1990]
Note: For the remainder of this dissertation, external entities, processes and data stores
will be referred to as objects. A data flow is used to connect the objects.
d. Information system Security.
It is necessary to distinguish information system security from normal computer security
in order to implement it as an extension to existing CASE methodologies.
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According to Baskerville [Baskerville - 1988], computer security can be defined as
identifying threat concepts and the physical and logical techniques applied in the protection
of the electronic computer and communication systems; while information security can be
defined as the broader view, incorporating systems analysis and design methods, information
systems, managerial issues, and social and ethical problems. Thus, computer security is
viewed by Baskerville [Baskerville - 1993] as a component of information systems security.
Booysen and Eloff further defines information security as consisting of the following two
major components: technological security and applications information security
[Booysen, Eloff - 1993]. The two views are summarised in Figure 1.1 in order to obtain a
definition for information systems security to be used throughout this dissertation.
(Baskerville) (BooyscnlElofl)
Figure 1.1: Information Systems Security
Technological security addresses both logical and physical aspects. Physical secuntv IS
defined as the action that prevents physical harm to the resources of a computer syS!CI11.
while logical security is the protection of data and access to and between programs
[Booysen, Eloff - 1993]. The security overhead programs Top Secret and RACF which arc
used extensively on most mainframe systems in the world, are good examples of logical
security in action, allowing the definition of access lists to application programs, as well as
the definition of all the possible users or user groups which must have access to those
programs.
I ~
Applications information security addresses the security Issues surrounding the
development of new applications systems as well as the maintenance of existing application
systems in terms of security features. This dissertation will focus on this area.
Note: To simplifythe terminology, applications information security will hereafter be
referred to as information security.
1.3 Problem statement
The main problem in information security is that in the specification and design of an
information application system, the addition of security features to the system is postponed
until one of the following stages in the traditional waterfall-model is reached [Baskerville -
1988]:
• the implementation stage, or
• the maintenance stage, when the system has already been installed and put to use.
The second case (adding security features during the maintenance stage) is even worse than
the first, because although both approaches involve a large measure of risk, the second one
usually amounts to considerable change to the original system design, and also causes
unrealistic system expectations [Booysen, Eloff - 1993].
Security features should be added to the system during the high-level design of the system, in
other words during the Upper-CASE design phase, not the Lower-CASE design phase.
1.4 Grey areas to be resolved when attempting a combination of security and CASE-tools
When attempting to combine computer security and CASE, several important questions must
be kept in mind for which answers must be found. The author attempts to answer the
following important questions using the literature and own experience with CASE-tools:
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a. What do security requirements for commercial information systems look like?
In other words, what requirements should an information system satisfy in order to be
classified as 'secure'? This issue is covered in Chapter 4, which presents some rules and
principles for design to ensure the general security and consistency in the developed
system. It also presents the framework for the design of the security activities of the
prototype.
b. Why are there virtually no CASE-tools on the market that support information
security in terms of such security requirements?
Section 1.1 has stated the main reasons for this question. Chapter 2 looks at previous
approaches in the research for the design of a 'secure' application system. Chapter 3 also
reviews two commercial CASE-tools that the author has tested.
c. When are security features normally added to an application system? When should
such features be added to a system?
Section 1.4 examined these issues shortly. Baskerville proposes the addition of security
features to an application system during analysis and design. The proposed method
presented in Chapter 4 also propagates this viewpoint.
d. How .can the existing CASE environment be adapted to incorporate security
definition and enforcement facilities?
Section 2.2 investigates the positioning of security activities within a development
environment. The suggested security activities of the three approaches from literature are
also positioned in this development environment to facilitate easier comparison.
Chapter 4 describes the proposed approach developed by the author of this dissertation for
expanding the development environment to include security facilities.
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e. What kind of rules can be defined in terms of objects on a DFD, information flow
between them, and their security properties? Which of these rules can be automated?
Chapter 2 investigates the work done in the field of security. Chapter 4 specifies security
classification for objects on a DFD in order to make security analysis possible, and lists
some requirements for a secure system. Binary and compound access rules between DFD
objects are defined, which are also automated in the prototype.
f. What are the prospects of integrating security capabilities into a commercial CASE
tool?
Chapter 5 covers the detail of the implementation of the prototype, looking at its purpose,
some DFD examples, security activities and recommendations done by it. A critical
evaluation is given in Chapter 8, describing the possible commercial use ofsuch a tool.
1.5 Motivation
The goal in the research done by Booysen and Eloff [Booysen, Eloff - 1993] was to propose a
methodology for integrating application information security with CASE. The proposed
methodology, called ASSDM (Automated Secure System Development Methodology) defined
five stages to reach a secure application system. These stages are listed in Figure 1.2 on the
following page.
ASSDM was just a theoretical idea. At a later stage, together with the author of this
dissertation, they developed a revised model, the EASGE model (Extended Automated
Software Generation Environment) [Booysen, Eloff, Kasselman - 1994] which forms the core
of the proposed approach presented in Chapter 4.
..
A model is of little practical use if it cannot be implemented. The possibilities in terms of
implementation of a model can be seen as an indication of its present usefulness If
implementation of the EASGE model is possible, then there must be merits to its
implementation in the real world of CASE today.
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Phase 1: User needs
Phase 2: Network of functions
Phase 3: Information flow controller
Phase 4: Information flow enforcer
Phase 5: A secure application system
Figure 1.2: Five stages to a secure application system (ASSDM)
The author of this dissertation has developed a prototype tool to demonstrate the possibilities
brought to light by EASGE. This prototype is a partial DFD tool that a systems analyst can
use for drawing DFDs which can be analysed by it. It is partial because it is not a fully fledged
CASE package, but a demonstration tool. The prototype will examine the data flow occurring
on the diagram and make some suggestions to the analyst on improving the security of this
data flow on the diagram.
1.6 Short overview of each chapter
In Chapter 2 theoretical approaches to the design of 'secure' application systems will be
presented. The approaches ofBaskerville, Austria, and Eckmann will be discussed [Baskerville
- 1993] [Eckmann - 1994] [Pemul - 1994]. The proposed methodology, EASGE, developed
by Booysen, Eloff and the author [Booysen, Kasselman, Eloff, - 1994] is presented in Chapter
4.
In Chapter 3 two commercial CASE-tools will be critically reviewed in terms of design
assistance to the user and security definition and enforcement capabilities.
In Chapter 4 some rules and principles will be defined that should be present in a CASE-toJI
in order to design a 'secure' application system. The design framework of the prototype is also
presented in this chapter in terms of such rules, because it uses them for analysing the secun.y
aspects ofa DFD.
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Chapter 5 presents an example that is analysed by the prototype. Aspects discussed in this
chapter include the purpose of the prototype, security activities that it performs, possible
recommendations that it suggests, and several examples of DFDs analysed by it.
Chapter 6 covers some details on the design and implementation of the prototype.
Chapter 7 presents a user manual for the prototype, explaining basic features and how to
operate the tool.
Chapter 8 investigates the future prospects of information security in the design of application
systems, evaluating the prototype in terms of the implementation feasibility of its security
activities in the real world ofCASE today, and Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation.
Annexure A lists the security algorithms used in the prototype and Annexure B gives a listing
ofall the Pascal source code for the prototype.
Annexure C presents the article by Booysen, Eloff and the author [Booysen, Kasselman, Eloff
- 1994].
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Chapter 2
Theoretical approaches to the design of a 'secure' application system
2 Introduction'
There is a gap in application software development. What is this gap? Security. The smallest
lack of security provides a possible loophole for the computer hacker who could possibly be a
thief or a terrorist.
There are. virtually no commercial packages available on the market that support the analysis
and design of secure application systems, and this lack of security has been identified and
analysed to some extent by, among others, Baskerville [Baskerville - 1993], Pemul [Pemul -
1994] and Eckmann [Eckmann - 1994]. In their research and development, they have tried 10
incorporate the field of information security into the field of general information systems (IS)
development. Their efforts have led to the development of approaches that attempt to integrate
the two fields.
These approaches are described and critically discussed in this chapter. In Section 2.5, a
diagram is presented which illustrates the position of the proposed approach in terms of the
three approaches from the literature. The diagram also illustrates the role of the prototype DFD
tool that the author has developed.
The proposed approach is presented in detail in Chapter 4. This approach by Booysen,
Kasselman and Eloff [Booysen, Kasselman, Eloff - 1994] adopts some of the elements of lie
other three approaches in terms of security, and expands them to a level that can oe
computerised and incorporated into an existing CASE-tool.
2.1 Presentation of the approaches
During development, an application goes through different stages in its life cycle, for exam; le
analysis, design, implementation and testing. Booysen proposes an Automated Software
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Generation Environment (ASGE) that denotes CASE-tools which support the entire life cycle
[Booysen, Kasselman, Eloff - 1994].
Figure 2.1 is a diagram representing an ASGE. The user requirements serve as input to the
ASGE and the final application system is the output. Diagrams are used to describe the user
requirements in a format that can be readily understood by both users and systems designers.
They might be Data Flow Diagrams, Entity Attribute Relationship diagrams, or other design
diagrams.
Revise
User
Diagrams ._-.......:.o----t Requirements
(input)
Applicationsystem
(output)
Figure 2.1: Automated Software Generation Environment (ASGE)
The diagrams are stored in the repository of the CASE-tool which was used to generate them.
They evolve during the analysis and design stages, and are normally used during the
implementation of the application logic. During this implementation stage, program code is
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generated for the application and database tables are created on a secondary storage medium
The tables are then populated with data. After that, the application system is ready for testing.
Note: This Environment will serve as a basis for comparing the different approaches
presented in this chapter. Each approach will be diagrammaticallyrepresented similar
to the ASGE, to facilitate easier comparison. Wherever an approach suggests any
security activities, those will also be indicated on the relevant ASGE diagram.
Note: This diagram is not presented as a proposed systems development life cycle, but is
used merely as a skeleton of systems design to which security activities can be
attached during the discussion of the various approaches.
"
2.2 Baskerville
- 2.2.1 Analysis of the evolution of security analysis and design methods
In his paper, Baskerville first gives an analytical description of the evolution of IS security
analysis and design methods' [Baskerville - 1993]. He distinguishes three generations of
systems development and security development methods and compares them. Table 2.1
summarises the three generations in terms of primary features and gives key examples o.~
methods and tools available in each generation. A short discussion of each generation
follows.
2.2.l.a First Generation: Checklist Methods
Checklist methods are still used in some areas of information systems development.
especially in the personal computer marketplace, where independent systems analysis :s
often not cost-effective. Sales representatives configure a combination of available
hardware and software to form a solution to the customer's needs or problems. A C0S:-
benefit analysis is needed to ensure control over the total cost. Because this methc.i c:-
systems "development" is still used today, there is no end date to this generation if. ,~~
table.
--...
Checklist security methods generally begin the design of security with an examination
ofall known risks and controls, instead of a view of what risks are involved in the case
at hand. A list is provided to the analyst, containing every conceivable control that can
be implemented in an application system. He first checks to see whether or not the
control has been implemented already. If it hasn't been found, he analyses the necessity
for the control, and if required, implements it.
Generation of Principle Objective Primary Systems Security
System Features Development Development
Development Methods and Typical and Typical
Methods Tools Tools
First Generation: The selection of the Mapping of Vendor's technical Security
Checklist various solution limited solutions sales procedures and checklists and
Methods components, to onto the literature risk analysis
(From 1972) create a sum solution information
problem
Second- The partitioning of A partitioned Top-down CRAMM·,
Generation: complex systems complex solution engineering. rapid BDSS·, control
Mechanistic solutions: identify that matches prototyping, system point and
Engineering and solve each functional and logic flowcharts exposure analysis
Methods detailed functional requirements matrices.
(From 1981) requirement computer
questionnaires
Third- The abstraction of Highly abstracted Structured analysis. Logical Controls
Generation: the problem and design expressing data modelling. Design. data Ilow
Logical solution space: both the problem information diagrams.
Transformation create a logical and solution space engineering, data SSADM-
al Methods model of the now and entity- CRAMM.
(From 1988) problem and solution attribute relationship
diagrams.
Key: CRAMM - CCTA's Risk Analysts and Management Methodology
CCTA = UK Government Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency
BDSS = Bayesian Decision Support System
SSADM-CRAMM =CeTA's Structured Systems Analysis and Design Method interfacing with
CRAMM
Table 2.t: Three Generations of Systems Development and Security Development Methods
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2.2.l.b Second Generation: Mechanistic Engineering Methods
These methods aim at finding an ideal system solution by breaking up the problem into
sub-problems which can be analysed in detail. Solution elements can then be integrated
to form a coherent solution.
Engineering concepts form the core of these methods. The process of "building" an
application system is broken down into logical steps which are performed in a specific
sequence. The classical "waterfall" or "bottom-up" approach forms the basic project
life cycle which is the integral substance of many current design methodologies. Other
examples of engineering-based systems development methods are top-down
engineering, rapid prototyping, and system and logic flowcharts.
Stage 1: Identify and evaluate system assets.
Stage 2: Identify and evaluate threats
Stage 3: Identify possible exposures
.'
Stage 4: Risk analysis
Stage 5: Prioritise controls for implementation
Stage 6: Implement and maintain controls
Table 2.2: Generic Second-Generation Security Project Stages
The engmeenng perspective of the second generation causes security analvsis
techniques to focus on physical specifications such as control points and access
procedures. An existing mechanistic engineering life cycle is the security waterfall the;
consists of the stages listed in Table 2.2 on the previous page.
Concerning security development, there are vanous examples of fully cornp.ncr-
supported security analysis and design methods which provide an extensive database ..::-
possible threats, assets, and controls, from which the analyst selects a subset during tbe
analysis and design phases of the application's life cycle. Three examples wi.I ce
described briefly.
• CRAMM (CCTA's Risk Analysis and Management Methodology) [Farquhar
- 1991] is a method which was adopted by the UK Government Central
Computer and Telecommunications Agency (CCTA) as a government-wide
standard to risk analysis and security management. This method uses data on
asset groups, risk levels, existing controls and an internal database of 900
possible counter-measures to compile a list of additional controls that can be
added. It follows all of the generic stages in second generation security
methods listed in Table 2.2.
• BDSS (The Bayesian Decision Support System) [Ozier - 1989] is a complete
computer-supported information security design method that has its roots
firmly fixed in quantitative risk analysis techniques. Its output has the
following reports:" an executive summary which focuses on the design process
VUlnerabilities, decision support in terms of foregoing or accepting each
security control, and a technical analysis which provides detailed
documentation from the security analysis and design project. Each. report
contains relevant graphs to support the findings of the method.
• RISKPAC is a method which utilises questionnaires to deductively compile
the security controls necessary for the application. Security designers, system
professionals and information system users can all give their input to the
program. The questionnaire employs linguistic variables, and in this way
enables qualitative user evaluations. The final output is also of a qualitative
nature [Computer Security Consultants - 1988].
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2.2.l.c Third Generation: Logical Transformational Methods
The main objective of these methods is to abstract the problem space and the solution
space, in order to distantiate analysis and design concerns from physical limitations.
This distinguishes the methods from first and second generation methods, which start
the analysis by looking at the physical limitations.
The most significant challenge to' designers in the third generation is to select the
correct attributes to be abstracted in the model. Friedman describes this phase as one in
which the primary criterion for a successful system becomes "producing the right
system, rather than producing the system right" [Friedman - 1989].
Baskerville [Baskerville - 1993] classifies the third generation models into two
categories:
Three distinguishing characteristics of third-generation security methods are defined by
Baskerville [Baskerville - 1993]. Firstly, the emphasis will be on producing the right
types of security for the system, not just implementing the security correctly. Secondly.
the security design method will either be characterised by logical models or
transformational models (or both). Thirdly, cost-benefit risk analysis will be ce-
emphasised as abstract models are increasingly used. .
The work in the third generation of security methods is still formative. However, there
are two methods that have been published that approach the criteria described abo. e
the CCTA SSADM-CRAMM interface and the Logical Controls Design method
The CCTA which has developed the second generation CRAMM security method, ,.. as
also responsible for the UK Government standard called 'Structured Systems Analysis
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and Design Method' (SSADM). They have extended the CRAMM method into an
overall systems development process by developing an interface between CRAMM and
SSADM. CRAMM is the only second-generation method which has been transformed
into a total information systems development method which allows for security
definition activities. The SSADM-CRAMM interface is a unique combination of
second generation security design and a third generation systems development method.
The disadvantage of this combination, is that, in order to produce recommended
security risk countermeasures that can be compared, broad assumptions must be made
about the physical assets that can be expected for the target application system. This
means that CRAMM can only be used during the logical modelling phases of SSADM
if the systems designers create an assumed physical model.
The Logical Controls Design approach is Baskerville's own approach to secure
information system analysis and design. It builds on the YourdonlDe Marco
methodology to facilitate the addition of security features to information systems
[Baskerville - 1988]. It focuses the security design process on the software and work
procedures that access and manipulate information, in other words, away from
hardware aspects. This focus shift emphasises logical controls that can endure longer
than physical controls in an organisation.
Baskerville [Baskerville - 1993] notes that the people responsible for researching
systems development methods seem to view security as a separate issue from analysis
and design. It was noted in Section 1.4 that security features are normally added to an
application system on an ad hoc basis, if necessary.
It is suggested by him that the best approach to the development of a security analysis
and design methodology would be to nest it as a component part of an existing,
established, successful overall information systems analysis and design methodology
[Baskerville - 1988]. This existing methodology points to the Upper-CASE
environment as defined in Section 1.3, because it focuses on the analysis and design
phases of information systems development, i.e. on the logical development activities.
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Security definition features should be present on this level. This means that logical
security processes should be added to an application system during the Upper-CASE
phases in the life cycle, in order to become an integral part of the eventual application
system.
He also suggests that the availability of an integrated security design methodology
would encourage the increased use of such a methodology as an application system
design tool, with important implications for the security and integrity of resulting
information systems in general.
2.2.2 Baskerville's suggested security design methodology (Logical Controls Design)
Baskerville [Baskerville - 1988] expands the methodology of YourdonlDe Marco to include
security tools in the following way:
First ofall he identifies five security design phases as listed in-Table 2.3:
Phase One: Identify entities
Phase Two: Identify risks
Phase Three: Identify controls
Phase Four: Evaluate controls
Phase Five: Implement
Table 2.3: Security design phases according to Baskerville
Phase One is where the analyst identifies the important software entities to be implemented in
the application system. Phase Two is where risks are identified, such as disclosure or
modification of data. During Phase Three, controls are created to protect data against the
risks. Phase Four involves evaluating the controls in terms of implementability and cost znd
Phase Five concerns the implementation of the system.
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Baskerville then argues that Phase One, identify entities, is a natural activity of structured
specification, and Phases Four and Five, evaluate and implement, are not structured design
considerations since these phases involve feasibility and physical implementation.
His conclusion is that only Phases Two and Three, identify risks and identify controls, need
to be added to an existing methodology such as the one of YourdonlDe Marco. Since the
specification of a DFD occurs on a logical level instead of a physical level, one only needs to
consider logical risks when attempting to ,extend this logical methodology. Table 2.4
illustrates these levels. The risks are described in the following section.
A DFD is also the ideal starting point for analysing and designing security features for a target
application system, since it represents the high-level view that the software engineer and the
end user have of the system under development.
Design scope Activity Risks to be considered
Physical design Consider physical Unauthorised entry to computer room.
risks
Logical design Consider logical Unauthorised modification, deletion or
risks disclosure of data in an application system.
Table 2~4: Type ofrisks to be considered for different design levels.
2.2.3 Baskerville's method focuses on software instead of hardware
The Logical Controls Design method focuses the process of security design away from the
hardware to the software and work procedures that access and manipulate information. This is
an important shift in focus, because the focus is now set on logical controls that should stand
the test of time much better than physical controls.
The lack of physical (hardware related) aspects in the logical model have the effect that the
type of risks to be concerned about in the model is limited to logical risks. Baskerville
identifies three classes of logical risks which can be present in such a model: destruction,
modification, or disclosure of information to unauthorised users or entities: The destruction
risk signifies the risk of data being deleted, either by intent or by accident. The modification
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risk signifies the risk of data being altered without authorisation, and the disclosure risk
signifies the risk of data being made available to unauthorised people.
The Logical Controls Design method makes provision for controls as well. A control is
inserted on the overall systems logical model in the form of a control process with possible
control data. In this way, the logical security model is part of the logical systems model.
For example, if we have a data flow Verified Timecharts in a data dictionary, the three risks
modification, disclosure and destruction have to be addressed. The analyst can add controls to
the data dictionary, like those in the example entry into the dictionary represented by Table
2.5.
For completeness of the set of security controls, the method adds cross-references in each
data dictionary entry. A cross-reference takes the form of a threat class together with the
logical process that contains the control for that threat class. For example, in the example data
dictionary entry below the risks together with their control processes are listed for the data
flow Verified Timecharts. The exact structures of the security process elements are also
documented, just like any normal process" This results in the security control processes being
an element in the overall data flow diagram in the same way and on the same level as normal
systems processes,
For each process in the model, there are up to three relevant control processes to prevent any
of the three risks from realising.
Data Flow Name: Verified Timecharts
Composition: Timecard-Header-Record
* (Timecard-Record)
* Timecard-Hash-Record
Modification Control: Process 2.2 (Print Paycheques)
Destruction Control: Process 1.3 (Transcribe Timecards)
Disclosure Control: Process 2.1 (Sort Timecards)
Table 2.5: Logical Controls Design data dictionary entries with security controls
y t
2.2.4 Graphical positioning of Baskerville's method in the ASGE
The additions of Baskerville are shown on the diagram (Figure 2.2). The security stages
'Identify risks' and 'Identify Controls' are added to the normal ASGE.
Identify risks
Identify controls
Figure 2.2: ASGE and Baskerville's Approach
2.2.5 Critical discussion of Baskerville's approach
The Logical Controls Design method is distinguished from the CCTA SSADM-CRAMM
method described in Section 2.1. I by the fact that security design activities are raised to the
same level as application design activities, i.e. a logical level instead of a physical level.
The advantages of the Logical Controls Design method are that security design features are
integrated with system design activities on the Upper-CASE level (analysis and design). This
performance is accomplished by Baskerville through the addition of detailed security controls
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to the system design. The analyst gets a logical view of the security design that isn't limited by
any physical considerations. The security control processes are analysed and designed on the
same level as normal application processes and documented in the same way. Security controls
are linked to the processes that use them and cross-referenced in a proper way, in order to
ease their implementation during the implementation phase of the application.
Disadvantages are that, as a third generation method, this approach is only formative.
Furthermore, although it checks for breach<:s of security during direct information flow
between entities in the form of the three risks described in Section 2.2.2 being breached, it
doesn't check for the three risks in the situations where indirect information flow occurs. For
example, as shown in Figure 2.3, ifwe have the situation where information flows from Object
A to Object B, as well as from Object B to Object C, it implies that information is also flowing
indirectly from Object A to Object C. This kind of situation isn't addressed by the Logical
Controls Design method.
An implementation could analyse such indirect flows and indicate possible materialisation of
the above-mentioned risks. For example, the disclosure-risk could' cause harm to the
confidentiality of information in a database when Top .Secret-classified data is allowed to flow
to Confidential-classified Objects.
2
...
Key: 1 = Direct information flows
2 = Indirect information flow
Figure 2.3: Indirect information flow
Although the approach of Baskerville is relatively formal, many aspects of it are
implementable. The proposed approach that is presented in Chapter 4 adopts some concepts
from Baskerville's approach. The two design phases Identify Risks and Identify Controls are
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incorporated into the proposed approach. The risks that are addressed by it include the three
classes oflogical risk defined by Baskerville (i.e. disclosure, modification and destruction). It
facilitates the addition of controls on a logical analysis level, similar to Baskerville's approach.
2.3 Eckmann
2.3.1 Eckmann's approach (Formal flows)
In his paper on automated information flow' analysis, Eckmann discusses flow tools that
analyse covert information flow in formal specification languages [Eckmann - 1994]
Informally, the concept "covert information flow" denotes a hidden information flow or an
information flow which are difficult to detect manually, i.e. without using information flow
analysis tools. Also informally, the term "security label" as used by Eckmann is a security
classification that is assigned to a state component in the formal specification. For example, a
state component A can be assigned a security label "high-level" or "low-level".
Although flow tools automate much of the work of analysing covert channels for information
flow, existing flow tools typically report large numbers of formal flows. Eckmann [Eckmann -
1994] defines a formal flow as a flow that was found in the specification, but is not in the
system being specified. In other words, we can see it as a flow that was identified as ar:
indirect or covert flow not originally specified. Such flows must then be proved to be only
formal (due to the specification), or they must be treated as real flows and consequently
proved to be secure as well.
Eckmann states that an important goal for flow tool builders is to reduce the number c:
reported formal flows. His paper examines the causes of formal flows and describes .=.
technique for eliminating many of them, which results in automated flow analysis which ;~
practically more useful to the analyst.
Using flow tools, application systems can be analysed in terms of security, formally specriec
and an attempt can be made to prove security using automated flow analysis. Covert char.nels
for information flow can then be exposed to the analysis team for scrutinisation. Tools used b:.
~ ,
.'-
Eckmann are lila Jo [Scheid, Holtsbers - 1992] as formal specification language and lila Flow
[Eckmann, Cowal- 1992] as flow analysis tool.
Eckmann describes two security policies as defined by Fine [Fine - 1989]: the ft-policy (flow
tool policy) and the ni-policy (non-interference policy). The ft-policy is a policy enforced by
certain flow tools. The policy requires that each target's new and old security labels must be
higher than the old label of each of its sources. A target is any state component of which the
value or label changes, and a source is anything that affects the new value or new label of a
target. The ni-policy requires that "Iow"-classed subjects do not see any change in their
environment as a result of actions taken by "high"-classed subjects. This is what is meant by
non-interference (oi).
2.3.2 Eckmann's extended ft-policy
Fine showed that many formal flows are the result of flow tools enforcing a security policy
that is too strict [Fine - 1989]. Eckmann proceeds to extend the ft-poIicy, describing a
technique for eliminating the unnecessary formal flows identified by the policy. He also
presents a way of implementing his extended ft-policy in flow tools. The presented technique
allows the specification writer to specify a security policy together with the functional
specification. This is accomplished by assigning security labels to state variables and
transforms in the formal specification. The specification writer also suggests security levels for
unclear formulas, which the tool checks and uses. Eckmann calls a suggested security level an
opaquedefinition, and defines it as a hint given by the specification writer to the flow tool,
suggesting semantic information that might be useful in the flow analysis [Eckmann - 1990].
2.3.3 Example of Eckmann's extended policy
Firstly, an example system from Eckmann's work is presented. This is called the AB system.
Secondly, an Ina 10 formal specification of the system is given. Thirdly, the Ina 10
specification is extended to specify a security policy. Lastly, the output of the Ina Flow
security checking tool is presented for the system.
3S
2.3.3.a System definition
The AB system has two state components, A and B. The system contains read and write
operations for integer values, with the following behaviours:
• When a high-level subject writes a value v, the following assignments are
performed: B. B - A + v
A := v
• When a high-level subject reads a value, the current value of A is returned.
• When a low-level subject writes a value v, the following assignment is performed:
B := A + v
• When a low-level subject reads a value, the current value of B - A is returned.
The AB system is defined to be secure if and only if no high-level information can ever be
observed by a low-level subject. The system must therefore be scrutinised to determine
whether there is any information flow from a high level subject to a low-level subject.
2.3.3.b Ina Jo specification
The Ina Jo formal specification for the AB system is represented in Figure 2.4 [Eckmann -
1994].
2.3.3.c Extended Ina Jo specification'
>"-~
To specify the system's security policy, labels are assigned to the state variables and
transforms. An example of this is given in Figure 2.5. In the figure, vertical lines on the
left-hand side of the text means that changes have been made here from the original formal
specification.
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specification AB
level top
variable A, B: integer
variable 10Jeturn, hiJeturn: integer
transform hi_write (v: integer)
effect N"B = B-A+v
& N"A=v
transform hi read
effect N"hi return = A
transform 10_write (v: integer)
effect N"B = A + v
transform 10 read
effect N"lo return = B - A
end top ~
endAB
Figure 2.4: Ina 10 specification example
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specification AB
level top
I type mlsIabel = (syslo, syshi)
I constant
Idominates (L1:m1sJabel, L2:m1sJabel)
=LI <=L2
variable A, B: integer
variable 10Jeturn, hiJeturn: integer
I label A @ syshi,
I B @ syshi,
110Jetum @ syslo,
Ihireturn @ syshi
transform hi_write (v: integer)
effect N"B=B-A+v & N"A=v
.'
transform hi read
effect N"hi return = A
transform lo_write (v: integer)
effect N"B = A + v
transform 10 read
effect N"lo return = B - A
I label hi_write(v) @ syshi,
hiread @ syshi,
lo_write (v) @ syslo,
10_read @ syslo
end top end AB
Figure 2.5: Example of a security-extended Ina Jo specification.
2.3.4.d Flow Analysis using Ina Flow
An example of flow analysis by Ina Flow is given in Figure 2.6. For the AB system, there is
only output for the last transform, which changes a sys l o variable. The analysis identifies a
suspected flow, called a conjecture, which seems to exist between A and B to 10_return.
Flow Conjecture (1) for Transform
10 read
Transform Preserves Correctness
- -
& 10 read
-> (Nil 10Jeturn = 10Jetum
--> dominates(syslo, syshi))
Figure 2.6: Ina Flow output for the system above
2.3.5 Graphical positioning of Eckmann's method in the ASGE
In order to illustrate which principles from Eckmann's approach can be added to the analysis
and design stages of an application system life cycle (as denoted by the ASGE in Figure 2.1),
Figure 2.7 has an analysis stage, a design stage, and the output of the stages is a formal
application definition. The additional block on the right-hand side of the figure contains the
security activities Identify informationflows and Clarify with opaque definitions of Eckmann.
In the case of Eckmann, the analysis and design stages are formal and therefore theoretical.
Addition of Eckmann's mechanisms to the ASGE is therefore also theoretical.
2.3.6 Critical discussion of Eckmann's approach
A strong point of Eckmann's approach is that a security policy can be incorporated into a
formal specification in the form of security labels.
Another" advantage is that information flow is identified between different classes of subjects.
Direct information flow is detected, for example, between the two state variables A and B in
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the discussed example. Indirect information flow is also detected, for example, between A
and B to 10 return in the example.
Identify information flows
Clarifywith opaque definitions
Figure 2.7: ASGE and Eckmann's Approach
.'
The greatest advantage of Eckmann's approach is in terms of a decrease of the number of
formal flows. This is accomplished by opaque definitions which are given by the specification
writer as hints to the flow tool.
The main disadvantage is in practical use. The tools Ina 10 and Ina Flow operate on formal
specifications only. Formal specifications are good for theoretical studies, but a great distance
away from implementability. The security policy is also specified on a formal level, and only
has two security levels, syslo and syshi. For practical, commercial use in the form of additions
to a CASE-tool, Eckmann's method is not directly applicable in the CASE-tool environment.
although certain concepts are usable. In Chapter 4, the proposed approach extends the
concept of security labels and will allow it to be used it on a logical level. It also uses the
concept of an opaque definition in the form of a user-suggested security classification on a
logical level.
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2.4 Pernul
.'
2.4.1 Pernul's approach (Data and Function design)
Pernul's paper describes a semantic data model used as an actual design environment for
designing multilevel secure database applications. Security classification down to a single data
field is supported in the multilevel database concept [Pernul - 1994b].
Pernul and his team proposes a combined data- and function-driven design of information
systems [pernul - 1994a]. Pernul uses Entity Relationship techniques to model the structural
(i.e. data) part of information systems, and Data Flow Diagrams to model the behaviour. Both
techniques have been extended to capture the security semantics that he proposes. The study
concentrates on the DFD section of his model, since the aim in the proposed model is to
extend security on the logical (i.e. DFD) level and to be able to implement this improved
security in a practical way. Pernul and his team have developed a prototype implementation of
their model, using the tools Interviews and Unidraw [Pernul - 1994b].
2.4.2 Adapted Mandatory Access Control (AMAC) model for secure information systems
design-
According to Pernul [Pernul - 1994b], discretionary access controls are concerned with
defining, modelling, and enforcing access to information in the database. These types of access
controls are implemented in most database management systems (DBMS). Mandatory access
controls are, in addition, concerned with enforcing security onto the information flow in the
system being developed. For mandatory security, both the accessed data items and the subjects
(users and their transactions) are assigned security labels, for example top-secret, secret,
confidential, classified.
Pernul [Pernul - 1994b] has developed a model to fit mandatory access controls into
commercial application systems. Called the Adapted Mandatory Access Control Model
(AMAC) for information systems security, the goal of Pernul's model is to adapt mandatory
access controls to fit better into commercial data processing practice. Moreover, the AMAC
model does not only support access controls but is mainly a total design environment for
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secure information systems that are designed for implementation in DBMS which supports
either DAC (Discretionary Access Control), MAC (Mandatory Access Control), or both.
The technique combines concepts from the field of data modelling (specifically the ER
modelling technique) with concepts from the field of data security research, such as the Bell
and LaPadula security policy, which are formalised by two rules [Bell, LaPadula - 1976]. The
first rule, called the simple property, protects the database information from unauthorised
disclosure, and the second (*-property) protects data from contamination or unauthorised
modification by not allowing any information flow from high to low.
(i) Subject s is allowed to read from data item d ifc1ear(s) > =, c1ass(d).
(ii) * Subject s is allowed to write to data item d ifc1ear(s) < = class(d).
The disclosure and modification risks mentioned here are two of the risks identified by
Baskerville in his paper, and described in Section 2.2.3 [Baskerville - 1988].
As the read and write checks are both mandatory controls, successful protection is given by
the simple security property and the *-property against undesired information flow among
subjects with different security clearances.
Pemul [Pemul- 1994b] describes a useful design concept called Multi-Level Secure (MLS)
databases as a possible combination of mandatory security and the Bell-LaPadula paradigm.
The concept ofMLS relational properties has been carefully formalised by Jajodia and Dandhu
[Jajodia, Dandhu - 1991], but several ambiguities still exist, according to Pemul.
MLS supports the assignment of a security label to an individual attribute value in a database.
For example, suppose we have the following data table, represented in Table 2.6, which has
the attributes Title, Subject, Client and Total Classification. The Total Classification is the
highest of the security classifications of each tuple (data occurrence).
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Title Subject Client Total Classification
Alpha, S Development, S A,S S
Beta, U Research, S B,S S
Celsius, U Production, U C,U U
Alpha, U Production, U D,U U
Key: S = Secret
U = Unclassified
Table 2.6: Projects
The first tuple's Title attribute has the value ofAlpha and the security label for this attribute is
secure (S). All the values of the first tuple are classified as secret, thus the tuple's Total
Classification has the value of S. However, the tuple with the title Beta has a label of
unclassified (0), but the tuple's Total Classification is S, because the security classification of
its Subject attribute is secret.
Pemul and his team have developed a semantic data model for multilevel security. The MLS
model underlying it is the one developed by Jajodia and Sandhu [Jajodia, Sandhu - 1991].
They define three types of classification constraints to express the security semantics of the
database application, integrity constraints (responsible for secure update of the database),
secrecy constraints (responsible for data classification) and access control requirements
(regulate the type of access to data by people). They also propose security relevant extensions
for Entity-Relationship modelling and Data Flow modelling. A discussion of the DFD
extension follows.
2.4.3 Extensions to the DFD
Pernul [Pernul - 1994b] defines extensions that are needed, including the labelling of DFD
objects and the choice of a formal security policy such as Bell and LaPadula.
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·In a DFD, data stores are labelled as the sensitivity of the information contained in it, ranging
from Unclassified to Top Secret. Any process that reads data from a data store must have a
clearance greater than the classification of the data store.
Similarly, if there is a data flow from process P I to process P2 and P I has a classification of
Top Secret and P2 a classification of Unclassified only, that data flow might be a source for an
undesired information flow, from a high level downward to a lower level security classified
DFD object.
For example, in Figure 2.8, process PI reads data from data store DI, which has a security
classification of Unclassified to Top Secret, because of multi-level security of the various data
attributes or fields that it is composed of Process PI thus needs a clearance greater than that
ofdata store DI, in other words Top Secret (TS) .
. ,. ~ """--1:-I Datastore 1
[U..TSJ
I----:~:~ Request
Log
TS
Figure 2.8: Classifying System Functions [Pernul - 1994b]
2.4.4 Advantages of extending DFDs
Pernul defines several advantages of extending DFDs by adding security concepts:
• It helps in identifying and positioning security critical parts of an application.
• It may help to identify 'dangerous' information flow channels by pointing out
information flows between processes of different security clearances.
• It may help in determining appropriate security clearances for subjects. This can be a
big help when developing a complex database application system.
2.4.5 Design phases for security critical databases using AMAC
The following design phases are discussed because they represent a useful method which is
similar to the one that will be used in the proposed method. They are used in AMAC for the
design ofsecurity critical databases:
(i) Requirements analysis and conceptual design
This results in a conceptual database model that is described by a single ER-schema
extended by security flags or classifications indicating security requirements for certain user
roles. For example, if a database contains secret (8) information, a user must have a
clearance ofat least Secret to access the data in the database.
(ii) Logical Design
AMAC contains general rules for the translation of ER schemata into the relational data
model or into the multilevel relational data model. Output of the transformation process is a
set of relational schemata, global dependencies defined between schemata and necessary
for database consistency during further design steps, and a set of views describing access
rules on relational schemata.
(iii) The AMAC security object
When it is necessary to enforce mandatory security, a security object and security subject
must be defined. Security levels are then assigned to them. In AMAC a security object is a
database fragment and a subject is a view. Fragments are derived by using structured
database composition and views are derived by combining resulted fragments.
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(iv) Support of automated security labelling
In most commercial, civil information technology applications, data which is labelled with
security classifications is not available. AMAC offers a supporting policy for the automated
security labelling of security objects and security subjects. Automated labelling is based on
the following assumption: The greater the number of views accessing a particular.
fragment. the lower is the sensitivity ofthe containeddata. This effects the level ofsecurity
classification that needs to be assigned to the fragment. For example, if a fragment isn't
accessed by many views, then it might be classified as top secret (highly sensitive).
Similarly, if a fragment is accessed by many views, it might be labelled as unclassified or
confidential.
(v) Security Enforcement
In AMAC fragments are physically stored. Security is enforced by using trigger
mechanisms that are supported by many commercial DBMS products. Triggers are hidden
rules that can be fired (activated) if a fragment is effected by certain database operations.
Security critical actions in databases are the select command (for read access), the append,
insert, delete, and update (for write access) commands. In AMAC select-triggers are used
to route queries to the proper fragments, insert-triggers are responsible to decompose
tuples and to insert corresponding sub-tuples into proper fragments, and update- and
delete-triggers are responsible for protecting against unauthorised modification by
restricting information flow from high to low in cases that could lead to an undesired
information transfer.
2.4.6 Security advantages of AMAC
Pemul sees the following security advantages for AMAC:
• It supports all the phases of the design of a database and can be used for construction cf
databases which are protected on a discretionary basis, as well as databases which are
protected on a mandatory basis.
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• Uniform labelling is possible by using fragments as the granularity of the security object.
Furthermore, a supporting policy to derive single level fragments from multilevel base
relations is provided.
• Automated labelling as implemented in AMAC, leads to candidate security labels that can
be refined by a human security administrator if necessary. This overcomes the limitation
that labelled data often is not available in civil environments.
• By using triggers security enforcement can be fine-tuned to meet the security requirements
of the specific application system under development.
2.4.7 Critical discussion of Pernul's approach
Pemul [Pemul - 1994b] proposes extensions to the data flow diagram definition activities to
include security activities. In this way, security activities are added on a logical level, i.e.
without physical limitations. He notes the following advantages when extending DFDs:
• Security critical parts of the application can be identified
• 'Dangerous' information flow channels can be identified
• Appropriate security clearances for subjects can be determined.
The proposed approach uses the following stages of AMAC:
• Phase 3, defining a Sanitiser Object, which enables information flow between
objects with different security classifications.
• Phase 4, support of automated security labelling, is supported partially in the
"proposed method, in that security labels will be suggested to the user. It is not
based on the frequency of use of the data, however, but on the classification of the
objects around it.
The concept of MLS databases will be adopted in theory for the proposed approach, but only
on a logical level, i.e. the analyst will be able to add security handling objects on the DFD
level.
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The Bell and LaPadula security policy will also be used, but will be extended to be less
militaristic and more commercially practical, by expanding the write action to allow for
different types ofwrite actions to occur, i.e. insert, append, delete and update.
Pemul's classification of DFD objects will be adopted, i.e. objects will be labelled from
Unclassified to Top Secret. In Chapter 4, different types of access to the database will also be
considered, because the access type actually influences the type of risks which are at stake for
the system security. For example, a read action implies the risk of disclosure as defined by
Baskerville [Baskerville - 1988], while an update action implies both a disclosure risk (through
the read action) and a modification risk (through the write action).
2.4.8 Graphical positioning of Peroni's approach in the ASGE
In positioning Pemul's approach in the ASGE (Figure 2.9), the five stages of AMAC are
added to the Automated Software Generation Environment. These stages are executed during
the Analysis and Design stages ofASGE. Both occur on a logical level.
2.5 Pesitioning of The Proposed Approach
Figure 2.10 illustrates the proposed approach's target niche. The approach is built upon
several pillars that are principles and mechanisms taken in full or in part from the three
approaches presented in this chapter, and extended to be implementable. The prototype
implements the security principles and activities of the proposed approach. These principles
and activities are described in detail in Chapter 4.
Some elements of a DFD CASE tool are also adopted. For example, a Graphical User
Interface (GUI) and the ability to create and edit DFDs. These elements are combined with tr.~
security principles and activities from the Information Security domain. The result is a tool
which allows for secure DFDs to be generated. The prototype tool which was developed ty
the author is presented in Chapters 5 and 6.
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Requirements Analysis and Design
Logical Design
Security Object
Automated Security Labeling
Security Enforcement
Figure 2.9: ASGE and Pernul's Approach
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Figure 2.10: Positioning of the Proposed Approach's Prototype Tool
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2.6 Conclusion
The three approaches presented in this chapter represent a great amount of work done in the
research related to the incorporation of security definition activities with application system
analysis and design activities. In the critical discussion of each, some attributes of the approach
have been identified by the author that need to be implemented in a prototype program to
enable the systems analyst to accomplish security analysis and design on a logical level. Those
attributes will be fully dwelled upon in Chapter 4 and if necessary, expanded to reach a level
that is sufficient for implementation.
According to Baskerville [Baskerville - 1993] it is worth the effort to try to combine an
information security-methodology with an existing software engineering methodology such as,
for example, that of Yourdon and De Marco or Gane and Sarson, so that security checking
facilities can become an integral part ofsuch a methodology. That is the goal of the proposed
method in Chapter 4.
In Chapter 3, some CASE-tools are discussed in terms of their capabilities concerning the
effective and secure analysis and design ofan application system. This provides an overview of
the state of the art in the commercial market for CASE-tools.
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Chapter 3
A critical review of some CASE-tools
3 Introduction
Two commercial CASE-tools will be reviewed in this chapter to evaluate their security
analysis and definition capabilities, and their support for effective analysis and design.
The first tool is Silverrun for Windows, which gives the systems analyst a Data Flow Diagram
definition tool, amongst other tools. The second, Object Modeler for Windows built on the
Sapiens mainframe CASE-tool, has a different approach; a combination of Entity-Relationship
modelling and Object-Oriented methods. Object Modeler is discussed because its security
features are quite comprehensive. For example, security down to the individual data field level
is supported.
."
The following structure is followed in discussing the tools:
• General information;
• Assistance to the analyst in bettering the quality of the design;
• Assistance to the analyst in defining an application system's design diagrams: and
• Security analysis and design capabilities (if present).
3.1 SILVERRUN
3.1.1 General
Silverrun is distributed by Computer Systems Advisers. It is a multi-platform CASE
Workbench which can run on MS-Windows, OS/2 and Apple Macintosh systems.
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Silverrun consists of 4 modules, namely Silverrun-ERX (Entity-Relationship eXpert),
Silverrun-DFD ('Data Flow Diagram Diagrammer'), Silverrun-RDM ('Relational Data
Modeler') and Silverrun-WRM ('Workgroup Repository Manager').
3.1.2 Quality overall design
The Silverrun modules ERX, RDM and DFD allows fast access to application definition
information. This information is divided into two parts:
. ,
• The Project Dictionary (Repository) contains information which can be used
in all four modules, for example data structures, base types and domains.
• The Model or Schema Dictionary contains the relevant information for each
type of diagram, for example the objects that are part of the DFD, such as
processes and data flows.
Silverrun offers some functions to enhance information integrity and confidentiality, especially
when working in group format over a local area network. The first function is parameterised
update operations, which can be one of the following: addition, modification, or deletion of
the model or project data. It is however not possible to use this facility for analysis or design
of the target system's database accesses. The second function is the choice of either
individual or group selection of concepts to be updated. For example, the user can select
objects on the diagram to be updated. The third function is the capability of hierarchical
selections, where selection of a concept retrieves all the information that is connected to it,
such as tower-level processes. Fourth is an update history for project or model data. The fifth
function is the facility of impact reports, where a trial update is done and a report is produced
specifying the impact on the rest of the project team. Sixth is password protection on save or
read. Seventh, a creation and a modification date for each information process. Lastly, a
selective clean-up function is provided, to facilitate relatively easy deletion of objects that are
not in use anymore.
One outstanding feature concerning the design quality in data flow diagrams in Silverrun DFD
is the verification of the integrity of the DFD according to rules which test the quality of the
design. These rules are presented in Figure 3.1. They can be checked by Sil~errun on request
by the analyst. These rules are called 'syntax rules' in Silverrun and, dependant on which
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formalism is used for representing the DFD, different combinations of the rules are activated
for checking the diagram. A report is then generated to a text file, stating which, if any, of the
rules were found to be breached.
The following features are also provided by Silverrun:
• Selective clean up to remove objects that are meaningless to the project, for example
objects that are no longer used in the model;
• A report writer with flexible formatting; .
• An import/export function that enables data exchange with other programs, via ASCII
files;
• The facility to generate relational database table definition schemata with the RDM tool
from the EAR diagram.
.'
Arells there:
1.Any processes without a synchronisation rule? 14. Flows without an emission condition?
2. Processes without a name? IS. Data stores with the default name?
3. External entities with the default name? 16. Flows with the default numericalID?
4. Processes which are not graphically present? 17 Data stores which arc not graphically present?
5. External entities which are not graphically present? 18. Processes linked to processes?
6. Data stores linked to a data store? 19. Data stores linked to an external entity?
7. External entities linked to an external entity? 20. Orphan processes (not linked to an object)?
8. Orphan data stores (not linked to an object)? 21. Orphan external entities (not linked to an object)?
9. Orphan flows (not linked to an object)? 22. Flows linked to only one object?
10 Processes without input flows? 23. Processes without output flows?
II. Data stores without input flows? 24. Data stores without output flows?
12. An external entity with an input flow? 25. An external entity with an output flow?
13: Flows which are in the hierarchy of the process
to which they are linked?
Figure 3.1: Syntax rules verified by Silverrun CASE-tool
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3.1.3 Assisting the designer with design diagrams
Dictionary information can be entered graphically, or imported from other sources such as file
descriptions, screen and· report specifications, or from other dictionaries. This means that
objects in a model can be entered by importing text descriptions. For example objects such as
data files, external entities, or processes can be described in structured English and engineered
to graphical entities.
Silverrun-DFD supports the methodologies of Gane and Sarson, Yourdon and DeMarco, and
Merise. The analyst can also customise the representation of objects to facilitate the
customisation ofa methodology.
A user-friendly option is the capability to choose any object from a palette, for example, a
common item, data structure, or process can be selected from the list of available objects.
Depending on the tool in use, the 'selection can be used to automatically generate a sub model
or an object, add or replace the attributes ofan existing entity, or create duplicates.
An innovative feature in Silverrun is the expert system which assists the analyst during analysis
when using the ERX tool. The expert system asks questions concerning entities and the
relationships between them, to aid in clarifying what type of relationship is applicable between
entities on the ER diagram.
3.1.4 Security. analysis and design capabilities
The ease of use of Silverrun makes it a user-friendly tool, but in terms of security it comes
short. It has no security analysis and design options, except on the dictionary update level. 1\0
facility exists for tracing direct or indirect information flow on the DFD, nor is there the ability
to specify what type of access (for example read, update, append, insert, or delete) occurs
between a process object and a data store object. These are facts which are needed to enable
the analyst to check that information flows in the developed system are secure and that
security in the system allows no risk such as unauthorised disclosure, modification or
destruction as defined by Baskerville [Baskerville - 1988].
54
3.2 Object Modeler
3.2.1 General
Object Modeler (OMD) is distributed by Sapiens International Corporation N.V., and is a
development tool that enables one to build applications, starting at the analysis stage, and
continuing the development through to production. It is built on a mainframe-environment
CASE-tool which is also called Sapiens. Although OMD is operated on a PC workstation
under MS-Windows or OS/2, it communicates with the mainframe every time that the user
(the systems analyst) changes something on the graphical model of the system developed on
the workstation [ObjMod - 1994].
The main strength of OMD is that it enables the analyst to concentrate on the data modelling
of the system under development. Implementation of the model is transparent to the analyst,
except if he wants to change the way of implementation.
OMD doesn't use DFDs, but rather combines an Object-Oriented (00) approach with
conventional Entity-Attribute-Relationship methodologies. Its methodology differs from that
of Data Flow Diagrams, in that it facilitates a high level functional analysis, called Man-
Machine-Interface (MMI) which constitutes the application flow. MMI is similar to structure
diagrams in the functional methodology, but doesn't show any data flow details. Instead, it
shows only the menu structure of the application. All OMD applications are menu-driven.
OMD consists of the following tools:
• an extended EAR diagram, called an Object Relationship Diagram (OR diagram);
• business rules;
• MMI (man-machine interface) requirements, which represents the application flow.
The results of these three components are integrated by OMD to produce a fully functional
end user application.
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3.2.2 Quality overall design
Sapiens, the CASE-tool that is the underlying heart of OMD, is an extremely powerful tool
which allows the development of a working prototype within a short time. The systems analyst
creates an object diagram on screen. This should include all the important objects in the target
organisation. An object can be linked to another object to become a child of that object. For
example, object Item-in-Order is a child of Order and can have many data occurrences. This is
illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Order
Itc m-in-Order
4 I I
Figure 3.2: Object diagram ofObjects 'Order' and 'Item-In-Order'
3.2.3 Assisting the designer with design diagrams
3.2.3.a The modelling environment
Since OMD is positioned on top of the Sapiens CASE-tool on the mainframe, OMD is very
important as modelling tool. It places an enormous amount of analytical power and control in
the hands of the analyst in the generation of a working prototype.
The analyst models the OR diagram and the business rules in OMD as a basic object model,
and the MMI as a function model. The basic object model contains objects which, during
implementation stage, translate into database tables in the Sapiens knowledge base. Each of
the table objects has embedded within it the following items:
• associated data fields (called object attributes);
• default data input forms, which are created automatically during the implementation
phase;
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• default transactions to. modify data in the table, created together with the data input
forms;
• optional business rules which are triggered for execution by a transaction; and
• optional security classification properties, which will be discussed later.
3.2.3.b Analysis, design and implementation approach
The development methodology differs from the Data Flow Design methodology of Yourdon
and Constantine [Yourdon, Constantine - 1979], in that there is no low-level functional
analysis, because low-level functions aren't needed in Sapiens. It uses interpreted code to
execute the application. Rather, the focus is on the functional requirements of the application,
allowing for easier conceptual analysis.
During the analysis phase the systems analyst creates the OR diagram for the basic object
model, by identifying the important objects in the organisation being modelled, and the
relationships between them. This is also different from the DFD approach, in that basic objects
are identified, for example, Employee or Order. With Data Flow Design on the other hand, the
upper level offunctional decomposition is the starting point.
For the function model in OMD, the analyst starts by breaking down the roof function into
supporting functions, to create an application structure which is navigated using a main menu
and sub menus.
During the Design phase, Object Modeler creates and edits the default designs necessary for
implementation of the object. For example, a relationship type might be changed, or another
object might be specified to be the main object in a specific relationship.
The basic object model and the function model together result in the Sapiens application
definitions which are executed as a working application. After implementation, a table can be
tested immediately using the default input forms; data can be inserted into the database,
modified or deleted.
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Because the Sapiens CASE-tool supports Rapid Application Development (RAD), the end
users should be involved frequently during all phases of development, to ensure the correct
end results and satisfaction.
3.2.4 Advantages of RAD
Because user specifications can change so rapidly and unexpectedly, changes are difficult with
a traditional CASE approach using a variant of the waterfall model. With Sapiens's RAD
environment no program code needs to be changed, only the business rilles. This allows for
easier and faster maintenance.
Compared to DFDs which are relatively volatile, objects in the organisation are very stable and
don't change easily. Therefore, an object model remains relatively stable. Changes in one
object don't affect other objects, because each object's information and behaviour is hidden
from other objects. This is an important Object-Oriented pillar called encapsulation.
3.2.5 Security analysis and design capabilities
Ol\.1D/Sapiens support the concept of multi-level secure (MLS) databases described by Jajodia
and Dandhu [Jajodia, Dandhu - 1991], by allowing the systems analyst to specify security
classifications on the level of an individual data field. Security 'worlds' can be defined. Each
target user is assigned to a 'world' with a specific classification which can only access certain
items with the same classification level in the Sapiens knowledge base.
The question is, is this type of security classification enough? Because of encapsulation of
object data, there is less information flow in an object-oriented application system than in a
functional application system, but there are lots of messages going to and from objects,
perhaps requesting data from objects and receiving output. These need to be investigated with
the same vigour that data flow should be analysed in a DFD.
Ol\.1D doesn't provide the capability to analyse the flow of messages between objects Direct
and indirect information flow should be investigated. This should take place according to the
security classification of objects and the access types between objects and databases.
Ol\.1D/Sapiens provides the security classification and support for information hiding by means
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of different user data views as well as by means of the object-oriented feature encapsulation.
There remains then the need for direct and indirect information flow analysis between objects.
3.3 Conclusion
Although some of the CASE-tools on the market support integrity and design checking
facilities, virtually none of them specifically provides any security analysis, design or
checking facilities which can be used to improve the security state of the application system
under development on a logical level as proposed by Baskerville [Baskerville - 1993] and the
author. This constitutes a major lack of ability in terms of design assistance to the software
analyst concerning application information security. It is this need that was identified in
Chapter 2 while investigating different approaches to the design ofmore secure applications.
In Chapter 4, the design of the approach is presented that indeed checks for direct and indirect
information flow on a DFD. Rules and principles that are needed in order to enable such
analysis and design activities are described, together with the different stages of the approach.
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Chapter 4
Proposed Approach to Secure Design:
Rules and principles to be considered
4 Introduction
In Chapter 2, the theoretical approach of Eckmann has been studied [Eckmann - 1994]. as
well as the more practical approaches of Baskerville [Baskerville - 1988] [Baskerville - 1993}
and Pemul [Pemul- 1994b]. In Chapter 3, two commercial CASE-tools have been studied in
terms ofdesign quality assistance and security capabilities.
The goal of this chapter is to describe in detail the proposed approach to the secure design of
an application system on the DFD level.
Section 4.1 presents some basic logical quality rules that can be used to automatically check
for logical errors on a DFD. Some of them are used in the prototype that the author of this
dissertation has developed.
Various concepts have been adopted from the three approaches of Baskerville, Pernul anc
Eckmann, Section 4.2 examines these concepts.
Section 4.3 describes the proposed approach from Booysen, Kasselman and Eloff [Boo: ser,
Kasselman, Eloff - 1994] that states security stages that can be integrated with an exis.in.;
design methodology such as the one of Gane and Sarson [Gane - 1990].
The Automated Software Generation Environment diagram is extended to form the Exter.Je.;
ASGE with the proposed security analysis and design activities added to it. All of l~,cs­
security activities will be implemented in the prototype and will allow for the increased
assurance of the information security ofa DFD.
4.1 Rules for effective Data flow design
Firstly, some basic rules, called syntax niles by Gane [Gane - 1990j, will be presented. These
rules are basic integrity checking rules to confirm that a DFD doesn't contain any "syntax
errors" in terms ofdesign. They assist the systems analyst in determining that the DFD is error
free in terms ofdesign quality.
Table 4.1 shows the rules which Gane defines as being representative of a correctly defined
DFD. The rules are practical, easy to understand and relatively simple to implement. Yet they
provide powerful analysis capabilities to the CASE-tool used by the analyst, and they can
automate some of the mundane checking, reducing effort that could be expedited more
fruitfully in other areas of the design of the system.
1. Do all objects (external entities, processes, and data stores) have identifiers?
2. Do all objects and data flows have names?
3. Do all processes and data stores have at least one inflow and one outflow?
Ifnot, why not?
4. Do all data flows start or end with a process?
Ifnot, what makes them happen? Data flows from external entities direct to data stores or
to other external entities are not correct.
5. Do all data flows have a directional arrow?
Table 4.1: Syntax rules which can be verified by CASE-tools [Gane - 1990]
The way that errors in a DFD or in other words, breaches of the rules, are handled by CASE-
tools varies from tool to tool. Some tools prevent breaching in an upfront manner. For
example, they don't allow the designer to create a data flow on the diagram when there is not
a parent and a child object under the start and endpoints of the arrow (respectively). In that
way, rule 4 in Table 4.1 is sustained. Some tools allow breaching, and give a warning message
immediately, while still allowing the analyst to continue. Other tools might allow the breach
and only give an error message when the diagram is verified, for instance, by selecting a
"verify integrity" option.
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The CASE-tool Silverrun utilises the last method, allowing almost any modification to the
DFD, and analysing afterwards. Object Modeler is lenient in allowing extensive changes to the
Object-relationship diagrams that the analyst produces. It prevents illegal design actions from
occurring, by dynamically disabling all the menu options that aren't appropriate for the
currently selected objects. The prototype that is designed in this chapter and illustrated in
Chapter 5, will allow certain implemented breaches to take place, after first warning the
systems-analyst.
4.2 Adopted concepts from the theory
4.2.1 Introduction
The proposed method can be classified as a Third-Generation me/hod as defined by
Baskerville [Baskerville - 1993]. This means that it is a Logical Transformational Method of
which the main objective is to abstract the problem and solution space by creating a logical
model ofthe problem and solution, as has been illustrated in Table 2.1 in Chapter 2.
The proposed method is called Extended Automated Software Generation Environment
(EASGE). It is an extension of the ASGE defined in Section 2.1 with security analysis and
design facilities being added to ASGE. The prototype which will implement the principles and
activities of the approach is illustrated in Chapter 5. It is called DFDSEC, the name being an
acronym for 'DFD Security'. It is designed to form part of an existing ASGE, as illustrated in
Figure 4.1. The block called Security Activities represents the activities of our approach.
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ACTIVITIES
Figure 4.1: Extended Automated Software Generation Environment
4.2.2 Concepts adopted from Baskerville's approach
a. Design phases
The design phases that are adopted in the approach are the two security-related design
phases defined by Baskerville for his method, the Logical Controls Design method
[Baskerville - 1993]. These design phases are Phases Two and Three (Identify Risks and
Identify controls).
Identify Risks
Identify Controls
Figure 4.2: Design phases adopted from Baskerville
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b. Risks
Some risks will be present when the final application system is used in the production
environment, and should be provided for and prevented during the analysis and design
stages of the application system, in other words, during the Upper-CASE environment as
defined in Chapter 1. The risks that are concentrated on are those defined by Baskerville,
i.e. the unauthorised modification. deletion or disclosure ofdata in an application system.
Modification
Deletion
Disclosure
Figure 4.3: Risks adopted from Baskerville
Apart from that, another risk that we also consider during the security activities, is one
defined by Hsieh [Hsieh - 1992]: indirect information flow.
c. Controls
The user will also be allowed to add controls onto the DFD he is editing, although not in as
much detail as Baskerville. In the prototype, graphical objects called Sanitiser Objec~' can
be inserted onto the DFD, which then serve as theoretical security processes in the final
system, allowing the passing of data between two objects of different security classifications
when necessary. These controls are only theoretical because the prototype operates on the
analysis and design levels only.
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4.23 Concepts adopted from Eckmann's approach
a. Security labels
The concept of security labels that Eckmann assigned to state variables and transforms, is
used in the approach. The analyst will be allowed to specify the security level of each object
on a DFD. For example, a data store can be classified as Secret and a process reading data
from that data store as Top Secret. This facilitates the analysis of the system under
development in terms of the secure flow of data between objects on the DFD, and allows it
to be scrutinised in order to classify it as 'secure' when the design stage is completed.
b. Flow Conjectures
Flow Conjectures as defined by Eckmann, which are suspected indirect data flows
between 'non-neighbouring' objects, can also be highlighted by the proposed approach,
together with direct insecure data flows between 'neighbouring' objects. As mentioned in
Section 2.3.5, Eckmann's method can only be applied to formal system specifications,
whereas the proposed approach is more practical in that actual DFDs can be analysed for
security. Chapter 5 will give detailed examples of this capability with the discussion of the
prototype.
42.4 Concepts adopted from Pernul's approach
a. Bell and LaPadula's Security Policy
The Bell and LaPadula security policy is extended to include rules not only for read and
write, but for all the data access types, i.e. read, append, update, delete and insert. The new
set of rules is called Binary Access Rules, for they are applied to each consecutive pair of
objects when analysing the security of the data flow in the system. These rules are described
in Section 4.3.5.
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b. Multi-level Security
Multi-level secure (MLS) databases support the assignment of a security label to an
individual data field. The MLS concept is defined by Pernul as a possible combination of
mandatory security and the Bell-LaPadula paradigm. It is formalised by Jajodia and Sandhu
[Jajodia, Sandhu - 1991], and used by Pernul and his team in their semantic model of MLS.
The proposed methodology will not implement MLS directly, but will adopt the notion of
Pernul's security object, and call it a sanitiser process object, which will filter information
down to lower classification objects.
c. Extensions to the DFD
The following extensions to the DFD are adopted, defined by Pernul [Pernul - 1994b]:
(i) Labelling of DFD concepts.
All DFD objects should be classified as Unclassified, Confidential, Secret, or Top
Secret) in order to enable security analysis of the system being described in the
diagram. Pernul labels a data store according to the sensitivity of the information
that is contained within it, as well as according to the frequency with which it is
used. A process or external entity that reads from that data store must have a
clearance greater than that of the data store, as described in Section 2.3.3. In the
approach, data stores will only be classified according the level of the sensitivity of
the data contained in it.
(ii) Choice of a formal security policy
Another extension to the DFD concept is that for security analysis, a formal
security policy should be chosen according to which analysis can be performed. In
the proposed approach, we use Binary Access rules and Compound Access rules
as a combined policy. These rules are described in Section 4.2.5.
d. Design Phases from AMAC
We adopt two design phases from the Adapted Mandatory Access Control method as
defined by Pernul and described in Section 2.3.5.:
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• Design phase 3: The AMAC Security Object
This phase is adopted for the proposed approach, together with MLS. A Sanitiser
Object is defined in the approach as a security handling object which should apply
MLS and filter the information to be passed to lower-classified objects.
• Design phase 4: Support of automated security labelling
In the proposed approach, partial support is given for automatic labelling of
objects in the DFD which don't have a security label. This is done by suggesting a
security classification for an object if its current classification results in an
information flow between objects of varying security classifications. Before
suggesting a security 'class, an analysis of neighbouring objects that aecess the
currently examined object is executed, to deduce a possible security class.
4.2.5 Concepts Adopted from the Work of Hsieh
The method that was devised by the author In conjunction with Booysen [Booysen,
Kasselman, Eloff - 1994] to generate information sets indicating indirect information flows
between objects, is built on the work of Hsieh [Hsieh - 1992]. This method is listed in
Annexure A.
4.3 Proposed Approach: Security Activities of EASGE
In this section, the proposed methodology as defined by Booysen, Kasselman and Eloff is laid
out. Six security activities to be added to the ASGE are defined. These activities should be
executed during the analysis and design of the system, when the DFD is created, The security
activities can be seen as added requirements to the existing user requirements for the system
under development. An example of such a security requirement is that Process A should be
classified as Confidential.
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The recommended security activities presented in this section are listed in Table 4.2. The first
three columns summarise the suggested security activities by Baskerville, Eckmann and
Pemul. The last column summarises the security activities that are proposed by the author.
They were developed in conjunction with Booysen and Eloff [Booysen, Kasselman, Eloff -
1994]. The proposed security activities are described in detail in Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.7.
Proposed by Proposed by Proposed by Proposed by Kasselman,
Baskerville Eckmann Pernul Booysen, ElofT
1. Identify 1. Identify infor- 1. Security 1. Get security classes for objects
risks mation flows objects from analyst
2. Identify 2. Clarify with 2. Automated 2. Get information flow types
controls opaque security (database access types) from
definitions labelling analyst
3. Create an Object Matrix
4. Construct a Revised Object
Matrix
5. Construct a Security Revised
Object Matrix
6. Strengthen Security/Sanitiser
Object.
Table 4.2: Proposed Security Phases in the EASGE
The table shows similarities between the approaches. This is natural, since the security
activities in the proposed approach were developed based on the activities presented in the
literature.
The proposed security activities of Booysen, Kasselman and Eloff (Phases 2 to 5 in Table 4 2)
are built upon Baskerville's Phase 1 (Identify risks), Eckmann's Phases 1 and 2 (Idemify
information flows and Clarify with opaque definitions) and Pemul's Phases I and ::
(Determine database access types and Logical Design). The proposed activity Strengthen
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Security/Sanitiser Object are similar to Baskerville's Phase 2 (Identify controls) and Pemul's
Phases 3 and 4 (Security objects and Automated security labelling).
Figure 4.4. shows how the Automated Software Generation Environment is expanded to
include these 6 security activities (stages). The user requirements serve as input to the system
development process. Using a DFD to represent the requirements, they are stored in the
repository. The DFD is constructed by analysing the requirements. After analysis, the security
stages come into action. Security classes are inquired by the prototype, data access types are
determined, the various analysis tables are generated .by DFDSEC, analysing the security of
the diagram. Some suggestions are presented to the analyst by the prototype and can be
adoptedor rejected. After the security stages have been completed, a new DFD is constructed
automatically by DFDSEC. This whole process can be repeated if necessary until the analyst
and the prototype are both content that the system is secure. Now the normal ASGE stages
can be continued, generating database tables and program code, and testing the application.
. .
Get objca securityclasses fromanalyst
Get information flowtypesfromanalyst
Create an Object Matrix
Construct a Revised Obj~1 Matrix
Construct a SecurityRevised Object Matrix
Strengthen Security- Sanitisa Object
Figure 4.4: The Extended Automated Software Generation Environment
with security stages
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The security stages will now be examined in more detail.
4.3.1 Allocate Security Classes to Objects
DFDSEC will assist the designer in assigning a security class to each object on the DFD,
based on his assessment of the sensitivity level of the information that is either contained in the
object, if it is a data store, or generated by the object if it is a process or external entity.
Objects can be classified as being in the set [Unclassified ... Top Secret].
4.3.2 Determine Information Flow Types
Objects on the DFD, which can be processes, external entities or data stores, are connected by
data flows, which are arrow symbols. By studying the direction of flow, DFDSEC can
automatically determine whether there is a read or a write action occurring between two
objects. For example, if information flows from a process to a data store, it can be determined
that the flow type is a write action. Similarly, information flowing from a data store to a
process is a read action.
A slight drawback to the advantage of this automatic approach is that only two flow types are
considered, i.e. the read and write actions. However, in a commercial database application
system, the designer needs to specify various write actions, i.e. append, insert, update, or
delete. Because of the different nature of these actions, they have different security
implications. For example, a higher classified (i.e., secret) process should be able to read from
a lower Classified (i.e., confidential) database, but the same process should not be able to
append to that database, because that would imply a disclosure risk [Baskerville - 1993].
Therefore, input from the designer is necessary to clarify or expand the automatically
determined write actions, before a complete security analysis can be done. DFDSEC uses the
set of arrow symbols depicted in Figure 4.5 to represent the different actions.
Figure 4.6 presents an example of what a DFD would look like with the data access types
indicated as in Figure 4.5. Objects reads information from Object; (a data store) and Object-
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(also a data store) is updated by Objects. Similarly, Objects reads information from Object-
and deletes data from Object; (a data store).
Read ~
Append I Insert 0 ~
Update ,---.
Delete v "-
Figure 4.5: Information Flow Types
IObject A IObj.:ct E
Read ,'"Delete l'-
~
Update ReadObject B ,.... ...1
• Object D
'-' 1 ObjectC •
Figure 4.6: Example DFD with indicated access types to databases
4.3.3 Create an Object Matrix
An Object Matrix is a rectangular array in which objects from which information flows, i.e.
origin objects, are mapped onto objects to which information flows, i.e. target objects. The
entry for a particular row and column reflects the information flow type (read, append, insert,
update, delete, or simply a flow of information -flow) between the corresponding objects.
An Object Matrix can contain both valid and invalid information flows between objects. For
example, if a Top Secret object reads information contained in a Confidential database, the
flow action between the objects would be valid, but if a Confidential object reads information
from a Top Secret object, the flow action would be invalid.
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For example, in Table 4.3, which is an example of an Object Matrix, Objectx appends
information to Object-, which should be a data store on the DFD. Likewise, Object- reads
information from Objects, and Objects reads information from Object,.
.. Object, Objects Objecte Objects
···.ObjeetA Read
. ... ....... .....
Objects Append
..
Objecte . .. Read
ObjectD >
.•• .c:.
Table 4.3: Example Object Matrix
4.3.4 Construct a Revised Object Matrix
As an Object Matrix contains only direct information flows (for example, between Obiectx
and Objects), it cannot reveal situations where indirect information flow is taking place (for
example, where Object; sends information to Objects, and Objects sends information to
Object-; so that Objectc indirectly receives information from Objects). The objective of a
Revised Object Matrix is to summarise all valid and invalid direct and indirect information
flow.
In the proposed approach, direct information flows are called Binary Accesses, or binary
information flows, because they are flows between two neighbouring objects. Indirect
information flows are called compound information flows, because they are flows
accumulated between more than two objects.
An information flow between a process and a data store is actually a type of access to that
data store. For example, a read access occurs when a process reads data from a data store.
and a write access occurs when a process appends or inserts or deletes data to or from a data
store. Consequently, we also use the term compound accesses for indirect database accesses.
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ObjectA Objecti, Object- Objectn
Objects, Read Compound Compound access
access
Objecto Append Compound access
> ()bjecte Read
.• ()bjecto
Table 4.4: Example Revised Object Matrix
For example, in Table 4.4 there are three occurrences of compound database accesses. A
problem arises, because we need to know what the indirect (compound) access type should
be.
In determining the 'compound access type, the rationale of the "grant" right in the Take-Grant
model is used [Lipton, Snyder - 1977]. .
For example, on the DFD in Figure 4.7, the objective is to determine the "combined" access
type that could exist between Object, and Object-, Object; and Objects, and Objects and
Objecto in the example.
?
IObject A -Read Object B Append ..I .1 ObJ.:(;1 C
R.:ad
?
? : Ohj.:(;ID
Figure 4.7: Example Compound Data Flow Diagram
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In order to determine the compound access type that exists between Objects, and Object-, it is
necessary to substitute the append flow type between Objects and Object- with write. This
allows the analyst to indicate a specific binary and compound access type in terms of the actual
action that occurs. As an update action requires information to be read before it is written to
another object, the update action type can be substituted with read-write.
The delete access "type is not considered, because when information is deleted, the information
no longer exists and cannot be transferred to other objects. If only some of the attributes are
deleted, it would indicate that the remaining information can flow to other objects. The
prototype presented in Chapter 5 doesn't implement this fine granularity, although a Sanitiser
Object can be inserted on the DFD to allow (on a logical level only) such information flows to
other objects to occur. The concept of multilevel databases [Pemul- 1994b] [Jajodia, Sandhu
- 1991] will assist the developer. in enforcing security down to an attribute level. Possible
combinations ofcompound access types between objects are depicted in Table 4.5.
Between Object, and Between Objecto and Objecte
Objecto
Read Append (i.e., Write)
Read Update (i.e., Read-Write)
Read Read
Append (i.e., Write) Read
Append (i.e., Write) Append (i.e., Write)
Append (i.e., Write) Update (i.e., Read-Write)
Update (i.e., Read-Write) Read
Update (i.e., Read-Write) Update (i.e., Read-Write) -
Update (i.e., Read-Write) Append (i.e., Write)
Table 4.5: Possible Compound Access combinations
From Table 4.5 it should be clear that a compound access type can only exist between at least
three objects. A compound access type is determined by studying the compound access
74
between three objects. These three objects need not be neighbouring objects, i.e. linked
directly to one another by means of a data flow.
A compound access type is then determined between the first object and the third object, using
the outcome of the combinations as summarised in Table 4.5.
The "newly" formed access type is then used as the first access type in determining the
compound access type between the next two objects. For example, if the flow type between
Object; and Objects is Read, and the access type between Objects and Object- is Append
(Write), we obtain a Read-Write access type. Read-Write indicates an update action, therefore
the compound access between Object, and Object- is Update. The access type between
Object, and Objecte now serves as the first access type in determining the compound access
type between Object; and Objects. If the access type between Object- and Objects is Read,
then the compound access type between Object; and Objects would be Read. (The
combination of Update - between Object, and Objects - and Read between Object- and
Objects).
Applying the compound access types in Table 4.5 to the example in Figure 4.7, compound
access types in the Revised Object Matrix in Table 4.4 can now be substituted with these
access types. Thus, the Revised Object Matrix for the example in Figure 4.5 is presented as in
Table 4.6:
"0 Object; Object, Objecte Objects
ObjectA. Read Update Read
Objects Append Read
Object- Read
Objects
Table 4.6: Adjusted Revised Object Matrix
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4.3.5 Construct a Security Revised Object Matrix
A security revised object matrix is used to summarise all valid information flows and accesses,
both direct (binary) and indirect (compound). The question arises as to when the binary and
compound information flows determined in the Object Matrix and Revised Object Matrix
would be valid or invalid.
Valid information flows are determined by using the security classes assigned to the objects
.(see paragraph 4.2.2), and by applying access rules stating when a flow is valid or invalid.
The author formulates the following access rules:
a. Binary Access rules
• Read: Object, can only read information stored in Objects, if the security class of
Object; is equal or greater than the security class ofObjects.
• AppendlInsert: Object, can append or insert information to Objects, if the security
class ofObject, is equal or smaller than the security class ofObjects,
• Update: Usually when an object updates another object, only a few attributes are
updated. The object updating another object thus needs to have clearance to update the
required attributes of the other object. In other words, Object; can update information
stored in Objects, if the security class of Object; is equal or greater than the security
class ofObjectg. The concept of multi-level secure databases [Pemul - 1994b] [Jajodia.
Sandhu - 1991] makes this possible. This concept is not demonstrated in the prototype.
• Delete: When an object deletes information contained in another object, either the
entire object or some attributes in the object are deleted. Depending on the type 0:-
deletion, the object deleting information stored in another object must have clearance tc
delete the information. Therefore, Object; can delete information stored in Objects. i:-
the security class of Object" is equal or greater to the security class of Object.,
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The binary access rules are summarised in Table 4.7:
Security class of the object to which information
flows (or target object)
U C S TS
.S~ctJ.rity~lass of U R,U,D,A,I A,I A,I A,I
... o~j~tt.·fr~~·.·which C R,U,D R,U,D,A,I A,I A,I
infol1l1atl()ri flows S R,U,D R,U,D R,U,D,A,I A,I
.-.:"'.:.>::--.-... ".::::<-.:.:.::
·(or.#ollrc¢.·.object) TS R,U,D R,U,D R,U,D R,U,D,A,I
.'
Key: U - Unclassified C - Classified
R - Read A - Append
Table 4.7: Binary Access Rules .
b. Compound Access Rules
S - Secret
I -Insert
TS- Top Secret
U - Update D- Delete
Since a single access type (or information flow) can be deducted between objects with
compound access types (or compound information flows) between them, the binary access
rules can be applied to check whether the compound access type or information flow is
valid or not.
4.3.6 Strengthen Security/Add Sanitiser Objects
DFDSEC should be able to point out invalid information flows by comparing the Revised
Object Matrix and the Security Revised Object Matrix. Entries that are not in the Security
Revised Object Matrix are invalid. It then presents the user with a choice. He can either:
(i) insert a Sanitiser Object; or
(ii) change the security class of one of the objects where an invalid information flow
is taking place.
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A Sanitiser Object is a process that is classified by default as Top Secret, and which has the
function of filtering information received from a higher classification object in order to let all
information which has the same security classification as the lower classified object, through to
the lower classification object. The concept of multi-level databases is once again very
important here. The prototype doesn't consider the fine granularity of information down to the
field level. Rather, it demonstrates the security stages on a higher level only, i.e. that of
analysis and design.
4.3.7 Repeat the Cycle
After Stage 6 in the proposed method, the analyst can restart the security analysis cycle,
starting at Stage 1 (Allocate security classes to objects). The cycle can be repeated until he is
satisfied,with the security of the system, and no more insecure areas of information flow are
revealed on the DFD.
4.4 General Advantages of the Proposed Approach
Eckmann's method reveals covert or indirect information flow in formally specified systems
descriptions. The added advantage in the proposed method is that indirect information flow is
detected and revealed to the systems analyst on a logical design level.
Automation of the security flow checking process can be achieved. This allows the analyst to
utilise his time more productively on design issues.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, analysis and design rules and principles were presented, as well as security
activities, which should be incorporated in the Automated Software Generation Environment
(ASGE) to enable the improvement of the security level and design quality of DFDs. The
proposed approach EASGE (Extended ASGE), was explained in more detail through the
addition'of security activities to the ASGE diagram.
Binary access rules and Compound access rules were presented, which actually form the
security policy on which the DFD-prototype DFDSEC is built. It forms the backbone of the
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security stages, since it assists in constructing the various tables that are used to determine the
security state of the DFD, and to determine where improvements should be made.
The activities and rules represent the logic of the prototype DFDSEC, which will be illustrated
in Chapter 5 with detailed examples. DFDSEC utilises some of the rules and principles for
effective design, and implements all of the discussed security stages.
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Chapter 5
Prototype implementation:
the DFDSEC tool
..
5 Introduction
The author of this dissertation has developed a prototype tool called DFDSEC, the name
being an acronym for 'DFD Security'. DFDSEC is a scaled-down DFD CASE-tool which
incorporates all the security activities and rules described in Section 4.1. Some of the rules for
effective design which were described in Chapter 4 are implemented as well, for example,
checking that all data flows have connected processes or external entities.
DFDSEC embarks on the journey of striving to combine the two fields of Information
Security and Computer-Aided Software Engineering, by integrating information security
principles with the normal analysis and design activities ofCASE-tools.
The tool demonstrates the concept of high-level security analysis and design which was
described in the previous chapters, allowing the designer to assign security classes to objects
in a DFD, then analysing direct and indirect information flows between such objects, pointing
out invalid information flows, and suggesting changes to the analyst concerning the DFD.
Chapters 4 covered the theoretical detail of the security principles upon which DFDSEC
operates, and its security stages. This chapter illustrates the theoretical with practical
examples. Detailed descriptions of how DFDSEC operates, as well as examples and
demonstrative screens sampled from DFDSEC analysing the example DFD, are presented.
The layout of the chapter is as follows:
Section 5.1 describes the purpose of DFDSEC in terms of security analysis. Section 5.2
presents the goals of DFDSEC and Section 5.3 lists the Security Stages. Section 5.4
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introduces sample DFDs, firstly as they would have appeared in the CASE-tools Silverrun and
OMD and secondly as represented by DFDSEC. Section 5.5 continues to explain the examples
by highlighting the security stages performed by the tool and the recommendations given by it.
5.1 Purpose of the Prototype.
The golden thread that is woven through all the discussed approaches in Chapter 2 and the
proposed approach in Chapter 4 is the goal to prevent invalid information flow between
objects with differing security classes. nFDSEC addresses the security issues surrounding the
development of new applications systems, embodied by the shaded area in Figure 5.1, as well
as the maintenance ofexisting application systems in terms of security features.
Security activities
Oc:t objectsecurityclasses fromuser
Oc:t illfonnation now types
Crate anObjectMatrix
Conslruc:t a Revised ObjectMatrix
Conslruc:t a Security Revised Object
matrix
Strengthen Security - Sanitizer Object
FigureS.I: Domain of the Prototype in the
Extended Automated Software Generation Environment
-I
I
I
I
I
The aim is to demonstrate that principles from the approaches of Baskerville, Eckmann znc
Pemul, can be implemented in the form of a working prototype, and that security stages can
exist as part of an existing, commercially used, CASE methodology. DFDSEC helps the
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designer to define a DFD using Gane and Sarson's methodology. The DFD is then analysed in
terms of secure data flow by applying the steps listed in Section 5.3.
DFDSEC is primarily concerned with high-level design, since it represents an example of
security extension to high-level design. Therefore, it doesn't reach down to the implementation
level..
DFDSEC will analyse the types of information flows between processes and the types of
accesses between data files on a DFD and will then highlight security weaknesses identified. It
will also suggest improvements to the DFD in order to improve the security of information
flow on the DFD.
5.2 Goals of the prototype
The goals ofDFDSEC are as follows:
(i) to indicate insecure information flows between processes and data stores, for example
information flowing from a "top secret" classified data store to a "secret" or
"confidential" classified process.
(ii) to identify and display insecure indirect information flows. For instance, if Process A
sends information to Process B via a shared database/file, and Process B sends
information to Process C via a shared database, as shown in Figure 5.2, then Process A is
providing information to Process C indirectly via B. If the security class of Process A is
more secretive than that of C (even if the security class of B is equal to that of A), then a
. potentially insecure flow of information between processes exists. The prototype will
identify these indirect flows.
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Indirect information flow
Figure 5.2: Indirect Information Flow between Data Stores and Processes.
(iii) to present warnings in the case ofdetection of ineffective design. For example, to detect
when information flows directly between two processes, instead of via a shared database
from one process to the other. According to Gane [Gane - 1990] it is a good design
principle to consistently use shared databases to store information flow, instead of having
direct information flow between processes.
(iv) to suggest appropriate processes to be added to the DFD for handling security. For
example, with the addition of a Sanitiser Process to the DFD that can handle security.
According to Baskerville [Baskerville - 1993], a new security control procedure should be
inserted as a sub-process ofa current process in cases where the disclosure or destruction
risks are present. However, in cases where the modification risk is present, security
checking should be done by an independent process, because of the nature of the
modification risk [Baskerville - 1988].
For example, the two risks disclosure and destruction of data, can be handled efficiently
by positioning the control process internally within the relevant process that causes the
- risk. This is the case because the security monitoring that needs to be performed under
these circumstances to prevent the realisation of the risk'can be done by the same process
or a sub-process of the process which accesses the data. However, in the instance where
the modification risk is present, the integrity of the data cannot be guaranteed when
security checking is done locally (within the same process). Baskerville suggests an
independent security process to monitor the modification of data by process objects
[Baskerville - 1988]. In the scope of this study, we can look at the situation in the
following way: if an object which is classified as Secret modifies the data in a Secret
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database, it would not be safe for that process to handle the security, simply because when
other objects which is Secret or Top Secret are added to the system later on, the security
process must be duplicated for each process. More importantly, when it is a malicious
object with intent to destroy or illegally modify the data (e.g. an object from another,
outside program), it is vital that the data in the database be protected by an independent
security object, which can always perform security monitoring for the database.
DFDSEC only allows the addition of independent processes, for illustration purposes.
(v) to allow the analyst to continue editing the DFD until he is satisfied with the security state
oftheDFD.
5.3 Security Stages of DFDSEC
The security activities in DFDSEC consist of the following security analysis and design
stages, discussed in Chapter 4:
1. Allocate security classes to objects.
2. Determine information flow types.
3. Create an Object Matrix.
4. Construct a Revised Object Matrix.
5. Construct a Security Revised Object Matrix.
6. Strengthen Security/Add Sanitiser objects.
5.4 Example with different representations (SILVERRUN, OMD and DFDSEC).
Consider the following user requirements, for an example DFD. This example will be used
extensively in the remainder of this chapter.
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5.4.1 User requirements
An application is needed with a process that can calculate salaries for employees of a large
company. There is an existing database containing employee data, for instance personal data
and rate per hour paid The process appends salary data to a data file. A salary clerk needs
access to the salary data so as to resolve ad hoc enquiries.for example to calculate average
salaries.
5.4.2 Silverrun Representation
Figure 5.3. shows the way that the example requirements could be represented in Silverrun,
using the Gane and Sarson methodology.
1
Calculate Salaries
1~1 IEmployee Data ._2--Eo=J;~~da~-F-1.
F-3,-
EE-1
Salary Clerk
_...
Figure 5.3: Silverrun Representation of the Example
5.4.3 Object Modeler Representation
Figure 5.4. shows the way that the example requirements could be designed using OMD. The
reader should remember that OMD uses an evolutionised EAR diagram which is Object-
oriented. An OMD OR diagram is represented in the figure. The basic relationship between
the objects are shown in the centre object (Emp-Salary). The logic of the requirements are
translated into OMD rules, which will signify the following meaning:
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• At the end of the month, for each Employee, fetch the data attribute Payment
Category (from object Employee).
• Fetch data attribute Payment per hour from Payment Rates.
• Calculate Salary as (Hours worked x Payment per hour).
• Update salary data in the object Salary Data.
The above-mentioned rules can be linked to the Employee object or to the Salary object, for
example.
Figure 5.4: OMD Representation of the Example
5.4.4 nFDSEC Representation
Figure 5.5 shows the way that DFDSEC would handle the situation. A security classification
has been added to each object, according to the sensitivity of the information that it contains
(if it is a data store), calculates (if it is a process), or is allowed to access (if it is an external
entity).
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EE-I
: Salmyclcrl::
I
Figure 5.5: DFDSEC Representation of the Example
Figure 5.6: DFDSEC Initial Screen
.5.5 Description of DFDSEC in terms of Security Activities and Recommendations.
When DFDSEC is loaded it presents the designer with a Graphical User Interface (GUI) as
depicted in figure 5.6. The GUI consists of three parts, namely a DFD window (A), a toolbar
(B), and an options bar (C).
The DFD window is used by the designer to represent user requirements in a visual way, i.e.,
by means of a data flow diagram. Drawing tools are contained within the toolbar and are
presented by the process icon, Sanitiser Process icon, External Entity, Data Store and Data
Flow objects. The D in Figure 5.6 indicates the drawing tools. The E in the figure indicates
utility tools, for example loading or saving a DFD. The options bar, indicated by C in Figure
5.6 allows the designer to change the line style, width and drawing colours. The F symbol in
Figure 5.6 indicates tools that can be used to analyse the DFD.
"
Analysing a DFD causes the information flow between objects on the diagram to be examined
in terms ofsecurity and integrity requirements according to the steps listed in Section 5.3. The
remaining tools are utility tools, used to save or load a diagram, exit the prototype, or start
creating a new data flow diagram.
The Gane and Sarson modelling technique [Gane - J990] serves as basis for DFDSEC.
According to this technique, the objects in the DFD are represented as shown in Figure 5.7
EE-I GJExternal [, Dat.. ..Oft I ~," Process IEnllty • flow I
.
Objects in a DFD (Gane and Sarson representation)Figure 5.7:
Using the drawing tools of DFDSEC, the designer has transformed the user requirements
listed in Section 5.4. J into a visual representation as depicted in Figure 5.8. Objects on the
DFD are connected by means of arrow symbols, so as to indicate the direction of information
flow within the system.
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·After the designer has placed the objects on the drawing board and connected them by means
of arrows, DFDSEC automatically determines the information flow type between objects on
the DFD. This is done by analysing the direction of the data flow arrows between two
objects. Only Read and Write actions can be deducted automatically. DFDSEC then
automatically labels the flow type between "Employee data" and "Calculate salaries" as read.
the flow type between "Calculate salaries" and "Salary data" as write etc. When the DFD is
analysed for security, the user is requested to supply more complete information concerning
the type of information flow. For example, if a write action has been deducted, the analyst
must specify whether it is an update, insert, append or delete action.
As the user requirements indicate that data is appended from the "Calculate salaries" object to
the "Salary data" object, the designer changes the write action to an append action, as
portrayed in Figure 5.9.
I EE-l Ijsay:= I
U ' i~I ~ If----.;IldD )
p-}
wOreCIJaIIate
·1D-2Isarciaa1Idcs
t
1lcall
Figure 5.8: Example Data Flow Diagram as created on DFDSEC
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Figure 5.9: Change ofInfonnation FlowType (Access Type)
The designer now selects the analyser icon (indicated by F in Figure 5.6) to indicate to
DFDSEC that the DFD can now be analysed in terms of security and integrity requirements.
The analysing process occurs internally and consists of the steps listed in Section 5.3.
The allocation of security classes to objects is depicted in Figure 5 10 The project leader has
indicated that the following security classes should be assigned to the process, data files and
external entity objects:
•
4" Calculate salaries (process) Top Secret
• Employeedata (data store) Confidential
• Salary data (data store) Secret
• Salary clerk (external entity) Confidential
• Retrieve data (process) Secret
The matrices presented below will not be presented III the dcsiuner. because thev arc meant tll
- .
be used internally for determining insecure nov.. s They arc merely sho» n here for cxplanat ion
purposes
<)0
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Figure 5.10: Allocation of Security Classes to Objects
Calculate Employee Retrieve Salary Salary
salaries data data data clerk
Calculate Append
salaries
Employee Read
data III,
iRetrieve Read ii
It
data I!I'il
i
Salary Read "11::
i:
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Salary :I
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Table 5. I: Object Matrix for the Example
·..
Calculate Employee Retrieve Salary Salary
salaries data data data clerk
Calculate Append Read
salaries
.Elllpl(Jyee Read Read Update Read
..·..·.d~i;<
..
···Retrieve Read
..,--...-.. -.- ....•...,....
data ..•·•
.. 8.a1ary -: Read Read
. ,-,
",' - ,". ' ....
<dabt·
-::~: ;
.. Salary
.:,:.:,.:';::;>./;-:":
.·c1erk
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Table 5.2: Revised Object Matrix for the Example
Calculate Employee Retrieve Salary Salary
salaries data data data clerk
Calculate
salaries
Employee Read Read Update Read
data -e-
Retrieve
data
Salary Read
data
Salary
clerk
Table 5.3: Security Revised Object Matrix for the Example
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DFDSEC now compares the Revised Object Matrix and the Security Revised Object Matrix to
determine invalid information flows. DFDSEC would point out that the binary flow from
"Retrieve data" to "Salary clerk" is invalid, (indicated by the thick line from "Retrieve data" to
"Salary clerk" in Figure 5.11) as the Salary clerk can only read information which has a
confidential or unclassified clearance. DFDSEC would suggest that the security class of the
Salary clerk be raised to be at least the same as the security class of "Retrieve data", i.e.
Secret.
DFDSEC prompts the designer to indicate whether he would like to change the security class
of the Salary clerk. As the user requirements stated that the salary clerk requires read access
to "Salary data" via the "Retrieve data" object, to resolve ad hoc enquiries, the designer has
reasoned that he needs to change the security class of the Salary clerk to Secret. This is
indicated in Figure 5.11.
Figure 5.11: Pointing out Invalid Information Flow Types
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DFDSEC prompts the designer to indicate whether he would like to insert a Sanitiser Object
between the "Calculate salaries" and "Salary data" objects. Examining the user requirements,
the designer concluded that once salaries have been calculated, it is necessary to append a
subset of the salary data from the TS process (Calculate Salaries) to the Salary data store
which is secret (S), so that the Salary clerk can resolve queries. Therefore, the designer has
opted to insert the Sanitiser Object. This is indicated in Figure 5.12.
The Sanitiser Object will facilitate the flow of information from a higher classified object to a
lower classified object (by definition), in order to override the rule that information cannot be
appended from a object with a higher security class to an object with a lower security class
(see the append rule in Section 4.3.5). Since DFDSEC is currently implemented as an analysis
and design tool, the implementation detail of the Sanitiser Object has not been addressed. One
possibility for implementing a Sanitiser Object can include multilevel security database
concepts [Baskerville - 1993] [J~jodia, Sandhu - 1991]. The Sanitiser Object is also similar to
Pemul's Security object, described in Section 2.4.5.(iii).
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Figure 5.12: Inserting a Sanitiser Object
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DFDSEC would also point out that the binary flow from "Calculate salaries" to "Salary data"
is invalid, as information flows from a Top Secret object ("Calculate salaries") to a Secret
object ("Salary data"). Due to the downflow of information DFDSEC suggests that a Sanitiser
Object be inserted between the "Calculate salaries" and "Salary data" objects.
Having changed the security class of the Salary clerk and inserted a Sanitiser Object, DFDSEC
automatically re-analyses the DFD. The various matrices constructed internally are presented
below:
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Calculate Employee Sanitiser Retrieve Salary Salar
salaries data object data data y
.../ ... clerk
./
Calculate salaries . Flow
Employee data < Read
Sanitist;~ obj~ Append
Retrieve data<··· Read
Salaryctati• Read
Salaqderl( ••
Table 5.4: Reconstructed Object Matrix for the Example
Note: The flow type between "Calculate salaries" and the "Sanitiser object" is indicated as
Flow, as information is transferred from the "Calculate salaries" object to the
"Sanitiser object" to prevent information flow from an object with a higher security
class to an object with a lower security class. The security class of any "Sanitiser
object" defaults to Top Secret.
Calculate Employee Sanitiser Retrieve Salary Salary
salaries data object data data clen..
Calculate salaries Flow
Employee data Read Flow
Sanitiser object Read Append RCdC
Retrieve data Rcac
Salary data Read RCdC
Salary clerk
Table 5.5: Reconstructed Revised Object Matrix for the Example
Calculate Employee Sanitiser Retrieve Salary Salar
salaries data object data data y
clerk
.' Calculate salaries Flow
Employee data Read Flow
Sanitiser object Read Append Read
•.•.....• Retrieve data Read
Salary data . . Read Read
I·.Salary clerk
Table 5.6: Reconstructed Security Revised Object Matrix for the Example
According to the binary access rules in Table 4.8, a TS object may only append to a TS data
store. This means that the Append between the "Sanitiser object" (TS) and "Salary data" (S) is
invalid. However, the Sanitiser Object would only allow secret information to flow to the
"Salary data" object. It would, in other words, filter the information, so that only data fields
classified as secret are allowed to pass to the lower object. Therefore the flow would be valid.
The same argument applies to the flow between the "Sanitiser object" and the "Retrieve data"
and "Salary clerk" objects.
DFDSEC now compares the Revised Object Matrix (Table 5.5) and the Security Revised
Object Matrix (Table 5.6) to determine invalid information flows. As no invalid information
flows exist, i.e., the Revised Object Matrix is identical to the Security Revised Object Matrix,
the real environment (EASGE) would proceed to generate databases tables and code.
5.6 Conclusion
The advantages of using an EASGE tool when developing a system are numerous. Firstly, an
EASGE tool allows most object interactions to be determined automatically using the high-
level design diagrams such as DFDs of the system. Secondly, a Revised Object Matrix ensures
that all valid and invalid combinations of information flow are considered during system
development. This is the aim of all three of the approaches in Chapter 2 (Baskerville, Eckmann
and Pernul). Thirdly, the security class assigned to an object is considered while developing
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the system. This allows security definition activities to become an integrated part of
application system development.
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Chapter 6
Design and Implementation of the Prototype.
6 Introduction
This chapter covers some of the details of how DFDSEC wasdesigned and implemented.
Section·6.1 presents the requirements specifications for DFDSEC, i.e. what is was required to
do, as well as detailed specifications for each stage ofDFDSEC.
Section 6.2 presents the requirements design for DFDSEC. This section explores the more
detailed design ofDFDSEC. Each stage of the prototype is explained in more detail.
Section 6.3 gives some important implementation details, such as the kind of memory
structures used and data stored for each object in the DFD.
6.1 Requirements Specification
The goal of DFDSEC can be summarised on a very high level as in Figure 6.1. The input to the
prototype is a DFD (defined by the analyst). The prototype analyses it according to principles and
rules for secure design, discussed in Section 4.3. The output is a more secure DFD.
PROCESSING
Get original DFD Security stagesofEASGE
Figure 6.1: The Main Goal ofDFDSEC
Secure DFD
A short description of each of the three main steps (stages) is now given.
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6.1.1 Get original DFD
In this phase of the prototype, the DFD is input from the analyst with the aid of drawing tools.
6.1.2 Processing
The aim ofthis phase of the prototype is to perform the security stages ofEASGE. This means that
the DFD is processed step by step according to a set of security stages. The security stage activities
include generation ofthe following:
(i) An Object Matrix, which maps source objects of direct information flows or direct
access types onto target objects.
(ii) A Revised Object Matrix, which maps source objects of indirect information flows
or indirect access types onto target objects. This matrix contains both valid (secure)
and invalid (insecure) information flows or access types.
(iii) A Security Revised Object Matrix, which maps source objects of valid (secure)
information flows or access types onto target objects.
The Revised Object Matrix and Security Revised Object Matrix are compared, and entries which
are not on the security revised object matrix are pointed out as dangerous or illegal information
flows. The analyst may then insert a Sanitiser Object to handle downflow of information between
objects ofvaried security classifications, or he may change the security class of a security breaching
object.
The ideal is that user interaction should be minimised, because the aim is to automate the securitv
checking process. However, the user (analyst) will still have to assign a security class to each
object in order to continue with the security analysis.
After generation of the matrices, a new DFD must be constructed if necessary This will be c onc
from the original DFD and the matrices.
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It makes sense to apply the security activities on the DFD level, because a DFD is more analysable
by a computer than normal language text. The part that the prototype performs can then also
become part of an existing CASE-tool, i.e. the part of handling the security analysis and design,
integrated with the normal analysis and design activities.
6.1.3 Secure DFD
The output of the Processing phase is a new, security-adjusted DFD which should be shown to the
user so that he can see the difference in design that has been achieved.
6.2 Requirements Design
6.2.1 Get Original DFD
The DFD definition (drawing) tool should have the following capabilities:
• Drawing processes, data flow arrows, external entities and data stores. Names should
be given to these objects.
• Each object must be moved interactively. Therefore, for each object the data in Figure
6.2 must be stored in the memory workspace. The area underneath the object shouldn't
be disturbed by the movement.
6.2.2 Processing
Processing of the DFD is to be done by the following software processes.
a. Information Flow Controller
This process should allow the user to assign security classes to the objects on the DFD (for
example, Confidential or Top Secret). This Controller analyses direct information flow between
different objects on the DFD and generates an Object Matrix The Object Matrix also contains the
information flow types or access types. For example, Read or Write access types. This is
determined by the direction of the arrow heads of each pair of objects
100
b. Information Flow Enforcer
This process generates a Revised Object Matrix from the Object Matrix, indicating the indirect
data flows between different modules on the DFD. This is done by a method which was deducted
from the work of Hsieh [Hsieh - 1992], generating information sets indicating between which
objects there exist indirect information flows.
From the Revised Object Matrix the Security Revised Object Matrix is generated. The type of
access between processes and databases should also be considered when checking the security,
because an update action has different implications from an append or a read action.
From the combination of these two matrices, the secure DFD is generated.
6.2.3 Secure DFD
The following component is needed in the prototype code in order to be able to construct a new
DFD:
a. Automated Diagramming System
By this component a new DFD can be generated from the comparison between the Revised
Object Matrix and the Security Revised Object Matrix, which should be secure.
The user should be able to iterate the process of editing the DFD and commanding DFDSEC to
analyse it, until he is totally satisfied that the DFD of the target application system is secure
6.3 Some implementation details
6.3.1 Memory structures for the storage of the DFD.
When DFDSEC is executed by the computer, the management of data concerning the \~:',)1I~
objects on the DFD is done by a doubly linked list memory structure, illustrated in Figure 6:
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Each object points to the previous and the next object, to speed up internal referencing when
analysing the information flow.
•
ointer to first +--+BI
object
•
Figure 6.2: The Nodes Connecting Objects on the DFD
. Each node ofthe linked list stores the data for one object on the DFD. Figure 6.3 shows a
more detailed diagram ofone node in the linked list. Each object can have more than one child
or more than one parent. For example, if a process reads data from two data stores, it is linked
to two parent objects.
, I: ICode ~amc SccLcYeI+Group fType Oeser Nll.1Lni'Ir I'n1.cvPltVisible Coords SizeColon Pwcnl/:odcs C1ul<lrJncodes I : I I
I I
'tl> ICode I ICode I ~I I
ICode I ICode I
I I
IC'ode I ICode I
Figure 6.3: Extension ofFigure-Data" in Figure 6.2
Figure 6.4 shows detail data stored in each node of the linked list
102
a. Object Code (e.g. EE-I for External Entity I)
b. Object Name (supplied by the user)
c. Object Type (e.g. ProcesslData flowlEntity/Store)
d. Security class ofelement (One of "Top secret! Secret! Confidential!
Unclassified" - this information is supplied by the user.
e. Description of the object (optional)
f Visibility (e.g. is Object currently visible?)
g xl, yl, x2, y2 (relative co-ordinates - relative to the actual design page)
h Sx, Sy (size ofelement on design page)
FColor, BColor (foreground and background colors)
J. Parent elements (pointers to other objects. E.g. a pointer to a process if the
current element is an information flow arrow)
k Children elements (pointers to other elements. For example from a current process
to one or more arrows, or from a current arrow to a process)
Figure 6.4: Record ofData Stored for Each ObjectlDFD element
A current process or arrow or other object which is current means the object which is the
selected one in the memory workspace at a point in time, either during analysis of the DFD, or
during editing of the DFD.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter examined some of the implementation details ofDFDSEC.
In Section 6.1, detailed requirements specifications were presented for DFDSEC, illuminating
what had to be done by each stage of the prototype, especially the Processing stage, in which
the DFD is scrutinised to check how secure it is.
In Section 6.2, detailed requirements design was subjected to the spotlight. The Information
Flow Controller and Information Flow Enforcer were described, which are the two software
processes which generates the matrices used for analysing the security level of the DFD.
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In Section 6.3, explicit implementation details were given concerning the type of memory
structures used in storing the DFD objects created using DFDSEC. The role of the doubly
linked list in DFDSEC memory usage was highlighted in this section.
Chapter 7 presents a basic user manual for DFDSEC.
."
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Chapter 7
User manual for DFDSEC
7 Introduction and structure of this user manual
In this chapter, a simple user manual is supplied for use when operating the prototype.
Section 7.1 contains instructions for the installation of DFDSEC onto the hard disk of a PC,
and the required and recommended computer system to be able to run the tool.
..
Section 7.2 explains how to activate the tool from the DOS prompt.
Section 7.3 describes the DFDSEC environment and user interface, including how to use the
mouse when operating DFDSEC, and the various shapes of the mouse pointer on the screen
during different types ofoperation.
Section 7.4 describes each icon on the user menu in detail, using the following structure:
• Identification
• Purpose
• Use
• Other important details when using this icon
Section 7.5 explains what the user (the systems analyst) should do when an error message
appears on the screen.
Section 7.6 expands on how to enter information in an input window on the screen.
Section 7.7 explains the procedure to define a sanitiser object It is necessary to enre: a
sanitiser object when information is flowing on the DFD from a higher classified object (e g
Top Secret process) to a lower classified object (e.g. Confidential database) and the secunry
classification can not be changed because of user requirements
7.1 Installation
The files for the DFDSEC program are supplied on a single 1.44 MB stiffy diskette,
DFDSEC can be installed on the hard disk of a computer by copying all the files on the
diskette to a directory on the hard disk. For example, if the diskette is in drive A, and the
target directory on the hard disk is c:\DFDSEC then type
copy A: *.* c:\dfds'ec <Enter>
7.2 Activating the tool and System requirements
Switch to the c:\DFDSEC directory (or the user-specified directory) and type:
DFDSEC <Enter>
This will load the tool into the computer's memory and start executing it.
It should be noted that the following system requirements are applicable. The user must have
a computer with a minimum of the following requirements (left column of Table 7.1). The
recommended specifications for efficient performance are given in the right column of Table
7.1.
Minimum requirements Recommended specifications
386SX processor 386DX or 486DX processor
VGA screen VGA screen
Mouse Mouse
2 MB memory 4 MB memory
1 MB free hard disk space 2 MB free hard disk space
Table 7.1: System requirements and recommended specifications to run DFDSEC
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7.3 Drawing a DFD with DFDSEC: General Information and Tools
7.3.1 DFDSEC Main Screen
When DFDSEC is loaded it presents the designer with a Graphical User Interface (GUI)-as
depicted in Figure 7.1. The GUI consists of three parts, namely a DFD window (A), a-toolbar
(B), and an options bar (C).
The DFD window is used by the designer to represent user requirements visually, i.e., by
means of a data flow diagram. Drawing tools are contained within the toolbar and are
presented by the Process, Sanitiser Process, External Entity, Data Store and Data Flow icons.
The D in Figure 7.1 indicates the drawing tools. The E symbol in the figure indicates utility
tools, for example, loading or saving a DFD. The options bar, indicated by C in the figure
allows the designer to change the line style, width and drawing colours. The F symbol
indicates tools that can be used to analyse the DFD.
The remaining tools are utility tools, used to save and load a diagram, exit the prototype and
start creating a new DFD.
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Figure 7.1: DFDSEC Main Screen
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7.3.2 Cursor Shape
It is useful for the user (the systems analyst) to note the shape of the mouse pointer on the
screen. When the mouse is in drawing mode, i.e. waiting for the analyst to draw an object,
the cursor is a cross. When the mouse is in command mode, i.e. waiting for the analyst to
choose a drawing tool in the tools window, the cursor is an arrow shape.
7.3.3 Currently Active Drawing Tool
One drawing tool can be active at a time, for example a process. Then the analyst can define
processes, until he selects another drawing tool. When a tool is active, and the analyst moves
the cursor over the command area , that tool stays active, although the cursor shape will
change to an arrow. The tool will stay active until a new one is selected. Otherwise, if the
cursor is moved over the working area again, the arrow will once again be a cross and the
analyst can continue drawing processes (or use whichever tool was active before).
7.3.4 The Mouse in Drawing Mode
The left button (LB) draws the object at the current position. Holding the right button (RB)
and moving the cursor (by moving the mouse) sizes the object. For example, press and hold
the RB down and move the mouse in the direction into which you want to size the object.
Release the button when sizing is completed.
The middle button (MB) also has a special function. When defining a process, and the MB is
pressed and held, and the pointer is moved, then the corner radius changes, i.e. the corners are
made bigger or smaller.
If the analyst presses and holds the LB button while moving the mouse pointer over the
command area, the drawing tool will not deactivate, in other words the tool stays active and
can still be used when moving to the working area again.
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If no button is pressed, and the mouse pointer is moved over the tools area, the pointer
temporarily becomes an arrow again, until moved back to the drawing area.
Choosing Another Tool
If the left button is pressed when the pointer (arrow) is on the menu area, the selected drawing
tool is deactivated, and the one under the mouse pointer (arrow) is selected as the new current
drawing tool.
7.4 The Menu Options
The individual options for defining a DFD are as follows:
7.4.1 The Process icon
Identification: [81 [0]
Purpose: Allows the analyst to define new process objects on the working area.
Use: Select the Process drawing tool by clicking the mouse when the mouse pointer is on the
Process icon. Size the process with the right mouse button, if necessary. Place the process
onto the working area by pressing the left mouse button when the object is at the required
position. After placing, a code will be assigned to the process and displayed inside it. The
analyst keeps on defining new processes until he selects a new tool.
Selecting an existing process on the working area: When the mouse pointer is in command
mode (arrow-shaped), the analyst may click on a process. The details of that process will then
be displayed in an editing window, and can be edited. Please refer to Section 7.6 for mere
information on editing data.
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7.4.2 The Flows Icon
Identification: g
Purpose: Lets the analyst define and place new data flow arrows between entities.
Use: Select the Flow drawing tool by pressing the LB when the mouse pointer is on the flow
icon. Define the flow by clicking the left button first inside a SOURCE entity, then inside the
TARGET entity. If either the start OR end point isn't inside an object (Process, Data store, or
External entity), the arrow is INVALID an is erased from the screen.
After placing, a code will be stored for the flow. It will not be displayed. The analyst keeps on
defining new arrows until clicking on the menu area, selecting a new tool.
Selecting a flow: When the mouse pointer is in command mode, the analyst may click on a
flow. The details of that flow will then be displayed, and can be edited.
Entering data: Data will only be required for an arrow when the program has analysed the
Revised Object Matrix. Only the information flow type (or access type) will be required by the
program. Use the same input method as for Security classes, i.e. use the <Left>/<Right>
arrow keys to select the correct type.
7.4.3 The External Entity Icon
Identification: [-I
Purpose: Lets the analyst define and place new external entities.
Use: Select the External Entity (EE) drawing tool by clicking the mouse when the mouse
pointer is on the EE icon. Size the EE with the right mouse button. Place the EE with the left
mouse button. After placing, a code will be displayed inside the EE. The analyst keeps on
defining new EEs until clicking on the menu area, selecting a new tool.
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Selecting an External Entity: When the mouse pointer is in command mode, the analyst may
click on an EE. The details of that EE will then be displayed, and can be edited. Please see
Section 7.6. for information on editing data.
7.4.4 The Data Store Icon
Identification: (5
Purpose: Lets the analyst define and place new data stores.
Use: Select the data store drawing tool by clicking the mouse when the mouse pointer is on
the icon. Size the data store with the right mouse button. Place the data store with the left
mouse button. After placing, a code will be displayed inside the data store. The analyst keeps
on defining new data stores until clicking on the menu area, selecting a new tool.
Selecting a data store: When the mouse pointer is in command mode, the analyst may click
on a data store. The details ofthat data store will then be displayed, and can be edited.
Entering data: Please refer to Section 7.6. for more information concerning the editing of
data.
7.4.5 The Load Icon
Identification: r;I
Purpose: Lets the analyst load a saved DFD from the active directory (the one from which the
program was executed).
Use: Click on icon. A window is displayed, asking for a filename. Enter a filename. Include a
DFD extension. For example, DFDI.DFD. The file is then loaded, and the DFD is drawn.
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7.4.6 The Save Icon
Identification: ~
Purpose: Lets the analyst save the current DFD in the active directory (the one from which
the program was executed).
Use: Click on icon. A window is displayed, asking for a filename. Enter a filename. Include a
.DFD extension. For example, DFDl.DFD. The file is then saved.
7.4.7 The Printed Page Icon! Screen Icon
Identification:
Purpose: Activates the analyser, and outputs the generated sets to the specified output device.
(printer or Screen).
Note: Choosing the Printer makes comparison with the DFD on the screen easier.
Use: Click on icon. The program will start asking information concerning each object, if that
object's Security Classification is Undefined. Enter information as described in Section 7 6.
Pressing <Esc> will skip the details of the current object and move on to the next one.
After every object's data has been retrieved from the analyst, construction of the Object Matrix
is started. Immediately thereafter, construction of the Revised Object Matrix is started The-se
two tables are then printed or displayed.
DFDSEC then proceeds with the construction of the Security Revised Object Matrix. First.v,
the analyst is asked every flow's information now type (or access type if the f:0\\ IS
connected to a data store) (e.g. ReadiWritelAJlfUpdateiDeletefFlow). Analysis is tr-en
finalised, constructing the Security Revised Object Matrix, and displaying it on screen. or
printing it.
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7.4.8 The Pen Icon
Identification: •
Purpose: Redraws the DFD.
7.4.9 The Pen Icon with the S in the Corner
Identification: Iii
Purpose: Shows security breaching problems by drawing the security-breaching information
flows (or access types), one at a time.
Use: Press left mouse button between each invalid display, or right mouse button to quit
function.
7.4.10 The End Icon
Identification: ;~
Purpose: Exits the tool
7.5 Error message and information message windows
When the analyst tries to execute an action that is not applicable or invalid, an error message
appears. The window of an error message is red, the message is displayed in yellow, and there
is a blue OK button. To close the window, the analyst can either:
1) click on the OK button; or
2) press any key on the keyboard.
7.6 Input Windows for Entering Information
Example: When a filename or other data has to be entered.
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Use: The analyst can move the cursor between input fields by pressing the <Up> and <Down>
arrow buttons, or the <<Tab.> or <Shift>+«TAB.> buttons.
Entering data: The <Tab>. key moves the text cursor to the following field. The <Up> and
<Down> cursor keys moves the text cursor to the previous or next input field, respectively.
Hints:
• Type the name in normally.
• Select the security class by pressing the left/right cursor keys until the correct class
is displayed. Then press <Enter>.
• Select the information flow type only for a data flow.
Press <Enter> or <Down> when a field is correct. The cursor moves to the next input field
<Esc> may be pressed to escapethe current input window.
Closing the window: When clicking the mouse pointer outside of the window, the window
will close. This has the same effect as pressing <Esc>.
7.7 Defining a Sanitiser Object
After the analyser has been activated and the DFD has been analysed (by clicking on either the
Printed Page tool or the Screen tool), DFDSEC will make some suggestions. It may suggest
the inser:tion ofa sanitiser object between two objects when a downflow of information occurs
(for example, from Top Secret to Confidential). It will specify the problematic objects and
their security classifications. The analyst can then confirm that he wants a sanitiser ObjCL~
inserted. DFDSEC prompts him to indicate the position of the new Sanitiser Object (S~
Figure 7.1). After the analyst presses the left mouse button on the required position. th-e
Sanitiser Object is put on the working area, and the information flow links or access links ar e
redrawn to go via the Sanitiser Object to the target object.
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Figure 7.2: Insertinga SanitiserObject on the DFD
7.8 Conclusion
This chapter supplied the user manual for DFDSEC. The following chapter will look at the
future prospects of the incorporation of computer security into the world of CASE tools
Chapter 8
Future Prospects and Conclusion
8 Introduction
The structure of this concluding chapter is as follows:
Section 8.1 lists some of the most important advantages of the Extended Automated Software
Generation Environment (EASGE) discussed in this dissertation.
Section 8.2 describes some prospects concerning the general feasibility of implementing
security activities as part ofa commercial CASE tool.
Sections.a presents the author's views on the viability of creating a similar prototype to
DFDSEC which can analyse object-oriented analysis and design diagrams.
Section 8.4 describes the views of the author in terms of analysing control flow which occurs
inDFDs.
Section 8.5 shortly focuses on the suitability and capabilities of DFDSEC for the analysis and
design oflarger, more complex, secure data flow diagrams.
-.:.'.
Section 8.6 concludes this dissertation with some suggested research directions.
8.1 General advantages
Using an EASGE tool when developing a system, has several benefits to the security state of
the system under development. Firstly, it allows most object interactions to be determined
automatically using the high-level design diagrams (i.e. DFDs) of the system. Secondly, a
Revised Object Matrix ensures that all valid and invalid combinations of information flow are
detected for scrutiny during system development. Thirdly, the security class assigned to an
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object is considered during the development of the system, instead of afterwards. This brings
security to the Upper-CASE phases, namely analysis and design, away from being an
implementation detail 'to be left for later'. In other words, security features can be added as an
integrated part of application system development, instead of being an ad hoc addition to
existing applications.
8.2 Implementation prospects
DFDSEC is an example of a possible mechanism which automatically enforces secure
information flow during the high-level development of an application system. The insertion of
a security handling object (Sanitiser object) onto the DFD allows for more realistic design, in
that information is allowed to flow down to objects with a lower security classification, under
the watchful eye of both the designer and the security CASE-tool, DFDSEC. Although
DFDSEC doesn't facilitate the implementation of a process, data store or external entity on
the DFD, nor the implementation ofa sanitiser process,· it is assumed that the sanitiser process
could be implemented had DFDSEC been a real CASE tool. Work done by Baskerville
illustrates a possible way of implementing processes to handle security, although he describes
it on a theoretical basis, in other words, not as being an activity of a CASE tool [Baskerville -
1993].
Concerning field-level security, DFDSEC doesn't consider the fine granularity of information
security down to the data field level, although it is implied (on a logical level) by the filtering
activitie~_ of information on field level. DFDSEC demonstrates the security activities on the
logical level only, i.e. that of analysis and design. With the increasing quality of multi-level
secure databases (MLS databases) as suggested by Pernul in [Pernul - I 994b] and CASE-
tools that use some form of MLS already (for example Object Modeler by Sapiens
International), the ease of implementation of a security strategy such as EASGE (implemented
in the tool DFDSEC), results in security implementation becoming more viable by the day.
It is hoped that this prototype will serve as an example of what powerful features call be
incorporated into the computer aided software environment to facilitate security enhancement
ofdesign diagrams and to automate as much of this as possible.
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8.3 Object-oriented implementation of a prototype
It is also believed by the author of this dissertation that an object-oriented prototype can be
constructed using the exact same security principles contained in EASGE (described in
Chapter 4) which were implemented in DFDSEC. The following guidelines could be followed:
• Object-oriented analysis and design assumes that an object operates by sending
messages to other objects which causes certain behaviour to be performed by the
addressed object. In Sapiens, which is an object-oriented CASE tool, messages between
objects take the form of transactions. An example of a transaction is the following:
3000,I,40,ABC. The 3000 is the number of a transaction linked to an object by the
object-oriented concept of encapsulation. The I is an operation code specifying that the
following data should be inserted in the data table with the same number as the
transaction (i.e. 3000). The data is the key of the table (which in this case has the value
of40) and a description field (which in this case has the value ofABC).
In. an object-oriented prototype similar to DFDSEC, the information flow between
objects on the DFD can easily be replaced by messages flowing between objects, which
mayor may not contain information such as in the above example. Security analysis will
be done on the information contained in the messages. In the case of a tool such as
Sapiens, the database access type which is used in the analysis (see Section 4.3.4) can be
inferred by the operation code contained in the transaction (for example I for Insert).
• The objects on the DFD (i.e. processes, data stores, external entities) will be replaced by
the objects that is being designed as objects in the target system. For example instead of
processes and data stores, the diagram will consist ofobjects such as Employee and Order
8.4 Analysing Control Flow in DFDs.
It is the view of the author that control flow analysis is similar to the analysis of object-
oriented diagrams and the analysis of normal data flow Control flow analysis can quite easily
be achieved using a tool built on the exact same security activities as DFDSEC.
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Control flow in a data flow diagram is similar to messages flowing between objects in an
object-oriented system. Control flow and object messages have the same goal: to cause
action by other objects, be they DFD objects (i.e. processes or data stores) or objects on an
object diagram (e.g. Order), respectively. Therefore, the type of data flowing between the
objects would, in both cases, be quite similar. It would be information concerning the expected
behaviour of the target object, with perhaps some database data/information accompanying
the control data, as in the case of the Sapiens transaction.
8.5 Analysing Bigger DFDs.
Although the examples ofDFDs analysed in Chapter 5 represent relatively simple information
flow in a small demonstration application system, the capabilities of DFDSEC isn't stretched
by this example DFD.
In experiments done by the author, one DFD was created which contained the following
objects:
• 18 Process objects
• 17 Data store objects
• 41 information flows and database access types.
The resulting Revised Object Matrix contained roughly 150 direct and indirect information
flows which consisted of both binary (direct) information flows and compound (indirect)
information flows. The Security Revised Object Matrix concluded that roughly 130 of those
information flows were valid and roughly 20 were indicated to be insecure.
Theoretically, the size of the DFD isn't a concern to DFDSEC, because of the use of
pointers. The number of objects on the DFD is only limited by memory space available and
screen size. However, screen size can become a problem because the current version of
DFDSEC doesn't support the scrolling of objects on the workspace (the DFD window on the
screen).
The time needed to analyse the security for the DFD increases with each addition of an object
to the DFD. The actual analysis time for the tested DFD with 18 process objects and 17 data
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stores was around 2 minutes on a 486DX4-1 OOMhz computer. This is because ALL possible
information flows are taken into account during the construction of the matrices for analysing
the security of the DFD.
8.6 Possible research directions
Possible research directions include the following:
• information flow and security analysis in object-oriented systems engineering;
• control flow analysis in data flow diagrams.
• the implementation ofmulti-level secure (MLS) DBMSs in a tool such as the one described
in this dissertation.
• exploring possible ways of facilitating the implementation of objects such as sanitiser
objects in a commercial CASE environment.
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Annexure A
Security Agorithms Implemented in DFDSEC
The algorithms for security analysis and enforcing in DFDSEC' are listed below. The main
procedure is ProcessDFDForSecurity, which executes the following steps:
• Initialises the sets which store the matrices' data;
• Ensures that for each object, all the necessary data has been entered, before analysis
starts;
• Activates the Information Flow Controller, which generates an Object Matrix;
• Activates the Information Flow Enforcer, which generates a Revised Object Matrix
and Security Revised Mattix, and suggests Sanitiser objects or changes to the security
classification ofan object;
• Redraws the DFD.
procedure ProcessDFDForSecurity:
beg1.n
INITIALISE LISTS IObjt,
Orig,Dest
R_Orig, R_Dest
SR_Orig,SR_Dest)
GET COMPLETE DATA FOR EACH OBJECT
if the object is a flow: Ask the usee to expand the i n I o r ms t. i: Ii f 1(''''
type if it is Weite.
if i~ is a process, data stoee, or exteenal entity:
As!': the usee for the secueity ::'",,".
INFORMATION FLOW CONTROLLER
CrE.He Object Hatrix. Storr, cr. or iq arid Des t
INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCER
Cr"ale Revised Object Matei:·:. St. :.:" i r. R_Oriq ,;; ..j j-,
Peint Revised Oeig and Des~ ~Pto
Cr e a t e Secueity-Revised Cb j ec t Matrix. Stoee in Sk_Gn·~,;'k. n,.:>t
Pe i ntSeckevisedOAndDSet s
Suggestions: Ceeate Sanitisel CbJ",cts or suggest Change of 5h"llity Class.
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the R_Orig and R_Dest sets,
Add the key of the P,u'ent
Add the key of the Child
Add the information flow
DRAW REVISED DFD
end; (ProcessDFDForSecurity)
procedure CreateOAndDSets;
begin
Repeat for every object in the object database
Retrieve the record of the object
if there are Children for the Object (the ParETItl then begin
repeat for every Child
Retrieve the record of the Child object
Add the key of the Parent to the Orig set
Add the key of the Chi ld to the Dest set
end; (CreateOAndDSets)
procedu~ CreateRevisedOAndDSets;
begin
DelBranchActive := false;
For every Object key in the Orig set
Retrieve the record of the current object in the Orig set
Retrieve the ,record of the current object In the Dest set
If the information flow type between Parent (in Ori9) and Child (in Dest)
is not Delete, AND
there does not yet exist a paIr (Parent,Child) for the current objects In
then
to the R_Orlg set
to the R_Dest set
type between Parent and Child to the n~,wTypeList
if information flow is Delete, then set DelBranchActive :~ true;
(Tra~e Indirect Flow)
tResetCount := 0;
tStoredKey .= Parent l:"y; (tSt0redKey Is tt,f' Dr io i n a I :rl"1lna1)
tKey .- Ch i ld key; I U;",y Is to b", t~,e ,;(,w or q)
repeat for each ob j cc t Ley I n the Or ig s e t
Re t r i.e ve the t;ey '_'f th" current object HI the Or i q SEt (Int·~ le: :'~r:eyl
if t Or Lqr.e y = U:ey then begin
Retrieve the i<ey o f th~ cu r r er.t ~:·bJt::ct- i r: ~Lr- (IF'st .o:,="t !ir'.t_ - . ~f,.,;',-r:,,-:"·)·}
t~eyListlJ. t~Fi no i t h (De s t, TPosZ); r;{:yLl :~t!J. !':Rf::t I 1 ev ..-=. ::.'::5':., t~ [11---.3 '" r~·y
Go to the begulrllnq c f the Or iq ar.j D",st : ;:~ts
breal:;
If the in(orm:lt"l·-,rl fl.-:·w tYr'~ b~t.""·~F.'rl t'-}I"-r.~_ :lrl 01:"11 dr,,:) _~L;...1 'If! D~:;j'_j
is Delete then
DelBranchAct i ve .- t r ue :
if DelBraltchAct i vr. then
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break;
if there does not yet exist a pair (tStoredKey,t.[)estKey) dlld
Flow <> Delete then
Add the key of the Parent to the R_Orig set
Add the key of the Indirect Child to the R Oest set
Determine the Compound Access type between Parent and I/ldirect Child
Add Compound Access type to the R_FlowTypeList
Make the Child key the new parent
if tResetCount > (Orig,Dest) Lists sizes then
break;
Do the whole process again, but for every Object key in the R_Orig set
The objective here is to ensure that, for example, had (C,D) been added to
R_Orig and R_Dest, that (B,O) and (A,O) will also be added if there is
information flow between (A,B) .and (B,C).
Until roo new indirect flows (backwards) has been added.
end; (CreateRevisedOAndDSets!
procedure CreateSecRevisedOAndDSets;
begin (L00k for parent and children entities!
for every Object Key in the R_OrOig set do
Test the security classed of Parent lin R_Orig) and the Child (in R_Dest)
Test if the information flow is clear
if the security classes are legal, then
Insert the keys of the objects from R_Orig and R Dest sets into SR_Orig
and SR_Dest (if it doesn't already exist)
Add Compound Access type to the SR_FlowTypeList
end; (CreateSecRevisedOAndDSets!
procedure GetPossibleInfoFlowTypel tOrigKey, tDestKey: KeyType;
var tIFT: String5);
begin
case tOrigKey(l) of lif til.: first letter of the obJ<oc:t c0de is a: )
:oP': begin
case tDestKeyili of
'D': tIIT := 'W'; {Sh0uld be.- r:h.:Hiqf:C:·j :': 'll','D' o r 'A' JUllri'1 .... c.:
5~curity ~nalysl~ ~~ale}
'P': t IF, 0-
end; ·~·.3;c~i
end;
'E': begin
. p': t I Fi" : ';";:
I I 1 1 ~. ] 1 : :~ ~ lTi,l t 1 ': I ~. J ' ...... : ~ ..t .' -.... < - I
end;
end;
'0': begin
~ .. -. ' i . :. 1; t· - . ' 1 r-:;:, , • ; ;
'P': tIFT: , k
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'D': (Show an error mes s aqe
end;
end;
end;
end; (GetPossiblelnfoflowType)
'Illegal Ir.: ,rm3ti'JtI flow: Between ~ Data
Stores!'}
procedure TestforCorrectlnfoflow( tOriq,tDest: StdElement;
var Chflow: boolean);
begi.n
Chflow := false;
{Determine which information flow type is present be tweer. t or iq and TDest. Upda t.e the
data flow's information flow type (InfoflowTypeJ a cco r d i r.c ~o the table)
for Each Parent of the current object do
for Each Child of the current object do
Get the flow that connect them
tOrigSec := The Security class of then Parent;
tDestSec := The Security class of then Chi Id;
tflow := The Information flow type of the data f l c-..·;
tOrigFigType := Parent Figuretype;
tDestFigType ,- Child FigureType;
{Determine flows according to object types}
1f IltOrigFigType - tDestfigType) {the same object}
and
ItOrigFigType
-
AProc) ) then Pas flows .~
else begj.n
{Determine possible flows according to security class€si
1£ tOriqSec
-
, , then beqin
1£ tDestSec , then Posflows :# 'All , el~-=
1£ tDestSec 'u
, then Posrlows '= 'A , cis",
1£ tDestSec 'C , then Posflows := 'A , f::L;~
1£ tDestSec 'S , then Pos FLows .- 'A t.'l .::0 r
1! tDestSec 'TS , then posrl.;,ws := 'A ' ;
end else
1£ tOri.~Sec 'u , then begin
1£ tDestSec , then p,jsrlow3 ,- ' RIL'IO' {;l~~
1f tDestSec 'U , then P05 rl"w~' · - ' Al I el.:!"
1f tDestSec 'C , then r-.:.", F'Ir·ws
·-
'A
if tOestSec 'S , then Po s FLows . - 'A r-~ •
1f tOestSec 'TS , then 1'0sflc,ws · - 'A ' .
end else
if tOriqSec 'C , then begin
1f tD~stSec , then ,·,·"n· .....'"': , - ' F~/l: I! I' ~
if ~ r;~;...t SeC 'V . then t' .,>Fl .- ......
"
~ "i\I ,;'J'
if ~De.stSec 'C , then i:-,..:. ....:Fl·~,·",;~ 'Al_
if t D(:.st.Se,:; 'S , then t-'~.-r:f~ (jWS ," '/,
..
if tDestSec 'TS , then f'CisFlows . - 'A ' .
end else
1£ tOrlgSec 'S , then beqin
if tOestSec , then [>"'srlow:;
· -
' K/lI/O' €' ~ E r:
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if tDestSec 'U , then Po s F'Lows : = 'R/1i/0' else
if tDestSec 'e , then PosFlows
· -
' R/li/D' £:lse
if tDestSec 'S , then PosFlows
· -
'All , f:?:lsE
if tDestSec ITS , then PosFlows
· -
'A ';
end else
if tOrigSec 'TS , then begin
if tDestSec , then PosFlows 'R/1l/0' else
if tDestSec 'll , then PosFlows .- 'R/1l/0' else
if tDestSec 'C , then PosFlows := 'R/1l/0' else
if tDestSec 'S , then PosFlows := 'R/U/D' else
if tDestSec 'TS , then PosFlows : :::: 'All ' ;
end;
end; (else)
{Check for legal information flow between objects}
Result := CompareFlows(tFlow,PosFlows);
if Result <> true then begin
TString := ";
Flow type has to be changed
if TFlow - 'W 'then begin
Ask the user to expand the flow type of the data flow to U or D or A.
end
else
if (TFlow = 'R 'J and {tOr1gFigType<>AOata store} then
Warn the user that the flow type is 1nvalid and that
it should be the one of the combinations of PosEl.ows;
else
Flow type doesn't need to be changed;
end;
end
Else begin {Test for special cases}
if ITFlow - 'R 'J and not(tOrig.Key!IJ in l'O','L'I) then begin
Warn the user that a Wrong Read direction was found
Flow type has to be changed;
break;
end; (if)
end IElse}
end
end; (if)
end; {TestForCorrectlnfoFlow}
procedure Cr e a t e Sar.L t r s e r UbI ,"·ct;
begin
Promp t s the user to de-fir," t_he r.........-;:itl·'r, ~~ tL·· .-;.-1~.;.~ ;.-.~: ~, -6.
Gets (,"~sition via rt.0!J}>":'
Draw 5~~itis~r objel:t
Change pos i t i ons c·f Ll ow» ':.r d·:-·~"-~.5S ~,i'E>'~"5
through the Sanitisel t .• '-1'.0, td:'~', •. ";';"
target
Redraw links
end; (Cro,ateSanitiserObje·:t!
f: ;,, 1 ~ I 6.
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·Annexure B
Pascal Source Code
forDFDSEC
unit SecFUDCU; {Containsall the Security CheckingFunctions}
.'
INTERFACE
uses KeyListU,DFDGlob;
function CompareFlows(tFIow: StringS; var tPosFiows: StringS): boolean;
(*
procedureGetObjectsConnected (tObjectl,tObject2: KeyType;
var tFIow: StdElernent;
var Result: Integer);
*)
procedureGetFIowConnected( tFIow: StdElernent;
var tOrigFig,tDestFig: StdElernent;
var Result: Integer);
procedureGetPossibleInfoFlowType( tOrigKey. tDestKcy: KcyType:
var tIFT: StringS:
var ErrorChoice: byte);
procedure TestForCorrectInfoFlow( tOrig.tDcst: StdElernent:
var ChFlow: boolean):
function ValidSecClasses(tmpOrig.lrnpDcst: KeyTypc): boolean:
function PairExists(tmpOrig,tmpDcst: Key'Iype): boolean;
function RPairExists(trnpOrig.lmpDcst KeyTypc): boolean:
function SPairExists(tmpOrig,trnpDest KeyType): boolean:
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function FlowTypeBetwecnObjccts(tOrigKey,tDcstKcy: Kcytypc): String5;
function C::ompFlowTypeBetwcenObjccts(Obj I.Obj2,Obj3: KcyTypc): String5;
procedure GetParcnts( tFigure: StdElement;
var Parents: KeyListU.RelationList;
var Result: Integer);
procedure GetChildren ( tFigure: StdElement;
var Children: KeyListU.RelationList;
var Result: Integer);
IMPLEMENTATION
uses Errorlfan,WinGlobU,DFDDrawU;
function CompareFlows(tFIow: String5;"var tPosFlows: String5): boolean;
var tmpBool: boolean;
tLoop: byte;
begin
tmpBool := false;
iftFIow ='All' then trnpBooI := false
else
for tLoop := I to 5 do begin
if (tPosFlows=' ') or
(tFlow[ I) = tPosFlows[tLoop» then begin
tmpBool := true;
break:
end {if}
else
if (tPosFlows='AII ') then begin
if(tFlow[l) in ('W'.'.'» then tmpBool := false
else tmpBool := true:
end; {if}
end; {for}
ComparcFlows:= tmpBool;
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end; {ComparcFlows}
(*
procedure GetObjcctsConnected (lObjecll,lObjcct2: KeyTypc;
var tFlow: Stdlilement;
var Result: Integer);
var TPos: word;
begin
Result :=0;
{save current position}
TPos := KeyListU.CurPos(FigureList);
{find Orig}
KeyListU.FindKey(FigureList,tObject I,EIFound);
ifElFound then begin
KeyListU.Retrieve(FigureList.tOrigFig);
end .'
else
Result := -I;
{find Dest}
tDestFig.Key := tFIow.Data.ChildrcnElcmcnts(I);
KeyListU.FindKey(FigurcList,tDcstFig.Key,EIFound);
ifElFound then begin
KcyListU.Rctrievc(FigureList.tDcstFig):
end
else
Result := -I;
{return position to original}
KcyListU.Findith(FigureList.TPos):
end: {GctObjectsConnceted}
*)
procedure GetFlowConnccted( tFlow: StdElcment
var lOrigFig.tDestFig: Stdfilcmcnt;
131
var Result: Integer};
var TPos: word;
begin
Result:= 0;
{savecurrent position}
TPos := KeyListU.CurPos(FigureList};
{find Orig}
tOrigFig.Key := tFIow.Oata.ParentElements[I); {pyl het nct cen parent}
KeyListU.FindKey(FigureList,tOrigFig.Key,EIFound};
ifElFound then begin
KeyListU.Retrieve(FigureList,tOrigFig);
end
else
Result := -I;
.'
{find Oest}
tDestFig.Key := tFIow.Oata.CbildrenElements[I); {pyl bet nct cen child}
KeyListU.FindKey(FigureList,tDestFig.Key,ElFound);
ifElFound then begin
KeyListU.Retrieve(FigureList,tDestFig);
end
else
Result := -I;
{return position to original}
KeyListU..~indith(FigureList,TPos);
end; {GetFI~onn~ed}
procedureGctPossiblelnfoFlowType( tOrigKey, tDcstKcy: Key'Iypc:
var tlf'T: StringS:
var ErrorChoicc: b)1C}:
begin
case tOrigKey[I) of
'S': begin
case tDcstKcy[ I) of
'0': tiFT := 'W ': {iUpdatcliDcletcliAppcnd}
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'P': urr--: ,.
'E': tIFf := 'R ,.
end: {case}
end;
'P': begin
case tDestKey[1] of
'D': tIFf:= 'W '; {iUpdatcJiDeJcteJiAppend}
'P': ErrorHandler.GDisplayMessage(MErrorChoice,O,O.
'Illegal Information Flow: Between 2 Processes! Continue?',2,falsc,O,ErrorChoicc);
'S': tIFf := ' ,.,
'E': urr := 'R ';
end; {case}
end;
'E': begin
casetDestKey[1] of
'P','S':urr := 'R ';
'E': ErrorHandler.GDisplayMcssage(MErrorChoiee,O,O,
'Illegal Information Flow: Between 2 ExternalEntities! Continue1',2,false,O,ErrorChoicc);
'D': ErrorHandler.GDisplayMcssagc(MErrorChoice,O,O,
'Illegal Information Flow: Between ExternalEntityand Data Store! Continue1'.3,falsc,O
,ErrorChoice);
end;
end;
'D': begin
case tDestKey[l]of
'P','S': urr := 'R ';
•.'D': ErrorHandler.GDisplayMcssage(MErrorChoiee,O,O.
'Illegal Information Flow: Between 2 Data Stores! Continue?'.2.falsc.O.ErrorChoiee):
'E': ErrorHandJer.GDispIayMcssagc(MErrorChoicc,O,O.
'Illegal Information Flow: Between Data Storeand External Entity! Continue?'.J.falsc.O
.ErrorChoice):
end;
end;
end:
end: {GetPossiblclnfoFlowTypc}
procedureTestForCorrcctInfoFlow( tOrig.tDest: StdElcmcnt:
var ChFlow: boolean);
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var tOrigCount, tDestCount: byte;
ElFound: boolean;
tFIow,
PosFlows: String5;
tOrigSec, tDestSec: String5;
tOrigFigType, tDestFigType: FigureTypes;
Result: Boolean;
tmpfigure: StdElement;
.'
begin
ChFlow := false;
{Determinewhat type of flowexistsbetween tOrig en tDest. Update flow's infoflowtypc}
for tOrigCount := 1 to MaxParents do begin
for tDestCount := 1 to MaxChildren do begin
if (tOrig.Data.ChildrenElements[tOrigCount] =
tDest.Data.ParentElements[tDestCountJ) AND
(tOrig.DataChildrenElements[tOrigcount) <> It) then {foundcommon now}
begin
{kry pyl in unpFigure}
unpFigure.Key := tOrig.Data.ChildrenElements[tOrigCount);
KeyListU.FindKey(FigureList,unpFigure.Kcy,EIFound);
ifElFoundthen begin
KeyListU.Retrieve(FigureList.trnpFigure);
tOrigSec := tOrig.Data.SecClass;
tDestSec := tDest.Data.SecClass;
tFIow := unpFigure.Data.InfoFlowTypc;
tOrigFigType := tOrig.Data.FigureT}-pe;
tDestFigType := tDcst.Data.FigureTypc:
{Determine possible now typesaccording to security ckasses}
{According to objecttypes}
if «tOrigFigTypc= tDestFigTypc) {same object}
and
(tOrigFigTypc = AProc» then PosFlows := '
else begin {Testaccording to security classes}
iftOrigSec = '. 'then begin
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iftDestScc = '. 'then PosFlows:= 'All 'else
if tDcstScc = 'V 'then PosFlows:= 'A ' else
iftDestScc = 'C 'then PosFlows:= 'A 'else
iftDestScc = 'S 'then PosFlows := 'A 'else
iftDestSec = 'TS 'then PosFlows := 'A '.
end else
iftOrigSec = 'V 'then begin
iftDestSec = '. 'then PosFlows:= 'RlUID' else
iftDestSec = 'U 'then PosFlows := 'All' else
iftDcstSec = 'C 'then PosFlows:= 'A 'else
iftDestSec = 'S 'then PosFlows:= 'A 'else
iftDestSec = 'TS 'then PosFlows:= 'A ';
end else
if tOrigScc = 'C ' then begin
iftDestSec = '. 'then PosFlows:= 'RlUID'else
iftDestSec = 'V 'then PosFlows:= 'RlUID' else
iftDestSec = 'C 'then PosFlows:= 'All' else
iftDestSec = 'S 'then PosFlows:= 'A 'else
iftDestSec = 'TS 'then PosFJows := 'A ';
end else
iftOrigSec ='S ' then begin
iftDestSec = '. 'then PosFlows:= 'RlUID' else
if tDestSec = 'V 'then PosFlows := 'RlUID' else
iftDestSec = 'C 'then PosFlows:= 'RlUID' else
if tDestSec = 'S 'then PosFlows:= 'All 'else
iftDestSec ='TS 'then PosFlows := 'A ,.
end else
if tOrigSec = 'TS 'then begin
if tOrigFigTypc = ASan then PosFJows := 'All 'else {betweenSanitiscr and other object}
iftDestSec =', 'then PosFlows:= 'RlUID' else
iftDestSec = 'V 'then PosFlows := 'RlUID' else
if tDcstSec = 'C 'then PosFlows := 'RlUID' else
if tDcstScc = 'S ' then PosFlows := 'RlUID' else
iftDestScc = 'TS 'then PosFlows := 'All ';
end:
end; {else}
{Determine valid inforrnatio flow between objects}
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Result := CompareFlows(tFlow,PosFlows):
if Result <> true then begin
TString := ";
ChFlow := true;
ifl"Flow = 'W 'then begin
TString :=
'Please expand the flow type of the arrow connecting ['+tOrig.Key+'] and ['+tDcst.Kcy+'] to U or D or A.':
ErrorHandler.GDisplayMessage(MInfo,O,O, TString,3,false,O,Windo\\OptionsChoicc);
break;
end
else
ifTFIow ='All 'then begin
TString :=
'Please specify the flow type of the arrow connecting ['+tOrig.Kcy+'] and ['+tDcst.Kcy+'J. ';
ErrorHandler.GDisplayMessage(MInfo,O,O, TString,3,false,O,WindowOptionsChoicc):
break;
end
else
if1Flow ='A ' then begin
TString :=
'Illegal Append action between ['+tOrig.Key+') and ('+tDcst.Kcy+'). Please cheek.';
ErrorHandler.GDisplayMessage(Mlnfo,O,O, TString,3,false,O,WindowOptionsChoicc);
break;
end
else
ifTFIow = 'U ' then begin
,TString :=
'lllegal Update action between ['+tOrig.Kcy+'J and ['+tDest.Kcy+'). Please cheek.':
ErrorHandler.GDisplayMcssage(MInfo.O.O. TString.3.false,O,WindonOptionsChoicc):
break;
end
else
if (TF1ow = 'R ') then begin
if (tOrigFigT}pc<>ADS) then begin
TString := 'Invalid now typcl Flow type must be '+PosFlo\\s+'. Continue?';
ErrorHandler.GDisplayMcssage(MErrorChoicc.O.O, TString.Lfalsc.O.Window OpuonsChoicc):
break;
end
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else
ChFlow := false:
end;
(*
else begin
TString := 'Error.';
ErrorHandler.GDisplayMcssage(MError,O,O, TString.I ,false,O,WindonOplionsChoicc):
end;
*)
end
Else begin {test for special cases}
if (TFlow='R ') and
nOl«tOrig.Key[I] in ['D','E'])or
«tOrig.Key[I] ='P') and (tDest.Key[I]='E'))) then begin
TString:= 'Wrong Read direction!';
ChFlow := true;
ErrorHandler.GDisplayMesSagc(MError,0,0, TString.I .false.u,WindonOplionsChoicc):
break;
end; {if}
end {Else}
end
else begin
beep;
exit;
end;
end; {if}
end; {for}
if Result <> true then
break:
end; {for}
end: {TestForCorrectlnfoFlow}
function ValidSecClasscs(tmpOrig.lmpDcsl: Kcy'Iypc): boolean:
var tmppos, {In original Orig and Dcst sets]
SvdPos: word:
tEIFound: boolean:
tmpOrigFig.
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tmpDestFig: StdElemcnt;
tNumEntities: word;
begin
ValidSecClasses := false:
tNumEntities := KeyLislU.Size(FigureLisl):
SvdPos:= KeyListU.CurPos(FigureList);
{Get securityclass of orig entity}
tElFound := false;
KeyListU.FindKey(FigurcList,tmpOrig,tElFound);
ifTELFound then begin
KeyListU.Retrieve(FigureList.tmpOrigFig);
end
else
beep;
{Get securityclass of dest entity}
tElFound ;= false;
KeyListU.FindKey(FigureList,tmpDest.tElFound);
ifTELFound then begin
KeyListU.Retrieve(FigureList.tmpDestFig);
end
else
beep;
if (tmpDestFig.Data.SecClass {Dcst} >=
tmpOrigFig.Data.SecClass {Orig})OR
(tmpOrigFig.Key(l) = 'S') {flow between TS Sanitiscrand other
object} then
ValidSecClasses := true
else begin
end;
KeyListU.Findith(FigureList.SvdPos):
end: {ValidSccClasses}
function PairExists(tmpOrig.tmpDest: Kcy'Iypc): boolean;
var tmppos,
SvdPosO,
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SvdPosD: word;
tKcyFound: boolean;
tmpOrig2,
tmpDest2: KeyType;
tNumEntities: word;
begin
PairExists := false;
tNumEntities := KeyListU.KSize(Orig);
SvdPosO:= KeyListU.KCurPos(Orig);
SvdPosD := KeyListU.KCurPos(Dest);
tKeyFound:= false;
for ~ppos:= I to tNumEntitiesdo begin
KeyListU.KFindith(Orig.tmppos);
KeyListU.KRetrieve(Orig.tmpOrig2);
KeyListU.KFindith(Dest.tmppos);.
KeyListU.KRetrieve(Dest.tmpDest2);
if (tmpOrig2= tmpOrig) and (tmpDest2 = tmpDcst)then begin
PairExists := true;
break;
end;
end;
KeyListU.KFindith(Orig.SvdPosO);
KeyListU.KFindith(Dest.SvdPosD);
end; {PairExists}
function RPairExisls(lmpOrig.tmpDest: KcyTypc): boolean:
var tmppos,
SvdPos: word:
tKcyFound: boolean;
tmpOrig2.
tmpDcst2: Kcy'Iypc;
tNumEnlitics: word:
begin
RPairExists := false:
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tNumEntilies:= KeyLislU.KSize(R_Orig);
SvdPos := KeyLislU.KCurPos(R_Orig);
tKeyFound := false;
for lmppos:= I to lNumEntilies do begin
KeyLislU.KFindith(R_Orig,lmppos);
KeyLislU.KRelrieve(R_Orig,lmpOrig2);
KeyLislU.KFindith(R_Dest.tmppos);
KeyLislU.KRelrieve(R_Desl,lmpDes12);
.'
if (lmpOrig2 = lmpOrig) and (lmpDest2= lmpDesl) then begin
RPairExists := true;
break;
end;
end;
KeyLislU.KFindith(R_Orig.SvdPos);
~eyLislU.KFindith(R_Dest.Svdl'os);
KeyListU.KFindith(R_FlowTypeList,SvdPos);
end; {RPairExists}
function SPairExists(lmpOrig,lmpDest KeyType): boolean;
var tmppos, {In Sec Revised sets}
SvdPos: word;
tKeyFound: boolean;
lmpOrig2,
lmpDesl2: KeyType;
tNumEnlitics: word:
tResel~ount Integer;
begin
SPairExists := false:
lNumEntities:= KeyLislU.KSizc(SR_Orig):
SvdPos:= KeyLislU.KCurPos(SR_Orig):
tKeyFound := false;
for lmppos:= I to lNumEnlilies do begin
KeyLislU.KFindilh(SR_Orig.tmppos);
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KeyListU.KFindith(SR_Dest,tmppos);
KeyListU.KRetrieve(SR_Orig,tmpOrig2);
KeyListU.KRetrieve(SR_Dest.tmplrestz);
if (tmpOrig= tmpOrig2) and (tmpDest = tmpDest2) then begin
SPairExists:= true;
break;
end;
end; {SPairExists}
KeyListU.KFindith(SR_Orig,SvdPos);
KeyListU.KFindith(SR_Dest,SvdPos);
KeyListU.KFindith(SR_FlowTypeList,SvdPos);
end; {SPairExists}
function FlowTypeBetweenObjcets(tOrigKey,tDestKey: Keytype): String5;
var TPos: word;
TString: String5;
TCount: byte;
tFigure: StdElement;
tLoop : byte;
FlowFound: boolean;
begin
TString := 1 I.
FlowFound := false;
{savecurrent position}
TPos:= KeyListU.CurPos(FigureList);
TSize := KeyListU.Size(FigureList);
{find Dest}
TCount:= 1;
repeat
KeyListU.Findith(FigureList.tCount):
KeyListU.Rctricve(FigureList.tFigurc):
if tFigure.Key( I) = 'F' then begin
{Flowfound. Test children and parents}
for TLoop := I to MaxChildren do
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iftFigure.Data.ChildrenElements[TLoop) = tDestKey then begin
FlowFound := true;
T'String :> tFigure.Data.lnfoFlowTypc;
break;
end;
ifFlowFound then break;
end; {if}
inc(tCount);
until tCount> TSize;
Ifnot Flowfound then
tString := '0 ';
{return positionto original}
KeyListU.Findith(FigureList,TPos);
FlowTypeBetweenObjects := TString;
end; {FlowTypcBetweenObjects}
function CompFlowTypeBelweenObjects(Obj I,Obj2,Obj3: KcyType): StringS;
var TPos: word;
FlowTypel,
FlowType2,
FlowT):pe3: StringS;
TCount:byte;
tFigure: StdElement;
tLoopl,TI..oop2 : byte;
FlowT~'pel_Founcl
FlowType2_Found: boolean;
TRPos : word;
tOrig,tDcst: Keyfype;
begin
FlowType3 := ' ';
FlowTypcl_Found := false:
FlowTypc2_Found := false:
{savecurrent position}
TPos := KeyListU.CurPos(FigurcList):
TRPOS := KcyListU.KCurPos({R_Orig}R_FlowTypcList):
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TSize := KeyListU.Size(FigureList);
{find FlowTypel between Objl and Obj2}
TCount:= 1;
repeat
KeyListU.Findith(FigureList,tCount);
KeyListU.Retrieve(FigureList,lFigure);
iflFigure.Key[l] = 'F then begin
{Flow found. Test children and parents}
ifnot(FlowTypel_Found) then begin
for TLoop1 ;= I to MaxChildren do
if (lFigure.Data.ParentElements[TLoopI] = ObjI)
and (lFigure.Data.ChildrenElements[TLoopl] =Obj2) then begin
FlowTypel ;= lFigure.Data.InfoFlowType~
FlowTypel_Found:= true;
break;
end
else
if lFigure.Data.ParentElements[TLoopI] == " then break;
end;tFlovVrypel_Found?}
ifnot(FlowType2_Found) then begin
for TLoop2 ;== I to MaxChildren do
if (lFigure.Data.ParentElements[TLoop2) = Obj2)
and (tFigure.Data.ChildrenElements[TLoop2] == Obj3) then begin
FlowType2 ;= lFigure.Data.lnfoFJowType;
FlowTypc2_Found;= true;
break;
end
else
iftFigure.Data.ParentElements[TLoop2] ::: " then break:
end; {FJowType2_Found}
if FlowType I_Found and FlowType2_Found then break:
end; {if}
inc(tCounl):
if (tCount> TSizc) and not(FlowTypel]ound) then begin {Find compound
access type in
R_FlowTypcList}
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for Tl.oopl := 1 to KeyListV.KSize(R]lowTypcList) do begin
{Get Set in RevisedMatrix}
I
KeyListV.KFindith(R_Orig,TLoopl); KeyListV.KRetrieve(R_Orig,tOrig);
KeyListV.KFindith(R_Dest,TLoop1); KeyListV. KRetrieve(R_Dcst.tlfcst):
KeyListV.KFindith(R_FlowTypcList,TLoop I);
if (tOrig =Objl) and (tOest = Obj2) then begin
KqListU.KRetrieve(R_FlowTypcList,FlowTypcl);
ifFlowTypel = I. 'then begin
FlowTypel_Found :=false;
beep;
break;
end
else begin
FlowTypel_Found := true;
break;
end;
end;
end; {for}
end; {find compoundaccess type in R_FlowTypeList}
until (FlowTypel_Found) and (FlowType2_Found) or (tCount > TSize);
lfnot«(FlowTypel_Found) and (FlowType2_Found» then begin
FlowType3 := '00 ';
end
else begin {Determine Compound Access type}
if(FlowTypel = 'R ') and (FlowTypc2 = 'R ') then FlowType3 := 'R I else
if(FlowTypel = 'R ') and (FlowTypc2 = 'A ') then FlowType3 := 'V I else
if (FlowTypel = 'R ') and (FlowTypc2 = 'V ') then FlowType3 := 'V I else
if (FlowTypel = 'A ') and (FtowType2 = 'R ') then FtowType3 := 'R I else
if (FlowTypel ='A ') and (FlowType2 = 'A ') then FlowTypc3 :='A I else
if (FlowTypel ='A ') and (FlowType2 = 'V') then F1owTypc3 := 'V I else
if (FlowTypel = 'U ') and (FlowType2 = 'R ') then FlowType3 := 'R ' else
if (FlowTypel = 'V') and (FlowTypcz = 'A ') then FlowType3 := 'R I else
if (FlowTypcl = 'V ') and (FlowType2 ='V ') then Flow Tvpc I := 'V '
ELSE
{if(F1owTypel = '. ') then}
FlowType3 := Flow'Iypcz;
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end;
{return position to original}
KeyListU.Findith(FigureList,TPos);
KeyListlJ.KFindith(R_Orig,TRPos);
KeyListU.KFindith(R_Dest.TRPos);
KeyListU.KFindith(R]lowTypcList,TRPos);
CompFlowTypeBetweenObjects := FlowType3;
end; {CompFlowTypeBetweenObjccts}
procedure GetParents( tFigure: StdElement;
var Parents: KeyListU.RclationList;
var Result: Integer);
begin
end; {GetParents}
procedure GetChildren ( tFigure: StdElement;
var Children: KeyListU.RelationList;
var Result: Integer);
begin
end; {GctChildren}
begin
end.
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unit DFDDrawU;
INTERFACE
uses KeyListU;
{Automated Diagramming System; contains program code to
draw and redraw DFD objects from data in the linked list nodes}
procedureRedrawEntity(lFigure: StdElemcnt);
procedureDrawDFD;
procedureDrawRevisedDFD;
IMPLEMENTATION
uses AMouse,WinGlobU,GWinsU,DFDGlob,Graph,GToolsU,GFigurcs.
GDrawerU.
ErrorHan.
SecFuncU,
MathsU,
Crt. .'
MenullsU;
procedureRedrawEntity(lFigurc: StdElcmcnt);
begin
{Displaynew data}
SetWriteMode(NormalPut);
with tFigure do
caseData.FigureType of
AProc: begin
AProcess.Init(Data.x I,Data.yI.Data.xz.Data.y2.round(Data.Radius). Data. Feolor):
GMousc.Show(falsc); AProccss.DrawFigure:
AProccss.DisplayData(lFigure.falsc):
GMousc.Show(true);
AProcess.Done:
end;
ASan: begin
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.'
ASanitizer.lnit(Data.x I,Data.y I,Data.x2,Data.y2,round(Data.Radiusj.Data.PColor);
GMousc.Show(falsc)~ ASanitizcr.DrawFigurc;
ASanitizer.DisplayData(tFigure,falsc);
GMouse.Show(true);
ASanitizer.Done;
end;
AFIow: begin
ADataFlow.Init(Data.x I ,Data.yI ,round(Data.Angle),round(Data.Radius),DFDGlob.FlowColor{Data.FColor}):
ADataFlow.SetLirnits(O,O,GetMaxX,GetMaxY);
GMouse.Show(faIse); ADataFlow.DrawFinaIFigure;
ADataFlow.DisplayData(tFigure,faIse);
GMouse.Show(tnJe);
ADataFlow.Done;
end;
AnEE: begin
AnExtEntity.Init(Data.x I,Data.y1,Data.x2,Data.y2,Data.FColor);
."
GMouse.Show(fa1se); AnExtEntity.DrawFigure;
AnExtEntity.DisplayData(tFigure,false);
GMousc.Show(tnJe);
AnE>.1Entity.Done;
end;
ADS : begin
ADataStore.lnit(Data.xl,Data.yl,Data.x2,Data.y2,Data.FColor);
GMousc.Show(falsc); ADataStore.DrawFigurc;
ADataStore.DisplayData(tFigure.falsc)~
GMousc.Show(true);
ADataStore.Donc~
end;
end~ {case}
end; {RcdrawEntity}
procedureDrawDFD;
var TLoop.ChildrenCount.
NumEntitics: Word:
TPos: word;
begin
GMousc.Show(falsc)~
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ASolFH.SelLimits(O,O,GctMaxX.GctMaxY);
GTools.FilISquare(Pictx I+ I,Picty I+I.Pictxz-Ll'ictyz-I ,SolidFill,BColor.BColor):
StatusBar.lnit(I,GctMaxY-TcxtHeightCY')-5,GctMaxX-I,GctMaxY-l.15.7{MBColor},7{MBColor});
SetWritcMode(NormalPut)~
TPos := KeyListV.CurPos(FigureList);
NumEntities := KeyListU.Size(FigureList)~
KeyListV.Findith(FigureList, l)~
for TLoop := 1 to NumEntities do begin
KeyListV.Retrieve(FigurcList,Figure);
RedrawEntity(Figure);
KeyListV.FindNext(FigureList);
end;
{GMouse.SetPosition(GetMaxX div 2,GetMaxY div 2);}
GMouse.Sho"'~true)~
KcyListU.Findith(FigureList,TPos);
end; {DrawI?FD}
procedure TGetError(lOrigSec,tDestSec: StringS; var Message: string);
begin {TS S C V}
if «lOrigScc[1] in IT,'S','C'» and (tDcstScclll == 'V'» OR
«lOrigSec[l) in [T,'S'» and (tDcstSecII] in I'U','C))) OR
«tOrigSecll] in ['1"» and (tDestSecll] in I'U','C,'S'))) then
Message :== 'Problem: DOWNFLOW OF INFORMATION, ,
else
if«tOrigSec(l] in I'V')) and (tDeslScc(l] in [T,'S','C))) then
Message :== 'Problem: ILLEGAL FLOW ACTION. '
else
Message :== 'Unknown problem. ':
end; {TGetError}
procedure CreatcSanitizerObjcct(\'ar tOrig.tDcst: Stdlilement);
var tSmidx.tSmidy: Integer; {middle x and y of Sanitizer object}
tDmidx.tDmidy: Integer; {middle x and y of dcsti nation object}
tPos: word;
tlnitxl.tlnityl: Integer:
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Result: Integer,
lDalaFlow: StdElement;
tCount byte;
tOCounl,lDCount: byte;
begin
lPos := KeyLislU.CurPos(FigurcList);
{define position (user)}
tlnitxl := PiClXl+(PiclX2-PiClXI) div 2;
tlnityl := PietY1+(pietY2-PictYI) div 2;
ASanitizer.lnit(tlnitxl-25,tlnily1-25,tlnitxl+25,tlnily1+25,15,ObjcctColor);
ASanitizer.DefineFigure(PictxI+I,PietyI+I,Pictx2-1,Piety2-I,Figure,I);
ASanitizer.Done;
{Get flow from TOrig. Make that flow= tOrig}
for tCounl := I to MaxChildren do begin
tOrig.Key := tOrig.Data.ChildrenElemenlS[ICounl);
KeyLiSlU.FindKey(FigureList,tOrig.Key,KeyFound);
ifnot Keyfound then break
else begin
KeyLiSlU.Retricve(FigureList,IOrig);
end;
{Flow's child =Sanitizer}
IOrig:Data.ChildrenElemenlS[ I) := Figure.Key;
{}
{Sanitizer's parent = Flow Key}
Figure.Data.Parentlilements]I) := tOrig.Key:
KeyListU.FindKey(FigureLisLFigurc.Key.KeyFound):
if not KeyFoundthen break
else begin
{Clear infoflowtype}
lDcst.Data.lnfoFlowTypc := IOrig.Dala.InfoFlowTypc:
IOrig.Data.lnfoFlowTypc:= '. '.
Figurc.Data.lnfoFlowTypc := '. ,.
KeyListU.Updalc(Figurelist.Figurc):
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end;
{}
{Dest's parent = Sanitizer}
for tDCount := I to MaxParents do begin
for tOCount := I to MaxChildren do begin
iftDest.Data.ParentElernents[tDCount] = tOrig.Key then begin
tDest.Data.ParentElernents[tDCount] := ";
break;
end;
end; {fortOCounr}
iftDeslData.ParentElernents[tDCount] =" then break;
end; {for tDCount}
KeyListU.FindKcy(FigureList.,tDcsl.Kcy,KcyFound);
if not KcyFound then break
else
KeyListU. Update(FigureList.,tDest);
tOrig.Data.x2 ;= Figure.Data.xl;
tSrnidx:= (Figure.Data.xI+Figure.Data.x2) div 2;
tSrnidY := (Figure.Data.yI+Figurc.Data.y2) div 2;
tDMidx := (tDcst.Data.xI+tDcst.Data.x2) div 2;
tDMidy:= (tDest.Data.yl+tDest.Data.y2) div 2;
if tOrig.Data.x I < Figurc.Data.x I then begin {Orig links van SP}
tOrig.Data.x2 := Figure.Data.x I:
·tOrig.Data.y2 := tSrnidY:
end
else begin
tOrig.Data.x2 := tSrnidx:
tOrig.Data.y2 := Figure.Data.y2:
end;
with tOrig.Data do
MathsU.CalcRadiusAndAngle(x l.y l.x2.y2.R.adius.Angle):
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KeyLislU.FindKcy(FigureLisl,tOrig.Key,KeyFound);
if KeyFound then
KeyLislU.Updatetf'igurel.ist,lOrig);
KeyLislU.Findith(FigureLisl,Size(FigureLisl»;
{Add new arrow from Sanitizer to tDest}
iftDest.Data.xl>Figure.Data.x2 then begin {calculate tDest's (arrow's) Radius and Angle}
MathsU.CalcRadiusAndAngle( Figure.Data.x2,tSmidY,tDcsl.Data.xl,tDmidy.
tDeslData.Radius,tDesl.Data.Anglc);
ADataFlow.lnit(Figure.Data.x2,tSmidy,round(tDcslData.Anglc).round(lDcslData.Radius),ObjcctColor);
end
else begin
MathsU.CalcRadiusAndAngle( tSmidx,Figurc.Data.y l,tDmidx,tDcsl.Data.y2,
tDest.Data.Radius,tDest.Data.Anglc);
ADataFlow.Init(tSmidx,Figure.Data.yl,round(tDest.Data.Anglc),round(tDcst.Data.Radius).ObjcctColor);
end;
ADataFlow.AddFigRecToList(tDest,Resull,false);
ifResult =0 {OK} then begin {Draw final arrow, wait for
click release, etc. before
starting with nextarrow
definition}
{Draw final arrow}
GMouse.Show(false);
SetWriteMode(NormalPut);
ADataFlow.DrawFinalFigure;
ADataFlow.DisplayData(Figurc.falsc);
Figure.Data.ChildrenElcments( I) := tDcst.Kcy;
KeyLislU.FindKey(FigureLisLFigure.Kcy.KcyFound);
if not KeyFound then break
else
KcyListU. Updateif'igurcl.ist.Figurc):
end;
ADataFlow.Donc;
end; {for (Count}
KcyListU.Findith(FigurcList,lPos);
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SetWriteMode(XORPut);
GMousc.Show(true);
end; {CrcateSanitizerObject}
procedureDrawRevisedDFD;
var TLoop,ChildrenCount.
NumIndFIows, {Numerof indirectflows = # in R_Orig and R_Dest}
NumFlows: Word;
tKeyOrig.
tKeyDest: KeyType;
tFigureO,
tFigureD: StdElement;
EFound:boolean;
tmpAngle,tmpRadius: real;
tOrigSec,tDestSec: StringS:
txl,tyl, {IXI en tyl =middelvan Orig figuurse xl en x2, en yl en y2}
tx2,ty2 {tx2 en ty2=middelvan Destfiguurse xl en x2, en yl en y2}
: Integer;
Confirm:Boolean;
Neighbours: Boolean;
begin
GMouse.Show(false);
ASoIFH.SctLimits(O,O,GetMaxX,GetMaxY);
NumlndFIows:= KcyListU.KSize(R_Orig);
if NumlndFIows = 0 then begin
beep:
ErrorHandler.GDisplayMessagc(MError.O.O.'DFD
yet!'.I.faIsc.O.Windo\\QptionsChoicc);
exit;
end:
for TLoop := I to NumlndFlows do begin
not processed
"Neighbours := false;
KeyLislU.KFindith(R_Orig,TLoop);
KeyLislU.KRetrieve(R_Orig.tKeyOrig);
KeyLislU.KFindith(R_Dest,TLoop);
KeyListU.KRetrieve(R_Dest,tKeyDest);
{Checkfor existenceof combination (tKcyParcnt,tKeyChild)
ifnot(SecFuneU.sPairExists(tKeyOrig.tKeyDest» then begin {draw in red}
KeyListU.FindKey(FigureList,tKeyOrig.EFound);
KeyListU.Retrieve(FigureList,tFlgureO);
KeyListU.FindKey(FigureList,tKcyDest,EFound);
KeyListU.Retrieve(FigureList,tFigureD);
txl := (tFigureO.Dataxl + tFigureO.Datax2) div 2;
tyl := (tFigureO.Datayl + tFigureQ..Data.y2) div 2;
tx2 := (tFigureD.Dataxl + tFigureD.Datax2) div 2;
ty2 :=(~gureD.Datayl +·tFigureD.Data.y2) div 2;
.'
{DrawsRed Arrow}
MathsU.CaleRadiusAndAngle(txl.tyl.L'<2.ty2.tmpRadius.unpAngle);
ADataFlow.Init(txl.tyl.round(tmpAngle).round(lmpRadius).12{Data.FColor});
ADataFlow.SetLimits(O.O.GetMaxX.GetMaxy);
SetWrileMode(NormalPul);
GMouse.Show(false);
ADataFlow.DrawFinalFigure:
tOrigSec:= tFigureO.Data.SccClass;
tDestSec:= tFigureD.Data.SccClass;
TGetError(lOrigSec,tDestSec.tString);
DFDGlob.StripTrailspace(tOrigScc);
DFDGlob.StripTrailspacc(tDcstScc);
tString := tString + 'from'+tOrigSec+' object l'+tFigurcO.Kcy+') to '+tDcstScc+
, object ['+tFigureD.Kcy+') ';
if (tFigurcO.Data.FigureTypc = AProc) and
(tFigureD.Data.FigureTypc =AProc) then
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tString := tString+ 'DUE to director indirect information flow between two PROCESS objects.'
else
tString := tString+ 'DUE to an Append, Updateor Readaction. ';
ifSecFuncU.PairExists(tFigureO.Key,tFigureD.Key) then {objekte r langs mekaar} begin
Neighbours := true;
tString := tString+ ' SUGGESTION: Insert a Sanitizerobject';
end;
ErrorHandler.GDispIayMessage(MInfo,O,O,tString,5,false,O,WindowOptionsChoiee);
GMoUse.Show(true);
{wait for click release}
repeat
GMouse.GetPosition(ButStatus,mxl,myl);
until ButStatus=O;
{erases red arrow}
GMouse.ShOw(~); .
SetColor(DFDGlob.BColor);
ADataFIow.DrawFinalFigure;
ifNeighbours then begin
Confirm:= MePuTools.GetConfirm ('Query','Do you want to inserta SanitizerobjectNOW?',
14,2);
case Confirmof
true: CrcateSanitizerObject(tFigureO,tFigurcD);
false: begin
tString := 'Suggestion: Changesecurityclass of';
tString:= tString + tFigureO.Key +' to '+tFigurcD.Data.SccClass+', or ':
tString := tString + tFigureD.Key + ' to '+tFigureO.Data.SccClass+'.':
GMouse.Show(false);
ErrorHandicr.GDisplayMessage(Mlnfo.O.O.tString.4,falsc.O,Windo\\QptionsChoice):
GMouse.Show(true):
end: {false}
cnd: {case}
GMouse.Show(true);
end; {if}
ADataAow.Done;
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end; {if}
end; {for}
DrawDFD;
end; {DrawRevisedDFD}
begin
end. {DFDDrawU}
.'
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Unit LListU; {Contains all the code to manage the double linked list}
INTERFACE
Const
None =";
-Type
{recordtype to be stored}
ListTypcs=(StringVal,Name_Cost);
ItemRectype=record
caseKind:~Types of
Name_Cost: (Name: string(20);Cost : double);
StringVal: (Strltem: String);
end;
{List}
ListPtr =AltemList;
ltemList =Record
ItemRec: ltemRectype;
.'.
Next : ListPtr;
End;
TableClass=OBJECT
{Pointers}
Temp, Before,After,NodeOut: ListPtr:
NewStr,BefStr,AftStr: string; {Strings for testing where
to put new item}
ltemList : ListPtr,
ItcmCount: Word;
procedure Init(fKind: List'lypes);
procedure Donc;
Procedure Con\,crtString(Var Convcrtlnput: string);
Procedure ListALL;
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Procedure AddEntry(ItemRec: ItemRectype);
Procedure Edit(ItemRec : ItemRectype);
Procedure DeleteEntry(ItemRec: ItemRecType);
Procedure GetNewTempValues(ItemRec: ItemRecType);
End;
Var
ItemTable
ltemRec
EmptyRec
: TableClass;
: ltemRecType;
: ItemRecType;
IMPLEMENrATION
uses DfDGlob;
procedure TableClassoInit(TKind: ListTypes);
begin
{skep lee node}
New(ltemTable.ItemLut);
New(femp);
.0
0
case TKindof
Name_Cost: begin
ltemListl\.ItemRec.Name := None;
ItemListl\.ItemRec.Cost := 0.00;
Temp-".ItemRec.Name := None;
Temp-".ItemRec.Cost := 0.00;
end;
StringVal: begin
Iteml.iste.Itemkec.Strltem := None;
Temp-".ItemRec.StrItcm := None;
end;
end; {case}
ItemList".Next := Temp;
ItemCount:= 0;
Tempe.Next := nil;
o'
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.'
end; {Inil}
procedure TableClass.Done;
var Pte: ListPlr,
begin
Ptr:= Iteml.iste.Next;
while Ptr".Next<> nil do
begin
Dispose(Ptr)~
Ptr := Pte".N~
end;
end; {Done}
ProcedureTableClass.ConvertString(Var ConvertInput: String);
Var
TempStr : String,
Len : Integer;
I : Integer;
Begin
TempStr := ConvertInput;
Len := Length(TempStr)~
Forl:= 1 to Len Do
Begin
Convertlnput(l] := Upcase(TempStr[I»;
En~
End;
Procedure TableClass.ListALL;
Var
Ptr : ListPtr;
i : byte;
Begin
Writeln:
If ItemList".Next = NILThen
Writeln{' ItemList is Empty ')
Else'
Begin
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Writeln(' List of Items');
Writeln;
End;
Pte := Iteml.isto.Next;
case ftr/\.ItemRec.Kind of
Name_Cost: begin
While Pte<> NIL Do
Begin
WriteInC Name='.Ptr"JtemRec.Name:10);
WriteInC Cost=',ftr/\.ItemR.ec.Cost:S:2);
Ptr := Ptr".Next;
End;
.end;
StringVal: begin
, While Ptr <> NIL Do
. Begin.
WriteInC StrItem='.Ptr".ItemR.ec.StrItem);
Ptr :=~.Next;
End;
end; •
end; {case}
End;
procedure TableClass.GetNewTempValues(ltemRec: ItemRecTypc);
begin
case ItemRec.Kind of
Name_Cost: begin
ItemTable.NewStr := ItemRec.Name;
ifItemTable.After <> nil then
ItemTable.AftStr := ltemTable.Afterh.ltemRcc.Name
. else
ItemTable.AftStr := ";
if(ItemTable.Bcforc <> nil) and
(ltemTable.BcforcA.Next <> nil) then
ItemTable.BcfStr := ltemTable.Bcforc".Nexr".ltemRcc.Name
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else
ItemTable.BefStr := ";
end; {Name_Cost}
StringVal: begin
. ItemTable.NewStr := ItemRec.StrItem;
ifItemTable.After <> nil then
ItemTable.A:ftStr := ItemTable.After.ItemRec.StrItem
else
ltemTable.Aftstr := It;
if (IteniTable.Before <> nil) and
.'.
. (ItemTable.Before".Next <> nil) then
ltemTable.BefStr := ItemTable.Before".NextJ\ItemRec.StrItem
(else-
ltemTable.BefStr := ";
end; ,
eDd;{case}
end; {GetNewTempValues}
l,;i _.'.'>. .• ",' •
~~·~a6leC~.AddEntry(ltemRec : I~emRectype);
Var
Duplicates iBoolean;
i : byte;
Begin
{ConvertString(Name);}
New(femp);
ItemTable.After := Iteml.ist;
ItemTable.Before := Iteml.ist;
caseIternRec.Kind of
Name_Cost: begin
Tempo.Itemkec.Name := ItemRec.Name;
Temp".ItemRec.Cost := ItemRec.Cost;
end;
StringVal:begin
Tempo.ltemkec.Strltem := ItcmRec.StrItem;
end;
end; {case}
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Duplicates := False;
GetNewTempValues(IlemRcc); {give values 10 lemporary variables}
While (llemTable.After <> nil) and (llemTable.NewSlr >= llemTable.AftSlr) and
(llemTable.After".Next <> Nil) And (Not Duplicates) Do
Begin
Ifnol(IlemTable.Before = nil) then
begin
if(llemTable.Before".Next <> nil)and
(llemTable.BefStr <> ltemTable.NewStr) Then
Begin
llemTable.Before := llemTable.After,
IlemTabliAftet := llemTable.~.Next;
GetNewTempValues(llemRec);
End
ElseDuplicates :=True;
end {IlemTable.Before <> nil}
else
break;
End;
IF (ltemTable.After <> nil) and (ItcmTablc.NcwSlr < ItcmTablc.AftSlr) and
(IlemTable.Before".Next <> nil) and (ltem'Fable.BerStr <> ItcmTable.NewSlr ) Then
Begin ~
IteinTable.Before".Ne.'1 := Temp;
Tempo.Next := ItemTable.After;
GctNewTempValucs(ItcmRec);
End
Else
Begin {nuwerckordaan cindcvan Iys}
(*
if (ItcmTablc.Bcfore <> nil) then
begin
if(llcmTable.Beforc".NcXl <> nil) and
(llcmTable.Bef'Slr <> ltcmTable.NewSlr ) Then
/
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IBegin*)
Itemf'able.Aftere.Next := Temp;
Tempe.Next := Nil; .
GetNewTempValues(ltemRec);
(*
End;
end; {ltemTable.Before <> nil}*)
End;
ifnotDuplicatesthen inc(ltemCount)
else beep;
End;
. .
. Procedure TableClasS.Edit(ItemRec : ltemRectype);
Var
Found : Boolean;
Begin
{Cotivertstring(Name);l. .
{VERANoERproc@~omallevelde teveranderl}
Fo~;:~~aise;-.' '?:.:':~" ...-
ltemTable.Before :,;, ItemList;
GetNewTempValu~ItemRec);
While (NOTFound) AND(ltemTable.Before".Next <> Nil) DO
If ltemTable.BefStr =ltemTable.NewStr Then
Begin
Found:=:rrue;
case ItemRec.Kind of
Name_Cost: begin
{Writeln(' Found',ItemRcc.Name);}
ltemTable.Before".Next".ItemRec.Name := ltemRec.Name; -
end;
StringVal: begin
{Writeln(' Found',ItcmRec.StrIlem)J
ltemTable.Before".Next".ItemRcc.StrItem := Itemkec.Strltem:
end;
end; {case}
End
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Else
ItemTable.Before:= Item'Iable.Beforeo.Ncxt;
IF NOT FoundThen beep;{Writeln('NOT IN ItemList II!!');}
End;
ProcedureTableClass.DcleteEntIy(ItemRec: ItemRecType);
Var
Found : Boolean;
Begin
{ConvertString(Name);} .
Found := False;
ltemTable.Before := Iteml.ist;
GetNewTempValues(ltemRec);
While (NOTFound)AND (ltemTable.Before".Next <> Nil) DO
IfItemTable.BefStr =ItemTable.NewstrThen
Begin .:",
Found :=True;
Nod.eOut:= ItemTable.BeforC"'.Next;
ItemTable.Before".Next := ItemTable.Before".Next"'.Next;
DisposCcNodeOut);
dec(ltemCount};
End
Else
ItemTable.Before := ItemTable.Before".Next;
IF NOT FoundThen Beep;{Writeln(' NOTIN ItemList I!!!'):}
End;
BEGIN
END. {Unit LListU}
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Annexure C
List ofAbbreviations
Following is a listofabbreviations usedoften in this dissertation:
AMAC
ASGE
~ASSDM
BDSS .'
CCfA
CRAMM
DAC
Dataflow
Data Store
DBMSs
DFD
DFDSEC
EASGE
ERX
Lower-CASE
MLS
MMI
OM»
00
RAD
RDM
SSADM-CRAMM
Adapted Mandatory Access Control
Automated Software.Generation Environment
Automated Secure System Development Methodology
Bayesian Decision Support System ..
UK Government CentralComputer andTelecommunications
Agency. :
ceTA's RiskAn.alYS~s ~dManagement Methodology
. ~ ..' ..... ,
DiscretionaryAccessControf
' ..
Flowofdata or Information between Objects on a DFD
Logicalfilethat may containdata
Database Management Systems
Data FlowDiagram
DFD Security (prototype discussed in thisdissertation)
Extended Automated SoftwareGeneration Environment
EntityRelationship eXpert
ProgramCodegenerationstage in software engineering
Multi-level Secure (Databases)
Man-Machine Interface
Object Modeler.
Object-Oriented
Rapid Application Development
Relational Data Modeler
CCTA's Structured Systems Analysis and Design Method,
interfacing withCRAMM
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.',
Silverrun
Sanitiser
Upper-CASE
.'.
Silverrun CASE-tool
Top Secret Objecton DFD, inserted by DFDSEC. Similar to
Pemul's Security Object and Baskerville's Control Process.
Analysis and Design stages ofsotwareengineering
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This paper presents the research work undertaken to investigate the relevance of using an
automated approach to .include information security activities as part of application system
. . ':
develoPment [1]. The prototype presented (named DFDSEC) • expands user requirements ~y
intr~ducing security and integrity reqinrements to the system under design. DFDSEC
• ,0. •.•.~~_,~.;._:'. _;_._..•:: .. ~ • • "
specifically utilizes data flow diagrams as a mechanism of representing user requirements:
Furthermore. data flow diagrams are used as input in the process of automatically analysing
the secure movement of data within an application system.
Keywords: CASE tools. information flow. information security.
Enforcing Information Security durinq the development ofApplication Systems
1. Introduction
In the 1970s, structured methods for system analysis and design evolvedas a possible
solution to the software crisis. Structured methods employ graphical notations, for .
. .
example Entity relationship and Data flow diagrams, to focus on parts of the system
" development life cycle~ During the mid-1980s Computer Aided Software Engineering
(CASE) tooisemergedfrom structured methods as an integrated support environment
.. for software developers. CASE tools were defined as:
"the use of a tool which brings relief during any stage of the system development life"
cycle [2]". Thi~.definition was u~:d synonymously with support tools (compilers, code
generators)for system analysis ~n£i design. Consequently, CASE tools were defined
as:
"a tool which wJ1l generate code automatically from the design specifications. [3]" This
definition implies that there was .;:trtificial intelligence in a CASE tool. The user could
develop models and the'-CASE "tool would correct mistakes, because "the CASE tool is
intelligent". When it was recognised that all CASE users must have knowledge of
system development methods and methodologies before attempting to work with a
CASE tool, new definitions for CASE tools were formalised, namely:
"CASE technology is the automation of step-by-step methodologies for software and
system development [4]". This definition covers different stages of the software
development life cycle. These phases are integrated through a data dictionary
Booysen, Kasselman, Eloff 1
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(repository) to share common information. As various CASE tools appeared to support
different phases of the system life cycle, the term upperjfront), middle, lower (back) and- - -
· integrated CASE were used to refer to these CASE tools.
_Probable the best way to define a CASE tool is -as a tool that assists its user in 'the
. "
. ' .. " . . . . . . '.'"
accomplishment of a given task, by providing support for one or more of the activities
of the system life cycle. Eventually one or more of these activities will be automated.
When the idea of modelling [4] is appliedto system development, functions to be
, performed by the system are abstracted and depicted in a visual way using conventional
- ' '
diagramming techniques. ,Using a process-data approach, three types of di~grams are
used, to depict the functionality 'pf the system, namely a context diagram, entity
... . . ~
relationship diagram and various types of data flow diagrams.
-,
Today CASE tools are used as a standard in system development to draw various data
modelfingdiagrams and to depict the movement of data throughout a system. However,
most of the mainstream C~'SE tools have a lack of security definition facilities. The
main reasons for this are [6]:
•
•
*
loss of performance of the final application with the addition of security features,
loss of flexibility because of restrictions and confinements on the target system's
behaviour, and
higher costs in system creation to account for analysis of the security
requirements, design and implementation of the security specifications, and
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maintenance of security in the system.
. As a data flow diagram represents the end user's view of the application system the
best, it can also serve as input mechanism in analysing the logical movement of data
throughout a system. It would also be feasible to add security features to the
application system underdevelopment during "the high level design of the application
"system, i.e., when d~ra~ng and defining the various data flow diagrams.
This paper presents the research work undertaken to investigate the relevance of using
" "
an Automated SC)ftware Generati?l) Environment (ASGE) to include information s.ecurity
as part of application·systems~To avoid confusion, the term ASGE is used In this paper
to denote CASEidOls that SOPP9rt the entire life cycle.
. 2. Security within ASGE
Figure 1 presents an overview of the components of an generalised automated software
.:-. . _.. ",:..' .'..... :..-
generation environment These components form a set of dependent processes with
an external interface, the user, and an internal interface between the processes, the
. repository. The user requirements are taken as input and an application system is
provided as output. The scope of the components covers the phases of an integrated
CASE tool.
An automated software generation environment (ASGE) provides the analyst/designer
with facilities for drawing, describing and defining initial user requirements. After
Booysen, Kasselman, EJoff 3
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ambiguities and platitudes have been removed'from initialuser requirements, the analyst
transforms written user requirements into visual representations. Entity relationship and
data flow diagrams are mainly used to present the end users view of the system in a
visual~. These diagrams are revi_sed~un~ttheuser is satisfied that his requirements
are met. The fmalversions of these diagrams are stored in an integrated form in a
central repository. The system definition as a whole is checked for consistency and
completeness, by using the repository to analyse the content of each diagram. After
consistency checks have been performed, database tables and code are generated,
before the live database is loaded. [4][7][8][9]
Various ASGE tools are available for automated software design, but none of these
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make any attempt to consider security and integrity as part of system development. As
a result, a need arises for an Extended Automated Software Generation Environment
(EASGE) which addresses security during the development of Application Systems.
Figure 2 presents an overviewof EASGE.
Rmse
+~~ L EAJt.DFD -..( t~
•
04~ " ••
y,
t
The yellowpart in figure2 representsthe "traditional" development activities of an ASGE
(see figure 1). As mentioned an ASGE provides the analyst with facilities for drawing,
describing and defining user requirements by means of dataflow diagrams. After the
dataflow diagram has been analysed for completeness and consistency I the EASGE
expands on the standard user requirements, by introducing 5 security requirements,
Booysen, Kasselman, Eloff 5
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namely:
2.1. Detennine infonnation flow types: Objects are connected on a data flow diagram by
means of an arrow symbol. By studying the direction of the arrow symbol, EASGEcan
automatically distinguish whether the actiont>.~~n two Objects is a read or a Write
. . ., action. For example. if lnformation flows from a process to a data store, it can be
automaticallydet~ned that the flow type is a write action. Similarly. information flowing
",'from a data store to a process is a read action- .
.•A shortcoming of these flow actions is
..~ . Read
. that' only ~" '.f1ow· tYpes· are
.. ..... . A~d
. considered. namely read.and write. In _ ...
a-cOmmercial application system, one
Should be able to distJnguishbetween
read, write,append, update and delete
- ~ .'" .. . " . :-
Update
Delete'
--1--
--~O-
x·
Figure 3: Information flowtypes
actions. When inspecting the action
involved in an appendupdate and delete.action it is evident that these actions require
. . ,
.
a specific write action. For example, when appending information to a file, a complete
new record is added to the file, without reading any information. When a file is updated,
a read action is required to view the information before changes are made (write) to the
information. Similarly, a delete action requires a "blank" write to a file. Therefore it is
necessaryfor EASGE to prompt the analyst to indicate the specific "write" action that is
involved, i.e., delete, update or append. Figure 3 portrays the various arrow symbols that
can be used in EASGE to indicate the action that an Object performs.
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pertorms.
2.2. Allocate security classes to o~jects: EASGE will assist the analyst in allocating a
security Class to each objeet(extemal entity, process, data store) on the data flow
diagram, based on "his assessment of the sensitivity level of the information.contained
in the object .The security class allocated to an object indicates the amount of
information contained in the' object that can be regarded sensitive. Opjects, for
example.can be classified as top secret" secret, confidential or unclassified.
2.3. Object Matrix: A data flow diagram portrays the direction of information flow in a
system. The direction of information flow shows actions (read, append etc) of certain
objects 'on otti~r objects. These actions can be usedto construct an Object Matrix. An
object matrix is a rectangular array in which objects from which information flows are
mapped onto objects towhlch information flows. The entry for a particular row and
. , ,
column reflects the information f10wtype (read, append, update or delete) between the
corresponding objects. This kind of access where information flows directly between
objects, is referred to as binary access. Binary access only focuses on the operations
that cause information to flow between two neighbouring objects, linked to one another
by means of an arrow symbol. Thus, an object matrix contains both valid and invalid
binary flow actions between objects. For example, if a top secret object reads
information contained in a confidential object, the binary flow between the two objects
would be valid, but if a confidential object reads information from a top secret object, the
binary flow woud be invalid.
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Forexample, in figure 4,Objecte is
reading information contained in
ObjectA (indicated by the arrow
symbol pointing from ObjectA to'
:Objec:tA
Confidc::atiaI
ObjcctB
TopSeacl
objectc
i Read
,
Objecta>.. This. is indicated by
. inserting Read in the.Object Matrix .
(table 1), at the inters~onof Row
Figure .4: .ExaInple data flowdiagram
Objec:tD
Top8ea'et
1. Column 2. The Append in table 1 (row 2, column 3) indicates that Objects is
~ - .• , .. -. '. -... '
, ;:.~;;o;. -.. '
.. ' . ~. ~ .'; -. . ".
. appending informationto Objedo Similarly, the intersection of Row 3, Column 4, (Read)
. .., . ," '. . '. ~ .: ---
indicates that inforTnation:eontained inObjecte is read by Objedo-
Append
Read
T;;lble 1: Object·~atrix
2.4. Revised Object Matrix: As an Object Matrix only contains valid and invalid binary
information flows, it has no intelligence to detect a situation as: Object, 0 Object, 0
Objecfc OObjedo. to condude that there is an indirect information flow between ObjectA
andObjedo Therefore, it is also necessary to consider the flow type that exists between
objects not linked directly to each other, but rather indirectly by means of intermediate
objects. We refer to this kind of information flow as Compound Information
-,
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Flow. The objective of a revised object matrix is to summarise all valid as well as invalid
binary and compound information flows. Therefore the revised object matrix in table 2
includes all valid and invalid binary information flow (table 1) as well as valid and invalid
compound information flow, . for ourexample in figure 4.
. -,
The algo~m for determining valid and invalid binary and compound information flow
can be found in Annexure 'A '
',. ...
Table 2;- Revised Object Matnx
,
Colum·rj·;.1~ ':Cofu"mn2:, ts~!'[ffi~~~?41.:14:r::'~f:( i~91~¥~:,~~t~~S~~~~'~:~~;&,w _," ••• =r-: .:"7.:&.:L~ ;,.;.-,-:._~. ;.s;-~ • .'::i'
~~~~:·~f~i~~~:=;~':"~k~~~:,r-~--:':~~1f~~~z}~t~'rf~~~:;~.re·, ~~'~;!J{~~:'~.'?~~''::_~7::a;,._......~~. '._'.':.4~~ _:~~~~~='~·i".;.~~~~.'.l:
I1ciVl~21 ~~ Read ". COmpound information flow Compound inform~tion flow
.~~.
" AppendRow:2,;~;f~~ " Compound,information flow.r.·-:;-," ~,""",..J!;,p.•• "
-, ia-,·~....-"t;r.l·~,Rovla~! .: Read'~,.__ ._-ft
R1;~~;O~
.' 'U:: .* •.-.i't
. , .
Comparing the content of table 1 and table 2, it is evident that in table 1, the type of
binaryinforrriationflow be~eenobjectsisindicated as either read, append, update or
delete, whereas, in table ?' the compound information flow between objects is indicated
as "Compound information flow", From this it is evident that a problem arises as to
what the indirect flow action should be.
2.4.1. Compound information flow types
In determining the compound information flow type, the rationale of the "grant" right in
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the Take-Grant [10] model is used. The objective is to determine the "combined" flow
type that could exist between:
?
," .. ~: ApPend I ! _
;()bjedB . : .; ObjedC '
,--_...;J~
.'
ObjectA and Objecte. Object, and
Objecfo, and Obj~cta and Objecto in ': !ObjcctA
theexample presented in figure 5...
.In detemlining,the compound flow,':~
type that exist between ObjectA and
? ~ObjedD
"':
Objecfc it is necessary to substitute the append floW type between Objecte and Objecte
with,write:'This allows one to indicate a sp~,Cffic binary and compound flow type in terms
of the actuaractionthat occurs. As an update flOW requires iniorm~on to be read before.
--' " ..' .;'. . :":"".." .
'.- '.~ ; . ..'-
.... -.".
it is written to 'another object, the update floW type can be substituted with read-write.
- '
The delete flow type is not considered, as, when infonnation is deleted, the information
no longer exists, therefore infonnation cannot be transferred to other objects. If only
some of the attributes are deleted, it would indicate that the remaining information can
., - .. ' . . .
.
flow to-other objects. The prototype presented in this paper, doesn't consider this fine
granularity, but assume that all information contained in the object is deleted. However
it is recognised in this paper, that the concept of multilevel databases [11] will assist the
developer in enforcing security down to an attribute level.
Possible combinations of compound access between objects are depicted in table 3,
Booysen, Kasselman, Boft 10
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IBetwlien6'bjec~''cincfObject;.z~~~~,;''IBetweeri' dbjec4~:and Objec~"-:I
Read . Append (l.e., Write)
.-
Read Update (Le., Read-Write)
Read
- '~ .. ,' - -
Read.
.--
Append (i.e., Write) Read
, Append (i.e•• Write) .', Append (i.e.,' Write)
,
Append (i.e:,.Write) Update.(i.e., Read-Write)
-:
uPdate (i.e., Read-'!ime):.. Read! '.
. '
. ' ..
,',
Read-Write) .Updat~~(Le:, Read-Write)Update '(i.e., .--.. .-
Update'-(i.e.,.Read-Write) Append (i.e., Write)
.
.. Table 3: Possible compound comblnatlons-'
- . . ..-.. .
..., .From table 3 it should be 'clear that a compound flow type can only exists between at
. "".;-' _. ". ~
le~s~ 3 objects. A 'comp~und'tiow type is determinecfby studying the compound flow
,between three objects. These objects need not to be neighbouring objects, i.e., linked
directly to one another by means of an arrow symbol.
A compound flow type is then determined between the first object and the third object,
. . - , .
, .
using the outcome of the combinations as summarized in table 4.
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Read
Read
Append (i.e.• Write) Update
Update (i.e;/Read-Write) _. ,"Update
Read
.:;: Append {i.e., Write),
';AppendO.e., Writ~) -:' .'
.: Append O.e., Write) ,
Read
Read
Append O.~:;\~Jrite)
Update,O.e;: Read-Write)
Read '0
" , ". ", "
, Read(i"
O' •• ' ...... ~ .. "
~pend
,Update
Update (l.e., Read-Write)
.:. " • .'r '
Update (i.e.i'Read~Write)"
Update (i.e., Read':'Write)
Read .\
" .Read '."
-Update
Update (i.e~.Read-Write) Append O.e.,Write) Read
Table 4: Compound access rules
The "newlt' formed information flow type is then used '~s 'the ,"first" flow type" jn':
determining the compound flow type between the next 2 objects. For example if the
flow type between Object, andObject, is Read. and the flow type between Object2 and
Object, is Append (write). we obtain a Read-Write flow type. Read-Write indicates an
update action. therefore the compound action between Object, and Object, is Update.
. .~ .
-,. -..
,'i·
The ~ow type between Object, and Object3, now serves as the first information flow
type. to determine the compound flow type between Object, and Object.. If the flow
type between Object, and Object, is Read, then the compound flow between Object,
and Object, would be Read. (The combination of Update - between Object, and Object,
- and Read between Object, and Object~).
Applying the compound flow types (table 4) to our example in figure 5, compound
information flow types (table 2), can now be substituted with information flow types
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(figure3). Thus, the Revised Object Matrix for our example (figure 5) is presented as
follows (table 5):
Append. Read
Read
2.5.· Security Revised Object ,Matrix
So far, EASGE has determined the information flow types (read, update, append or
delete) between objects on a dataflow diagram. Also, binary and compound information
flows were determined. However, these infonnation flows contain valid as well as
invalid information flows (see paragraph 2.3). From a security viewpoint, the question
arisesas to when the binary and compound information flows would be valid or invalid.
Valid binary andvalid compound information flows are determined by using the security
classes assigned to objects (see paragraph 2.2), and by applying access rules stating
when a flow is valid or invalid. In EASGE a Security Revised Object Matrix is used to
summarise all valid binary and valid compound information flows. Before determining
the valid flows for our example in figure 5, it is necessary to formulate rules (access
rules) stating when a binary or compound information flow would be valid, or invalid.
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2.5.1. Binary access rules
Binary access rules as defined in context of EASGE are as follows:
Read: Object, can only read information contained in Objecte• if the security class of
object, is equal or greater than the security class of Objecte.
Append: Object, can append information, to Objecte, if the security class of object, is
equal or smaller than the security class of Objecte.
Update: Usually when an object updates another object, only a few attributes are
updated. The object updating another object thus needs to have clearance to update
the required attributes of the other object. In other words, Object, can update
information contained in Objecte, if the security class of the object, is equal or greater
than the security class of Objects. Although the updating of information requires one to
consider information in an object on an attribute level, the prototype as proposed in this
paper, will not consider this fine granularity of information. However it is recognised in
this paper, that the concept of multilevel databases [11] will assist the developer in
enforcing security down to an attribute level.
Delete: When an object deletes information contained in another object. either the
entire object or some attributes in the object are deleted. Depending on the type of
deletion. the object deleting information contained in another object, must have
clearance to delete the required information. Therefore, Object, can delete information
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contained.in Objects, if the security class of Object, is equal or greater than the security
class of Objects.
The binary access rules for the for security classes, namely unclassified, confidential,
secret and top secret, are summarised in the table 6.
u C 5 TS
U R,U,D,A A A A
C R,U,D R,U,D,A A A
S R,U,D· R,U,D R,U,D,A A
TS R,U,D R,U,D R,U,D R,U,D,A
Note: U - Unclassified
R - Read
C - Classified
A-Append
S - Secret TS- Top secret
U - Update D - Delete
. In our example in figure 4, a confidential security class was assigned to Object., a
secret security class to Objects, a top secret security class to Objecte, and a top secret
security class to Objecte. As Objects is reading information contained in Object., the
security class of Objects must be equal or greater than the security class of Object..
according to the binary access rules (see table 6). As the security class of Objects is
secret and the security class of Object, is confidential, a valid binary flow exists between
Object, and Objects·
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As Objects is appending information to Object, the security class of Objectc must be
equal or greater than the security class of Objects. according to the binary access rules.
As the security class of Objecte is secret and the security class of Object, is top secret.
a valid binary flow exists between Objects and Objectee
As Objecte is reading information contained in Objecte. the security class of Objecte
must be equal or greater than the security class of Objecte. according to the binary
access rules. As the security class of Objecte is top secret and the security class of
;
Objedo is top secret, a valid binary flow exists between Objecte and Objectee
2.5.2. Compound access rules
As a single flow type exists between compound flows, the binary access rules can be
applied to check whether the compound flow is valid or not.
A compound information flow type (update) exists between Object" and Objecte (see
figure 5). As Object" is updating Objecte the security class o,fObject" must be equal or
greater than the security class of Objecte. according to the binary access rules (table
6). As the security class of Object" is confidential and the security class of Object, is
top secret, an invalid binary flow exists between Object" and Object; Therefore the
compound information flow between Object" and Object,'must be removed from the
revised object matrix. EASGE would point out this error to the analyst.
Also a compound information flow type (read) exists between Object, and Object; As
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Objecto is reading information contained in Object; the security class of Objecto must
be equal or greater than the security class of Objectj; according to the binary access
rules. As the security class of Object, is confidential and the security class of Object,
is top secret, a valid compound information flow exists between Object, and Object.;
Also a compound information flow type (read) exists between Objectg and Objedo. As
Objecto is reading information contained in Object, the security class of Objecto must
be equal or greater than the security class of Objects, according to the binary access
rules. As the security class of Objectg is secret and the security class of Objedo is top
secret, a valid compound information flow exists between Objectg and Objecto.
A Security Revised Object Matrix is constructed to summarize valid binary and valid
compound information flow types. For our example, the Security Revised Object Matrix
in table 7 can be constructed.
, , .... ,
" ...
CoJu lT1rt-1 Column 2 Colul1Jn'3 'Column 4:,
-- .. "
K :-i;;'1t:;.s"j·. 'If f~' .. .. " <.': '-::.~ :~.. - .-"'. .-- 'c o ~;:;":...,. '.:"
. -- "-< , - .,
-
Row 1 A Read Update Read
Row 2 r 8 -, Append Read
, -:-;'.-
Row3 C Read
Row 4 , - D
.Table 7: Secunty Revised Object Matnx
2.6. Remainder EASGE activities
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Having determined all valid binary and valid compound information flow types (see table
7), EASGE compares the Revised Object Matrix (table 5) and the Security Revised
Object Matrix (table 7) with one another, to determine invalid binary and invalid
compound information flows. A flow is invalid if an entry is found in the revised object
matrix and not in the security revised object matrix. EASGE highlights these invalid
flows on the data. flow diagram, by means of connecting the origin and destination
objects responsible for an invalid flow.
EASGE now presents the analyst with suggestions to address invalid flows so as to
improve the security of the application system under development. Suggestions could
include recommendations to change the security classes assigned to objects. For
example, if an invalid binary information flow. occurs, EASGE would recommend that a
change in the security class of the object responsible for the invalid binary information
flow, would allow for a valid binary flow. If the security class of Objedo in our example
. was undassified, the binary information flow between Objecte and Objedo would have
been invalid. EASGE would then have recommended to change the security class of
Objedo to top secret. Another suggestion might be to propose the use of a sanitizer
object.
A sanitizer object will ensure that only valid information received from an object with a
higher security class are filtered through to an object with a lower security class and that
only valid information received from an object with a lower security class are filtered
through to an object with a higher security class. For example, EASGE can suggest
a sanitizer object where an object has read information before appending information.
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If a sanitizer object is inserted between Objects and Object.; it will only allow secret
information contained In-Object, to be appended to Object., as Objects has read
confidential information from ObjectA•
It should be noted that EASGE models user requirements on a high level. Although
EASGE suggest that information should be filtered form objects with a higher security
classification to objects with a lower security classification, the prototype presented
doesn't implement information filtering in detail.
I
The analyst is now presented with the option to change the design diagrams, based on
the security issues mentioned above, or to proceed to generate database tables. If he
decides to execute the "change d~sign" option, he will have the opportunity to
"redesign" the system diagrams with the added security requirements. When satisfied
with the security level of the application system, database tables and code is generated
before the live database is loaded.
3. Discussion of the prototype (DFDSEC)
A prototype EASGE tool has been developed which addresses the grey part in figure
6. The prototype is named DFDSEC, as it only concentrates on including security
activities as proposed by EASGE to the high level design diagrams (data flow diagrams)
of an application system.
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FJ8lU'C 6: DFDSEC in <XXItCZl ofEASGE
When OFDSEC is loaded itpresents the designer with a Graphical User Interface (GUI)
as depicted in figure 7. The GUI consists of three parts, namely a DFD window (A), a
toolbar (B), and an options bar (C).
The DFD window is used by the designer to represent user requirements in a visual way,
i.e., by means of a data flow diagram. Drawing tools are contained within the toolbar and
are presented by the process icon, sanitizer process icon, external entity, data store and
data flow objects. The "0" symbol in figure 7 indicates the drawing tools. The "E" symbol
in figure 7 indicates utility tools. The options bar (indicated by "C" in figure 7) allows the
designer to change the line style, width and drawing colours. The "F" symbol in figure 7
indicates tools that can be used to analyze the data flow diagram. Analysing a data flow
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diagram entitles that the information flow between objects on the DFD are examined ir
terms of security and integrity requirements as described in paragraph 2.1 to 2.6. The
remainder of tools are utility tools, used to save and load a diagram, exit the prototype
and start a new data flow diagram.
The Gane-Sarson modelling technique serves as basis for DFDSEC. A detailec
description of this technique can be found in reference [12].
To illustrate how DFDSEC works, an example will now be presented
3.1 Working of DFDSEC
Consider the following user requirements
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An application is needed wfth a process that can calculate salaries for employees
of a large company. There is an existing database containing employee data,
for instance personal data and rate per hour paid. The process appends salary
data to a data file. A salary clerk needs access to the salary data so as to
resolve ad-hoc enquiries, for example average salaries.
I EE-J!ISaImy c1cd:
A
Write
-( p.J ~l~jf--~~·EI'"7""
t I
I ~IIReed II {P-2d U Reuieve~~loy=dam l dam
Using the drawing tools of OFDSEC. the designer has transfonned the user requiremems
into a visual representation as depicted in figure 8. Objects on the data flow diagram
(figure 8) are connected by means of arrow symbols, so as to indicate the direction of
information flow within the system.
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After the designer had placed the objects on the drawing board and connected them by
means of arrows, DFDSEC automatically determines the information flow type between
objects on the data flow diagram. DFDSEC then automatically labels the flow type
between "Employee data" and "Calculate salaries" as Read, the flow type between
"Calculatesalaries" and "Salary data" as write etc.
DFDSEC can only determine whether the information flow type between objects are Read
orWrite. Therefore, once a flow type is labelled as write, OFOSEC prompts the designer
to expand the Write action to indicate whether it is an Append, Delete or Update action.
As the user requirements indicates that data is appended from the "Calculate salaries"
object to the "Salary data" object, the designer changes the write action to an Append
action, as portrayed in figure 9.
~
I
Rc.dj
!
I
P-2 1 I
Rtmcve L.-J
I
----~/
~MSalsry dIIIa
.,.1...
t
IRead
I
ID-li~cbta
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The designer now selects the analyzer icon. (indicated by "F" in figure 7) to indicate to
DFDSEC that the data flow diagram can now be analyzed in terms of security and
integrity requirements. The analysing process occurs internally, as described in
paragraphs 2.2 to 2.5.2.
The allocation of security classes to objects (described in paragraph 2.2) is depicted in
figure 10. The project leader has indicated that the following security classes should be
assigned to the process, data files and external entity objects:
Calculate salaries (process):
Employee data (data file):
Salary data (data file):
Salary clerk (external entity):
Retrieve data (process):
Booysen, Kasselman, Eloff
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P-l
Retrieve
dam
EE-l
Read
The matrices presented below will therefore not be presented to the designer. They are
merely shown here for explanation purposes.
Object Matrix:
Calculate Employee Retrieve Salary Salary clerk
salaries data data data
I I
Calculate salaries I Append ,!
Employee data Read II
,
Retrieve data I Read
Salary data Read II
-
Salary clerk I I !;
--
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Revised Object Matrix:
Read
Read
Read
Update
Salary Salary
-.. ~ ...~" ~ ..
data clerk
Append ReadRead"
Read
Read,
~~.::ii-'_ ~~~:.:0~';~,i':':7-__
'd~titi''-_,T,?;~~_, datasalaries
Security Revised Object Matrix:
. "-'';'
;:Caicujat~~~ eiif Ic:te~~~ " ,.,'~" Sal~!y~ 'Sa1aJ"'~~"H'Retrieve ":::~,Y!i\}.I" i{~it' ~=i;~;;:',~~E?"~ ':~~~~~§$: :'\I1.~"';~"Ii:.J"rt.~~~:~_~ff~~~~~-salarie ':;:f~': data ;~:. ~ '":~~ aata'~~~? :-clerk'~':':J'
Ilii2~!_: ,
-,~~!~"pic;ye~'~ata Read Read Update Read
Yietri~v~-'d~ta .- .. .-
-'.=".- .
:S.t·i~,ydata<;:,'~ .- .' Read
-
,..,.-....-
-,
"Salary clerk
DFDSEC now compares the Revised Object Matrix and the Security Revised Object
Matrix to determine invalid information flows. DFDSEC would point out that the binary
flow from "Retrieve data" to "Salary clerk" is invalid, (indicated by the red line from
"Retrieve data" to "Salary clerk" in figure 10) as the Salary clerk can only read
information which has a confidential or unclassified clearance. DFDSEC would suggest
that the security class of the Salary clerk be raised to be at least the same as the
Booysen, Kasselman, Eloff 26
'! I
Enforcing Information Security during the development of Application Systems
security class of "Retrieve data", i.e. Secret.
DFDSEC prompt the designer to indicate whether he would like to change the security
class of the Salary clerk. As the user requirements stated that the salary clerk requires
read access to "Salary data" via the "Retrieve data" object, to resolve ad-hoc enquiries,
"'
the designer has reasoned that he needs to change the security class of the Salary clerk
to Secret. This is indicated in figure 11.
c
EE-l
s
I ~ ~C!.l_dara.~ -z __
, ,
,
TS
r;;.p 'j=AppcDd===~L~~~:--
\... J
DFDSEC would also point out that the binary flow from "Calculate salaries" to "Satary
data" is invalid, as infonnation flows from a top secret object ("Calculate salaries") to a
secret object ('Salary dataj. Due to the downflow of infonnation DFDSEC suggests that
a sanitizer object be inserted between the "Calculate salaries" and "Salary data"
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objects. .
DFDSEC prompt the designer to indicate whether he would like to insert a sanitizer
object between the "Calculate salaries" and "Salary data" objects. Examining the user
requirements, the designer concluded that once salaries have been calculated, it is
necessary to append salary data to the Salary data file, so that the Salary clerk can
resolve enquiries. Therefore, the designer has opted to insert the sanitizer object. This
is indicated in figure 12.
The justification for inserting a sanitizer object is due to an information flow between the
"Calculate salaries" object (which is top secret) and the "Salary data" object (which is
secret). The sanitizer object will facilitate the flow of information from a top secret to a
secret object, in order to over right the rule that information cannot be appended from
a object with a higher security class to a object with a lower security class (see append
rule in paragraph 2.5.1). Since DFDSEC is currently implemented as a design tool the
implementation detail of the sanitizer is as yet not been addressed. Possibilities for
implementing a sanitizer object can include multilevel database concepts [11].
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Having changed the security class of the Salary clerk and inserted a sanitizer object
DFOSEC automatically re-analyses the data flow diagram depicted In figure i 1 The
various matrices constructed internally are presented below
Object Matrix:
Calculate Employee Sanitizer Salary Retrieve Salary I!
:
salaries data object data data clerk :
I
I'
Calculate salaries Flow ,.j L
I , IiEmployee data Read i i I.
I . d I IiSanitizer object I "I r.;)pen
\ i;,
Salary data I Read I I.I;, ,
I I \ I I !Retrieve data i J ~~2:! ,
--'
I , I I iSalary clerk I \:, )~
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Note: The flow type between "Calculate salaries" and the "Sanitizer object" is indicated
as flow, as information is transferred from the "Calculate salaries" object to the
"Sanitizer object" to prevent information to flow from an object with a higher
security class to an object with a lower security classification. The security "class
of any "Sanitizer object" defaults to Top secret.
Revised Object Matrix:
;?iz. ..._.~._. ",. O:.":,"::J, . .-:;'.: ¥.~
Ccilculatesalaries'
.~'::" -'. _ _~..., -,,-~.:,,'J.:..;..-.-_ ~
Security Revised Object Matrix:....
Flow
Flow
Append Read
Read
Read
Read
Read
Calculate salaries'
... :"-.-.--
Calculate. E~ployee-: Sanitizer Salary
~~ji~i~~~~~:J:;l~~'t~~~"Objec/;'~~ data
Flow
Retrieve Salary
data clerk
Employee data ~,-' Read
·C ."
Sanitizerobject ~
Salary data···~,
Retrieve data .
Salary clerk
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Although the Append between the "Sanitizer object" and "Salary. data" are invalid
according to table 6, the sanitizer object would only allow secret information to flow to
the "Salary data" object. Therefore the flow would be valid. The same argument
applies to the flow between the "Sanitizer object" and the "Retrieve data" and "Salary
clerk" objects.
DFDSEC now compares the Revised Object Matrix and the Security Revised Object
Matrix to determine invalid information flows. As no invalid information flows exist, l.e.,
all entries in the Revised Object Matrix is contained in the Security Revised Object
Matrix, the real environment (EASGE) would proceed to generate databases tables and
code.
4. Conclusion
The advantage of using an EASGE tool when developing a system, has several benefits
to the security state of the systemunderdevelcprnent. First, it allows most object
interactions to be determined automatically using the high-level design diagrams (data
flow diagrams) of the system. Secondly, a revised object matrix ensures that all valid
and invalid combinations of information flow are considered during system development.
Thirdly, the security class assigned to an object is considered while developing the
system. This allows security to become an integrated part of application system
development.
Booysen, Kasselrnan, Eloff 31
1\\ \1
Enforcing Information Security during the development of Application Systems
DFDSEC is an example of a possible mechanism which automatically enforces secure
information flow during the high-level development of an application system. The
insertion of a security handling object (Sanitizer object) allows for more realistic design,
in that information is allowed to flow down to objects with a lower security classification,
under the watchful eye of both the designer and the security CASE tool, DFDSEC.
DFDSEC is a prototype which contributes to the enhancement of existing CASE
environments so to automatically (as far as possible) enforce security aspects into
application systems designed with the assistance of CASE tools.
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